PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

BOSTON, MASS., MAY 18, 1942

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Psychoanalysis was born in 1893 when Freud and Breuer published a paper which laid the foundation for an organized discipline of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Nine years later, in 1902, an informal group of scientists gathered about Freud in Vienna. In 1908 there was an informal conference in Salzburg, and in 1910 the first International Psychoanalytic Congress was held in Nuremburg and the International Association was founded. In February 1911 the New York Psychoanalytic Society was organized; in May of the same year Doctor Brill and Ernest Jones arranged the first meeting of an American Psychoanalytic Association in Washington. In 1932 the American Association became a federation of psychoanalytic societies.

This year, therefore, marks the tenth anniversary of the organization of our Association in its present form, and lacks one year of being the fiftieth anniversary of the inception of psychoanalysis. For these reasons, it seemed appropriate to me to use this occasion to reflect audibly upon the structure and function of our organization in relation to psychoanalysis as a science, and its meaning not only for the world but for us who practice it.

We are gathered today in one of those annual incidents of coming together which characterize all scientific groups and, indeed, all human groups. We here have many things in common but the one thing in common which brings us together at this moment and under these auspices is our interest in a

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Some of the material of this address was taken from a chapter in a forthcoming book by the author entitled *Love Against Hate*, to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Company, October 1942.

certain technique for understanding human beings and for treating some of them who need it and want us to do so, and for organizing and elaborating the conclusions we draw from our observations. We are committed to the principle that as human beings we ourselves are not exempt from the laws we have discovered by this technique; indeed, we believe that until we have made a study of ourselves as individuals we cannot accurately appraise or assist others. It would seem legitimate to extend this principle to the examination of our organization.

I shall, therefore, review for your consideration some of our theories about group structure in general and shall then submit some ideas regarding the structure of our own organization in particular and the effect upon it of three significant events of recent times:

1. The growth of psychoanalysis in America.
2. The death of Sigmund Freud.
3. The explosion of a world war.

I shall begin in a most general way by directing your attention to the ways in which human beings attach themselves to one another in groups in a supposedly nonsexual way. This has been called gregariousness and described by some, more eloquently than accurately, as due to a 'herd instinct' [1] similar to that which impels the flocking of certain birds and herding of beasts in large assemblies. But there is no need to postulate any such special instinct. Men gather together at times for practical reasons of greater economy or greater safety or greater power; such gatherings are not motivated by any instinct, either a 'herd instinct' or the instinct of love. But there are other gatherings, gatherings that occur daily, hourly, in a million villages and by roadsides and hearthsides, in which the affection of people for each other is the moving spirit. In the custom to which our own country is so particularly given, of organizing clubs, societies, associations, unions, and the like, one can see a spontaneous tendency toward increasing the opportunities for knowing and understanding one another. It is an unusual

[1] Trotter, W.: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1916.

individual who does not to some extent enjoy meetings and gatherings, and we are all better for them.

Freud [2] ascribed the cohesiveness of the group to a common devotion to a leader, a devotion in which the hostile elements are kept in abeyance through a kind of tacit recognition that ultimately he—the leader—will be replaced by one of the followers, who meanwhile suspend all mutual hostilities. Each follower thus identifies himself with the leader, and hence to some extent with all the other followers. The successful leader must manage to keep the constantly accumulating aggressions of the group discharged by directing them to this or that *external* danger or project. Such a reinforcement and concentration of emotion is like a Leyden jar; it has an enormous potential and can be exploited by psychopathic leaders to accomplish great harm. Examples of this are to be seen in the career of Adolf Hitler, in lynchings and other mob violences, and even in some 'good' organizations which suffer for a time under 'bad' leaders.

But honest leaders, who will not distort reality to manufacture 'enemies' in order to increase internal solidarity, are far more numerous than dishonest and psychopathic leaders; the latter are only more conspicuous. And in organization and group association, formal and informal, there is an investment of love which is mutually reinforcing, and, hence, highly desirable.

In our own work we have had many opportunities to observe this in connection with medical organizations. The average citizen has no idea how thoroughly and intricately medical men are organized. The American Medical Association has been accused of being the most powerful trust in the world and a great many unfavorable things have been said about it. The fact remains that it is largely responsible for having brought American medicine to its present high peak of accomplishment. Selfish and shortsighted it has undoubtedly been at times, but it has held up standards of education, publication, medical

[2] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* London: Int. Psa. Press, 1922

research, and medical ethics from which every citizen in this country has profited. It is not my point to attack or defend the American Medical Association, however, but only to comment that this powerful organization is made up of perhaps the most individualistic and unorganizable of all citizens.

But we all belong not only to the Americal Medical Association and to our county medical societies but to many other medical organizations. Most of us belong to the American Psychiatric Association which is scientifically the parent organization of the present body. Now that our orientation in regard to psychoanalysis has taken definite form and we recognize that we are physicians first, psychiatrists second, and psychoanalysts third, I feel strongly that our membership in the American Psychiatric Association should become unanimous. The gigantic strides which that organization has taken in establishing psychiatry and, incidentally, psychoanalysis in its proper place in American medicine deserve our unwavering and undivided support. As I said to the New York Psychoanalytic Society two years ago, 'Psychiatry has been magnanimously and profitably hospitable to psychoanalysis in this country. Psychoanalysis should not be less hospitable, less open-minded, less aware of it responsibilities to psychiatry.'

One often hears complaints from physicians, psychoanalysts not excluded, to the effect that we have too much medical organization, too many meetings to attend. I should like to consider the reasons for the necessity of so much organization. One of these, practical, not psychological, is the need for consultation in the modern practice of medicine because of its growing complexity. The practice of medicine was at one time more art than science and even after it became more science than art, its requirements did not exceed the capacities of the average intelligence. At the present time, however, the field of medical science is so broad and so complicated that no human being could possibly master it. The result is that physicians lodge in various corners of the field, so to speak. It would seem entirely logical for groups of them to work together, to coöperate in the study and treatment of the sick patient from the

angles of various special fields of knowledge. The Mayo Clinic has proved in a magnificent way the potentialities of such medical coöperation. It is almost unnecessary to mention the fine work it has done for multitudes of patients, but it may be less familiar that this coöperation among physicians has enabled the Mayo Clinic to do two other things. First, it has furthered medical science by research and clinical observations equaling or surpassing those of any publicly endowed medical school in the world. The average physician cannot be expected to turn a considerable portion of his income into financing studies that will promote public health; but that is precisely what this coöperating group of private physicians has been able to do. More than that, there is a spirit of comradeship and affection among the physicians of the Mayo Clinic staff which is for many of them one of the chief rewards of their work together. I know of this from intimate contacts with them, and I see the same thing in my association with the colleagues in our own Clinic. I have practiced alone and I know some of the satisfactions of being so completely independent and self-sufficient; I have also practiced in a group, and I know the satisfactions of coöperating with colleagues instead of competing with them, of admitting one's mistakes and discussing without rancor the mistakes of others, of sharing a common purpose, common enthusiasms, and common disappointments. I know that these latter satisfactions are far greater.

It is surely a relevant question to ask why, under these circumstances, coöperative associations of physicians are not more frequent. There are probably many reasons for this, some of which are not pertinent to our theme. But I have often thought that the unconscious roots of the 'rugged individualism' which has so long characterized physicians are to be found in the peculiarly intimate interpersonal relationship between the doctor and his patient. Theoretically, the patient comes to the doctor to be relieved of pain. Theoretically, the doctor undertakes to relieve this pain, expecting nothing from the patient but the payment of a bill; but, actually, we know that the patient is motivated by unconscious expectations and

desires in the establishment of this relationship and so is the physician. The patient thinks he wants the doctor to treat him, but it becomes very apparent in some cases and it is inferentially true in many others that the patient wants more than this—he wants the doctor to give him something, to do something to him, to like him, even to love him. And, for his part, the doctor, while he wants his fee, also wants the patient to like him, to be grateful to him and, in a sense, to love *him*. Doctors do love their patients and their patients love them, and this is not an unhealthy situation, nor a deplorable one; it is a part of the process of healing and being healed. But, on the other hand, it is something which interferes with the association of doctors in a group because the emotional relationship that exists between physician and patient is personal, intimate, confidential and exclusive. Unless this is clearly understood and full allowance made for it, jealousies spring up. The real reason why most doctors are so violently opposed to state medicine is that they fear, with justice, that this emotional relationship between them and their patients would be seriously impaired by impersonal, mechanistic administration.

I come back to the necessity for organizations, and I shall pass over those practical aspects which will occur to everyone, such as official recognition, coöperation with other organized scientific bodies, the regulations of the principles of practice, the dissemination of new ideas, new experiments, new results. I want to emphasize again the psychological principles which Freud first pointed out and which we have all come to recognize more and more clearly. Organizations, and this does not exclude our own, exist because of the need of human beings for love. We need to neutralize the aggressions that well up within us—often, strangely enough, against those who have the most in common with us. To understand all is to forgive all, and to know one another well enough should not be to hate one another the more but to love one another the more. If we fail in doing so, something is wrong in our organization or something is wrong in us.

I would not have this construed to mean that our psycho-

analytic organization is more prone than others to fail in its task of relieving individual loneliness and controlling hostilities. The inherent danger in any group seems to be the tendency to become static so that the promise of growth in friendship is often unfulfilled.

There is often an insufficiently strong central interest or unity of purpose to keep the group welded together in a common goal; internal dissension, distrust, jealousy, overambitiousness and envy tend to overwhelm the erotic bond. Afraid of their own hostilities, the members shrink into smaller and smaller units or cliques or compensate for their own hollowness by an overemphasis on the snobbishness and exclusiveness of the group. A typical example is the petty gossiping and mutual hostility of the members of the proverbial small town sewing circle.

Naturally, the more homogeneous the club, the greater the peril in this quarter. The tendency of all groups to select members who resemble each other in some way, leads to rivalry on the one hand and to staleness on the other. One prophylactic measure against this danger is the periodic infusion of new blood, the addition of new members. This requires a readjustment of the emotional linkages of all members and affords intellectual stimulation as well. If the differences of the new members are as great as their resemblances, the club is strengthened to the extent that it can absorb the new and continue in a more cosmopolitan unity.

These general considerations relate to the particular problems of our own Association, and especially to the very rapid growth which it has been undergoing. Ten years ago we were born, and while we are still very young and very small compared to the great Psychiatric Association and medical associations, nevertheless, we have grown with great rapidity. There are now seven constituent societies and soon more groups will apply for membership. We have in training perhaps two hundred students so that by two or three years from now our membership will almost certainly be doubled. What was once like a little family gathering has now become as large a

meeting as can be comfortably handled in the average hotel convention room. Informality has gradually been replaced by a necessary formality, with certain consequent losses. Time after time we have had to change our constitution to fit our growing needs, and we shall have to do so many more times as we continue to grow. I can remember the New York Society when its average attendance was six or eight physicians who met in private homes. I remember sitting in the hall of an apartment for two hours one evening while the business session was in progress, following which one of the members reported some of his own experiences in analysis with Professor Freud. It is a far cry, too, from the time when teaching was an individual affair between two physicians to our present attempts to standardize and formalize our educational program.

In July last year I wrote each one of you asking for suggestions in regard to the changes that might be made in our Association. I received a great deal of helpful advice. Since that time I have conferred many times with the officers of the Association, with the Executive Council, with our indefatigable Secretary, Doctor Bartemeier. In accordance with the instructions of the Executive Council last year, Mr. Austin Davies, Executive Assistant to the American Psychiatric Association, made a survey of our constitution and made exceedingly helpful recommendations which were considered by the Executive Council. A few weeks ago I called a meeting of some of the older teaching analysts in Chicago and discussed with them the possible changes that might be made to adapt our ideals and teaching purposes to the larger needs of our organization.

On the basis of these various suggestions, proposals are now being discussed in Executive Council and in the Council on Professional Training. I will not go into detail about these except to say that it seems desirable that we should have a stronger central organization, that more authority should be given to the American Association by the constituent societies. We are probably not yet large enough to have a full-time executive secretary, but it is time that we changed from a loose organization of independent groups, to a more centrally directed

association. I have long felt, for example, that the appointment of training analysts ought to cease to be a local function and become a national function, or else that it should be relegated to the institutes which, in turn, should be responsible to the national association. The details of these plans will be proposed to you in due time in accordance with the procedure prescribed by our constitution.

We can expect difficulties and disagreements in the many changes that we are obliged to make in adapting ourselves to growth, but I do not see why we need to expect rancor and bitterness. Psychoanalysis is greater than the association of psychoanalysts, and the association is greater than any one of us or, for that matter, any group of us. If we are loyal to one another, loyal to our teacher and to the principles which he taught us, we shall not be overwhelmed by personal irritations and disagreements.

If these have been somewhat greater in the past year than in previous years, perhaps it can be related in no small measure to the disturbing effects upon all of us of the death of Freud. He himself anticipated some of these difficulties and I have the impression that he had this very much in mind, either consciously or unconsciously, when he wrote his last great contribution to human thought, Moses and Monotheism. Freud was our Moses and, like the children of Israel, we feel guilty in connection with his death, no matter how much we consciously regret it, and despite the fact that in reality we can be charged with no responsibility for it. How we react to that guilt depends upon our individual psychic structures. As Freud pointed out in his book, it is unimportant by whom Moses was killed or by whom Jesus was killed. What is important is the fact that the Jewish conscience reacts repeatedly in denial of the accusation, and this is intertwined with the tendency of some Christians to unload their own feelings of guilt onto the Jews instead of onto Jesus. Christians and Jews react to guilt feelings and react to them in ways which are superficially different but actually, in the last analysis, the same. Our tendency as analysts is to react to our guilt by attacks upon one another.

From our own science we know that the atonement often repeats the crime. Those who feel unable to atone for their sense of guilt may feel impelled to make overt attacks upon some symbol of the leader—his memory, his theory, his principles, or other followers—in self-justification. One recalls the querulous cry of a little man forty years ago: 'Must I stand always in Freud's shadow?'

These things we should all face. Our attitude towards Freud should certainly not be a religious one. Superstitious religion is based on the theory that men were made by a God in His own image. To recognize that man creates his God, as the ideal of a benign father and with the highest aspirations of human thought, is to exemplify the spirit of a civilized, intelligent religion not incompatable with rigorous scientific discipline. This spirit should determine our feelings towards Freud. The temptation to abandon the *elohim* concepts of single heartedness, loyalty, affection and peaceful coöperation for polytheistic Jahvistic concepts of conflict is to take flight from our unconscious guilt feelings in the vain illusion that by sufficient heterodoxy and a sufficient plurality of loyalties, one can avoid the penalties of patricide without incurring the penalties of faithlessness.

Freud was not our God; he was our Moses. But in his death we did not lose our leader. No matter how much more we learn, Freud will always be our leader, as Galileo will always be the leader of astronomers and Newton of physicists. His physical presence was not the important thing; Freud's principles, Freud's integrity, Freud's honesty, and, above all, Freud's discoveries—these are still with us; they will always be with us. It is not only our privilege to add to his discoveries, it is our duty. But it is neither our duty nor our privilege to attempt to accomplish self-advancement in the name of intellectual freedom by proclaiming criticisms of Freud or exploiting great discoveries of our differences with him. Nor is it our privilege to distort and misrepresent what he has said in order to make ourselves seem more sensible, more perspicacious, more 'decent' or more pious.

Let us suppose that forty-nine years after Columbus discovered America, an organization of scientifically-minded navigators and geographers had been formed who were convinced of the validity of the theory that the earth was round and that another continent existed to the West. All of them had themselves made the trip across the Atlantic and seen for themselves that it was true. Let us further assume that the members of this organization felt that great possibilities existed for the peoples of Europe and for the peoples of the world by making use of the discoveries of Columbus. Let us remember that at that time the vast majority of Europeans were still highly sceptical of such theories, and even scornful of this small group of 'believers'.

Now let us assume that some of the members of this organization became jealous of Columbus, envious of the credit and acclaim that were being given him as a result of the growth of the knowledge that what he had discovered was true. Perhaps some of these envious individuals began talking like this: 'Oh, yes, Columbus was a courageous fellow. He made a great discovery but his theories were all wrong. He thought he had proved that the world was round. He thought he had discovered the East Indies. All these things are absurd. He didn't prove that the earth is round; he only proved that it extends horizontally somewhat further than we thought. We appeal to your common sense, dear public. We, too, have sailed the seas and, in our experience, it is desirable to sail to the northwest instead of due west. Land is found sooner and, in our experience, it is land of a very different type from what Columbus described—much less tropical. Our colleagues are very arbitrary and dogmatic about this, and Columbus was a very narrow-minded man owing to his peculiar Genoese culture; he was only interested in finding a new route by which to obtain spices and silks. This gave him the peculiar delusion that the earth was round. Pay no attention to it but listen to us.'

The other members of the Navigators' Society, feeling that the continuation of exploration was the most important thing and that Columbus had enunciated the essential principles both

in theory and practice for this, would be considerably alarmed at these disparagers, fearing that the dissension and counter-suggestions would mislead an already sceptical and ignorant world, and they would object. They would object to the dissemination of these aspersions upon Columbus, these distortions of his motives and theories, these detractions from his greatness: 'Either you believe the world is round or you don't believe it', they would say. 'Either you follow the technique of sailing in a generally westward direction or you do not. If you do not do these things, it is dishonest to call yourselves Columbians.'

One can imagine that some of these dissenters would then say, 'You people are no longer scientists; you are sentimentalists. You are attempting to stifle free speech. Columbus is not a God. We do not need to worship him. We are independent. We shall leave you and appeal to the people. We shall prove to them that their common sense is quite right; that the world is not round and that land can be reached by sailing in other directions than merely west. You backward Columbus worshipers can go on thinking the world is round if you like. We are the *advanced* Columbians.'

I use this illustration to make the point that nothing is so unscientific as to lose sight of the main principles. These main principles include not only a recognition of the fundamental importance of Freud's discoveries but the recognition that for the sake of dignity, unity, and prestige, scientific differences of opinion must be confined to the halls of our meeting places rather than used to obtain popular support by appealing to the prejudices and so called common sense of persons unfamiliar with the details and history of the science.

My final topic is the relation of psychoanalysis to the world war in which our country is an active participant. The president of our Association last year appointed a Committee on Morale which I supplemented by further appointments during my administration. This Committee has been very active and has made its report to the Council. It would certainly seem as if psychoanalytic experience ought to be used in the present war, but it is not so clear just how, where and by whom it

should or can be used. Our Committee on Morale has worked hard without getting as far as they had hoped. I do not think we should be discouraged by this, but I think perhaps we should realign our ideas. We are, after all, a small group, a part of a much larger group of those familiar with human psychology and psychopathology, and it would seem to me to be expedient for us to work through the American Psychiatric Association rather than directly. The Army, the Navy and the Public Health Services recognize psychiatry; they do not recognize psychoanalysis, and I am not sure that in our present state of knowledge there is any reason why they should. We could not possibly take on an extensive treatment program even if it were requested of us, and our ideas in regard to morale, intelligence, the analysis of propaganda, etc. do not differ substantially from those held by the members of our parent organization. It seems to me that it behooves us as psychoanalysts at the present time to pay prime attention to our patients and not attempt to gain a foothold in political and governmental activities.

On the other hand, it seems to me not only the privilege but the duty of psychoanalysts to contribute to the thinking of those medical men and psychiatrists who are in positions of responsibility in the government and in the armed forces. This we can do by the contribution of pertinent theories and observations relevant to general and specific problems.

The more general principles involved in the war seem to me to be of the utmost importance to us psychoanalysts and it is to these that I think we could contribute the most. As Dr. Samuel Hartwell put it, in his presidential letter to the members of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, 'The world's confusion is caused by the fact that human beings, although fully intelligent enough to control the environment in a way to give a good life to all, fail to react to one another constructively, to agree or to understand one another sufficiently well to live together with a reasonable degree of civilized sociability'. The fundamental reason for this unsociability seems to me to be one to which psychoanalysis ought to be able to contribute

more than any other branch of science, since we have at our hands the techniques for discovering what is unconscious, and surely much of this must be unconscious. Human beings would not, for conscious 'rational' reasons, bring so much sorrow upon themselves.

It is from unconscious motives that 'we human beings plant in ourselves the perennial blossom of cruelty—the conviction that if we hurt other people we are doing good to ourselves and to life in general. To destroy this cancer of our spirit is our real problem.' (Rebecca West) It is the aggressive instincts, the impulses to self-destruction and the destruction of others, that seize every opportunity to make men miserable.

Basic principles survive all disasters, all threats. Our growing pains, the death of our first teacher, even the world conflagration—these will not alter science, science in general or psychoanalysis in particular. These things will not even retard its development. On the other hand, dissensions, secessions, personal feuds and personal exploitations—while they cannot destroy psychoanalysis—certainly can retard its development and injure its prestige. I am no believer in peace at any price but I am a great believer in the strength of unity and amity. There is enough fighting among the peoples of the earth. Let us, as American scientists, work together in harmony, tolerance, coöperation—and loyalty. In all the history of the world there was never a time in which loyalty was more important. 'United we stand, divided we fall' is trite, but it is true—true for our international war, true for our states, true for Americans, true for psychoanalysts. Loyalty is one of the great virtues. Loyalty means not that I *am* you, or that I *agree* with everything you say or that I believe you are always right. Loyalty means that I share a common ideal with you and that regardless of minor differences we fight for it, shoulder to shoulder, confident in one another's good faith, trust, constancy, and affection. This is my ideal for the members of our Association.

SOME FORMS OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO SCHIZOPHRENIA

BY HELENE DEUTSCH (CAMBRIDGE)

Psychoanalytic observations of a few types of emotional disturbances are presented in this paper, and a series of cases reported in which the individual's emotional relationship to the outside world and to his own ego appears impoverished or absent. Such disturbances of the emotional life take various forms. For example, there are the individuals who are not aware of their lack of normal affective bonds and responses, but whose emotional disturbance is perceived either only by those around them or is first detected in analytic treatment; and there are those who complain of their emotional defect and are keenly distressed by the disturbance in their inner experiences. Among the latter, the disturbance may be transitory and fleeting; it may recur from time to time but only in connection with certain specific situations and experiences; or it may persist and form a continuous, distressing symptom. In addition, the emotional disturbance may be perceived as existing in the personality or it may be projected onto the outside world. In the one case the patient says, 'I am changed. I feel nothing. Everything seems unreal to me.' In the other, he complains that the world seems strange, objects shadowy, human beings and events theatrical and unreal. Those forms of the disturbance in which the individual himself is conscious of his defect and complains of it belong to the picture of 'depersonalization'. This disturbance has been described by many authors. In the analytic liter-

This publication is a combination of a paper published in the Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XX, 1934, under the title, *Über einen Typus der Pseudoaffektivität ('Als ob')*, and of a lecture given at the Chicago meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Society, 1938.

ature the reader is especially referred to the studies of Oberndorf,[1] Schilder,[2] and Bergler and Eidelberg.[3]

Most of the psychoanalytic observations in this paper deal with conditions bearing a close relationship to depersonalization but differing from it in that they were not perceived as disturbances by the patient himself. To this special type of personality I have given the name, 'as if'. I must emphasize that this name has nothing to do with Vaihinger's system of 'fictions' and the philosophy of 'As-If'. My only reason for using so unoriginal a label for the type of person I wish to present is that every attempt to understand the way of feeling and manner of life of this type forces on the observer the inescapable impression that the individual's whole relationship to life has something about it which is lacking in genuineness and yet outwardly runs along 'as if' it were complete. Even the layman sooner or later inquires, after meeting such an 'as if' patient: what *is* wrong with him, or her? Outwardly the person seems normal. There is nothing to suggest any kind of disorder, behavior is not unusual, intellectual abilities appear unimpaired, emotional expressions are well ordered and appropriate. But despite all this, something intangible and indefinable obtrudes between the person and his fellows and invariably gives rise to the question, 'What is wrong?'

A clever and experienced man, a patient of mine, met another of my patients, a girl of the 'as if' type, at a social gathering. He spent part of his next analytic hour telling me how stimulating, amusing, attractive, and interesting she was, but ended his eulogy with, 'But something is wrong with her'. He could not explain what he meant.

When I submitted the paintings of the same girl to an authority for his criticism and evaluation, I was told that the

[1] Oberndorf, C. P.: *Depersonalization in Relation to Erotization of Thought.* Int. J. Psa., XV, 1934, pp. 271–295; *Genesis of Feeling of Unreality.* Int. J. Psa., XVI, 1935, pp. 296–306.

[2] Schilder, P.: *Treatment of Depersonalization.* Bull. N. Y. Acad. Med., XV, 1939, pp. 258–272.

[3] Bergler, E., and Eidelberg, L.: *Der Mechanismus der Depersonalization.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXI, 1935, pp. 258–285.

drawings showed much skill and talent but there was also something disturbing in them which this man attributed to an inner restraint, an inhibition which he thought could surely be removed. Towards the end of the patient's not too successful analysis, she entered this critic's school for further instruction in painting and, after a time, I received a report in which her teacher spoke in glowing terms of her talent. Several months later I received a less enthusiastic report. Yes, the girl was talented, her teacher had been impressed by the speed with which she had adopted his technique and manner of artistic perception, but, he had frankly to admit, there was an intangible something about her which he had never before encountered, and he ended with the usual question, 'What is wrong?' He added that the girl had gone to another teacher, who used a quite different teaching approach, and that she had oriented herself to the new theory and technique with striking ease and speed.

The first impression these people make is of complete normality. They are intellectually intact, gifted, and bring great understanding to intellectual and emotional problems; but when they pursue their not infrequent impulses to creative work they construct, in form, a good piece of work but it is always a spasmodic, if skilled, repetition of a prototype without the slightest trace of originality. On closer observation, the same thing is seen in their affective relationships to the environment. These relationships are usually intense and bear all the earmarks of friendship, love, sympathy, and understanding; but even the layman soon perceives something strange and raises the question he cannot answer. To the analyst it is soon clear that all these relationships are devoid of any trace of warmth, that all the expressions of emotion are formal, that all inner experience is completely excluded. It is like the performance of an actor who is technically well trained but who lacks the necessary spark to make his impersonations true to life.

Thus the essential characteristic of the person I wish to describe is that outwardly he conducts his life as if he possessed

a complete and sensitive emotional capacity. To him there is no difference between his empty forms and what others actually experience. Without going deeper into the matter I wish at this point to state that this condition is not identical with the coldness of repressed individuals in whom there is usually a highly differentiated emotional life hidden behind a wall, the loss of affect being either manifest or cloaked by overcompensations. In the one there is flight from reality or a defense against the realization of forbidden instinctual drives; in the other, a seeking of external reality in an effort to avoid an anxiety-laden fantasy. Psychoanalysis discloses that in the 'as if' individual it is no longer an act of repression but a real loss of object cathexis. The apparently normal relationship to the world corresponds to a child's imitativeness and is the expression of identification with the environment, a mimicry which results in an ostensibly good adaptation to the world of reality despite the absence of object cathexis.

Further consequences of such a relation to life are a completely passive attitude to the environment with a highly plastic readiness to pick up signals from the outer world and to mold oneself and one's behavior accordingly. The identification with what other people are thinking and feeling, is the expression of this passive plasticity and renders the person capable of the greatest fidelity and the basest perfidy. Any object will do as a bridge for identification. At first the love, friendship, and attachment of an 'as if' person have something very rewarding for the partner. If it is a woman, she seems to be the quintessence of feminine devotion, an impression which is particularly imparted by her passivity and readiness for identification. Soon, however, the lack of real warmth brings such an emptiness and dullness to the emotional atmosphere that the man as a rule precipitously breaks off the relationship. In spite of the adhesiveness which the 'as if' person brings to every relationship, when he is thus abandoned he displays either a rush of affective reactions which are 'as if' and thus spurious, or a frank absence of affectivity. At the very first opportunity the

former object is exchanged for a new one and the process is repeated.

The same emptiness and the same lack of individuality which are so evident in the emotional life appear also in the moral structure. Completely without character, wholly unprincipled, in the literal meaning of the term, the morals of the 'as if' individuals, their ideals, their convictions are simply reflections of another person, good or bad. Attaching themselves with great ease to social, ethical, and religious groups, they seek, by adhering to a group, to give content and reality to their inner emptiness and establish the validity of their existence by identification. Overenthusiastic adherence to one philosophy can be quickly and completely replaced by another contradictory one without the slightest trace of inward transformation—simply as a result of some accidental regrouping of the circle of acquaintances or the like.

A second characteristic of such patients is their suggestibility, quite understandable from what has already been said. Like the capacity for identification, this suggestibility, too, is unlike that of the hysteric for whom object cathexis is a necessary condition; in the 'as if' individual the suggestibility must be ascribed to passivity and automaton-like identification. Many initial criminal acts, attributed to an erotic bondage, are due instead to a passive readiness to be influenced.

Another characteristic of the 'as if' personality is that aggressive tendencies are almost completely masked by passivity, lending an air of negative goodness, of mild amiability which, however, is readily convertible to evil.

One of these patients, a woman, and the only child of one of the oldest noble families in Europe, had been brought up in an unusual atmosphere. With the excuse of official duties, and quite in accordance with tradition, the parents delegated the care and training of their child to strangers. On certain specified days of the week she was brought before her parents for 'control'. At these meetings there was a formal check of her educational achievements, and the new program and other

directions were given her preceptors. Then after a cool, ceremonious dismissal, the child was returned to her quarters. She received no warmth and no tenderness from her parents, nor did punishment come directly from them. This virtual separation from her parents had come soon after her birth. Perhaps the most inauspicious component of her parents' conduct, which granted the child only a very niggardly bit of warmth, was the fact—and this was reinforced by the whole program of her education—that their sheer *existence* was strongly emphasized, and the patient was drilled in love, honor, and obedience towards them without ever feeling these emotions directly and realistically.

In this atmosphere, so lacking in feeling on the part of the parents, the development of a satisfactory emotional life could scarcely be expected in the child. One would expect, however, that other persons in the environment would take the place of the parents. Her situation would then have been that of a child brought up in a foster home. In such children we find that the emotional ties to their own parents are transferred to the parent substitutes in relationship to whom the œdipus develops with greater difficulty perhaps but with no significant modifications.

This patient, in accordance with ceremonial tradition, always had three nurses, each of whom wanted to stand first in the eyes of the parents and each of whom continually sought the favor of the child. They were, moreover, frequently changed. Throughout her whole childhood there was no one person who loved her and who could have served as a significant love object for her.

As soon as she was able to conceptualize, the patient immersed herself intensively in fantasies about the parents. She attributed to them divine powers through which she was provided with things unattainable to ordinary mortals. Everything she absorbed from stories and legends she elaborated into the myth about her parents. No longing for love was ever expressed in these fantasies; they all had the aim of providing a

narcissistic gain. Every meeting with the real parents separated them further from the heroes of her imagination. In this manner there was formed in the child a parental myth, a fantasmic shadow of an œdipus situation which remained an empty form so far as real persons and emotions were concerned. Not only did reality which denied her parent relationships lead to narcissistic regression into fantasy, but this process gained further impetus from the absence of any substitutive object-libidinous relationships. The frequent change of nurses and governesses and the fact that these persons were themselves subjected to strict discipline, acted on orders, and used all available measures to make the child conform to the demands of reality, measures in which a pseudo tenderness was consciously used as a means to attain didactic ends, precluded this possibility. The child was trained very early to cleanliness and strict table manners, and the violent outbreaks of anger and rage to which she was subject in early childhood were successfully brought under control, giving way to an absolutely pliant obedience. Much of this disciplinary control was attained by appeal to the parents so that everything the child did which was obedient and proper she referred to the wish or command of the mythical father and mother.

When she entered a convent school at the age of eight, she was completely fixed in the 'as if' state in which she entered analysis. Superficially, there was no difference between her life and that of the average convent pupil. She had the customary attachment to a nun in imitation of her group of girls. She had the most tender friendships which were wholly without significance to her. She went devoutly through the forms of religion without the slightest trace of belief, and underwent seduction into masturbation with quasi feelings of guilt—simply to be like her comrades.

In time, the myth of the parents faded and disappeared without new fantasies to take its place. It disappeared as her parents became clearer to her as real persons and she devaluated them.

Narcissistic fantasies gave way to real experiences in which, however, she could participate only through identification.

Analysis disclosed that the success of her early training in suppressing instinctual drives was only apparent. It had something of the 'trained act' in it and, like the performance of the circus animal, was bound to the presence of a ringmaster. If denial of an instinct was demanded, the patient complied, but when an otherwise inclined object gave permission for the satisfaction of a drive, she could respond quite without inhibition, though with little gratification. The only result of the training was that the drive never came into conflict with the external world. In this respect she behaved like a child in that stage of development in which its instinctual drives are curbed only by immediate external authority. Thus it happened that for a time the patient fell into bad company, in unbelievable contrast to her home environment and early training. She got drunk in low dives, participated in all kinds of sexual perversions, and felt just as comfortable in this underworld as in the pietistic sect, the artistic group, or the political movement in which she was later successively a participant.

She never had occasion to complain of lack of affect for she was never conscious of it. The patient's relationship to her parents was strong enough to enable her to make them heroes of her fantasy, but for the creation of a warm dynamic œdipus constellation capable of shaping a healthy future psychic life in both a positive and a negative sense the necessary conditions were obviously lacking. It is not enough that the parents are simply there and provide food for fantasy. The child must *really* be seduced to a certain extent by the libidinous activity of the parents in order to develop a normal emotional life, must experience the warmth of a mother's body as well as all those unconscious seductive acts of the loving mother as she cares for its bodily needs. It must play with the father and have sufficient intimacy with him to sense the father's masculinity in order that instinctual impulses enter the stream of the œdipus constellation.

This patient's myth bore some similarity to the fantasy which

Freud called the 'family romance' [4] in which, however, the libidinal relation to the parents though repressed is very powerful. By repudiating the real parents, it is possible partly to avoid strong emotional conflicts from forbidden wishes, feelings of guilt, etc. The real objects have been repressed but in analysis they can be uncovered with their full libidinal cathexis.

But for our patient there was never a living warm emotional relationship to the parents or to anyone else. Whether after weak attempts at object cathexis the child returned to narcissism by a process of regression or never succeeded in establishing a real object relation as the result of being unloved is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant.

The same deficiency which interfered with the development of the emotional life was also operative in the formation of the superego. The shadowy structure of the œdipus complex was gradually given up without ever having come to an integrated and unified superego formation. One gains the impression that the prerequisites for such a development also lie in strong œdipal object cathexes.

It is not to be denied that at a very early age some inner prohibitions are present which are the precursors of the superego and are intimately dependent on external objects. Identification with the parents in the resolution of the œdipus complex brings about the integration of these elements. Where this is absent, as it was in our patient, the identifications remain vacillating and transitory. The representatives which go to make up the conscience remain in the external world and instead of the development of inner morals there appears a persistent identification with external objects. In childhood, educational influences exerted an inhibitory effect on the instinctual life, particularly on the aggressions. In later life, in the absence of an adequate superego, she shifts the responsi-

[4] Freud designates as the 'family romance', fantasies which have in common the fact that they all relate to the ancestry of the person creating them. The typical version of the 'family romance' is 'I am not my parents' child. Whose child am I then?' The usual answer is, 'I come of a more exalted family'.

Cf. Deutsch, Helene: *Zur Genese des 'Familienromans'*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XVI, 1930, pp. 249–253.

bility for her behavior to objects in the external world with whom she identifies herself. The passivity of this patient as the expression of her submission to the will of another seems to be the final transformation of her aggressive tendencies.

As the result of this weak superego structure, there is little contact between the ego and the superego, and the scene of all conflicts remains external, like the child for whom everything can proceed without friction if it but obey. Both the persistent identification and the passive submission are expressions of the patient's complete adaptation to the current environment, and impart the shadowy quality to the patient's personality. The value of this link to reality is questionable because the identification always takes place with only a part of the environment. If this part of the environment comes into conflict with the rest, naturally the patient is involved. Thus it can come about that the individual can be seduced into asocial or criminal acts by a change in his identifications, and it may well be that some of the asocial are recruited from the group of 'as if' personalities who are adapted to reality in this restricted way.

Analysis of this patient revealed a genuine infantilism, that is, an arrest at a definite stage in the development of the emotional life and character formation. In addition to particularly unfavorable environmental influences it should be noted that the patient came from a very old family overrun with psychotics and invalid psychopaths.

Another woman patient had a father who had a mental illness and a mother who was neurotic. She remembered her father only as 'a man with a black beard', and she tried to explain as something very fascinating and wonderful, his absences as he was moved to and from a sanatarium and an isolated room at home, always under nursing care. Thus she built a myth around her father, replacing him in fantasy by a mysterious man, whom she later called an 'Indian' and with whom she had all sorts of experiences, each of which served to make her a superhuman being. The prototype for the Indian was the father's male nurse, whom the little girl saw mysteri-

ously disappearing into her father's room. The education and upbringing of the child were relegated to nurses, but despite this she succeeded in establishing a strongly libidinous attachment to the very abnormal mother. Her later relationships had elements of object-libidinous attitudes, sometimes warmer, especially in homosexual directions, but never sufficiently to change their 'as if' quality. The failure to develop an adequate object cathexis was, in this patient, related to the birth of her brother towards whom she developed an unusually aggressive envy. Comparisons of genitalia led the little girl to scrutinize her body for hours on end in a mirror. Later this narcissistic activity was gradually sublimated. At first she tried to model parts of her body in clay in order to facilitate her mirror studies. In the course of years she developed great skill in modeling and was for a brief time under the tutelage of a sculptress. Unconsciously, it was the fantasy of displaying repeatedly her body to the world. In later years she created only large, very voluptuous, matronly female figures. These proved to be weak attempts to recreate the mother she had lost in childhood to her brother. Ultimately she abandoned sculpture for music simply because she believed her teacher failed to appreciate her sufficiently.

Most conspicuous in her childhood was a monkey-like imitation of her brother with whom she was for years completely identified, not in fantasy but by acting out. Disastrously for both, the brother quite early betrayed unmistakable signs of a psychosis which culminated in a catatonic excitement. The sister imitated all her brother's bizarre activities and lived with him in a world of fantasy. Only her partial object-libidinous cathexis and a displacement of the process from the brother and identification with more normal objects saved her from being institutionalized. I was inclined at first to regard her condition as the result of an identification with her psychotic brother; only later did I recognize that the etiology of her condition lay deeper.

I believe this patient is similar to the first despite the differences in their development. In the second, it seems that a

disappointment shattered the strong relationship with the mother, that the mysterious absence of the father made it impossible for the little girl to find in him a substitute when her relationship to her mother was shaken, and that further relationships to objects remained at the stage of identification. By such identification she averted her intense hatred of her brother and transformed her aggression towards him into an obedient passivity in which she submissively identified herself with him. She developed no other object relationships. Her superego suffered the same fate as that of the first patient. The myth of the father and the very early devaluation of the mother prevented integration of her superego and left her dependent on persons in the external world.

A third patient, a pretty, temperamental woman of thirty-five with many intellectual and artistic talents, came to analysis because she was 'tired' after a long series of adventures. It soon became clear that, as the result of a certain combination of circumstances, her interest in psychoanalysis was actually an interest in the analyst, especially in her profession. While she frequently spoke of her tremendous interest in child psychology and in Freud's theory and read widely on these subjects, her understanding of them was extraordinarily superficial and her interest entirely unreal. More careful observation disclosed that this was true not only for all her intellectual interests but for everything she did or had ever done. It was surprising to recognize in this woman, who was so indefatigably active, a condition so closely related to the pseudoaffectivity of the 'as if' patient. All her experiences too were based on identifications, though her identifications were not so straightforward as were those of the other type of patient which is, one might say, more monogamous and adheres to but one person or one group at a time, while this patient had so many concurrent identifications —or symbolic representations of identifications—that her conduct appeared erratic. She was, in fact, considered 'crazy' by those who knew her. Her friends however had no notion that her apparently rich life concealed a severe lack of affect. She

had come to me because of a wish to change her character, that is, to create more peace and harmony in her life by identifying herself with a 'particularly solid' professional personality.

After six months the analysis appeared to be unusually successful. The patient learned to understand many things about herself and lost her eccentricities. She determined to become an analyst and when this was denied her, she collapsed. She was completely lacking in affect and complained, 'I am so empty! My God, I am so empty! I have no feelings.' It transpired that prior to analysis she had got into serious financial difficulties by breaking off various friendships and love relationships and had realized that she would soon have to work. It was with this intention that she came to analysis. Her plan was to become an analyst by identification with her analyst. When this proved impossible, this seemingly very able and active woman changed into a completely passive person. From time to time she had extraordinarily violent fits of childish weeping or outbursts of rage, flung herself on the floor and kicked and screamed. Gradually, she developed a progressive lack of affect. She became completely negativistic and met all interpretations with, 'I don't understand what you mean by that'.

At two points in this patient's development she had suffered severe trauma. Her father was an alcoholic, and the patient often witnessed his brutal mistreatment of the mother. She sided vehemently with the latter and, when she was only seven, had fantasies in which she rescued her mother from her misery and built a little white cottage for her. She saved every penny and worked hard in school to attain this aim, only to discover that her mother was not merely a passive victim of her husband but took pleasure in being brutalized. The consequent devaluation of her mother not only deprived her of her only object of love but also arrested the development of a feminine ego ideal of an independent, adequate personality. She spent the rest of her life trying to make up for this lack by creating a whole series of identifications, in the same way as the 'as if' patients.

Deprived of tenderness and affection in her childhood, her

instincts remained crudely primitive. She vacillated between giving these instincts free rein and holding them in check. She acted out prostitution fantasies, indulged in a variety of sexual perversions, often giving the impression of hypomania. She emerged from these debauches by identification with some conventional person and achieved by this means a kind of sublimation, the form dependent on the particular object. This resulted in a frequent shifting of her occupation and interests. So long as it was possible for her either to retain such a relationship or to allow herself the gratification of very primitive drives she was not aware of her lack of affect.

The following cases of emotional disturbance bear close similarity with the 'as if' group but differ in certain respects.

A seventeen-year-old boy of unusual intellectual ability, came for analysis because of manifest homosexuality and a conscious lack of feeling. This lack of emotion included his homosexual objects, about whom he created all sorts of perverse fantasies. He was obsessionally scrupulous, modest, exact, and reliable. He was passively oral and anal in his homosexuality. The analysis was extremely rich in material but progressed in an emotional vacuum. While the transference was frequently represented in his dreams and fantasies, it never became a conscious, emotional experience.

One day I gave him a ticket to a series of lectures in which I was taking part. He went to my lecture and had severe anxiety on the stairs leading to the lecture hall. By thus mobilizing his anxiety in the transference, the analysis began to progress.

An only child from a highly cultured environment, with a father who was strict and ambitious and a mother who dedicated her life to this handsome and talented son, he nevertheless suffered the fate of affective deficiency. The fact that he grew up in an atmosphere in which he never needed to seek for love, that he was overwhelmed with tenderness without having to make any effort to obtain it paralyzed his own active strivings for tenderness. He remained bound to primitive instinctual impulses, and because there were few infantile anxieties which

were not warded off with scrupulous care, there was no motive in him to build up defense mechanisms.

He underwent the trauma of the depreciation of his ego-ideal when he discovered that his admired father was uncultivated and limited. This realization threatened to depreciate his own value, for he was like his father, bore his name, and heard his resemblance to him repeatedly stressed by his mother. Through rigidity and strictness, in ethical and intellectual demands, he strove to become better than the self which was identified with the father. In contrast to the previous patients, he did not identify himself with a series of objects. Instead of having emotional relationships to people, he was split into two identifications: one with his beloved mother and the other with his father. The first was feminine and sexualized; the second was overcompensatory, rigid, and narcissistic.

Unlike the 'as if' patients, he complained of lack of feeling. He completely lacked the tender emotions which would have given warmth to his emotional life. He had no relation to any woman, and his friendships with men were either purely intellectual or crudely sexual. The feelings he had were of a character he would not let himself express. These were very primitive aggressions, the wildest, most infantile sexual drives, which were rejected with the declaration, 'I feel nothing at all'. In one way he told the truth; he was really lacking in any permissible feelings, that is, in the tender, sublimated emotions.

The tendency to identification is characteristic also of this type of affective disturbance. Even though this patient did not completely sink his personality in a series of identifications, the strongest section of his ego, his intellect, lacked originality. Everything he wrote and said in scientific matters showed great formal talent but when he tried to produce something original it usually turned out to be a repetition of ideas which he had once grasped with particular clarity. The tendency to multiple identifications occurred on the intellectual level.

Another patient of this group, a thirty-year-old married woman who came from a family in which there were many psychotics, complained about lack of emotion. In spite of good

intelligence and perfect reality testing, she led a sham existence and she was always just what was suggested to her by the environment. It became clear that she could experience nothing except a completely passive readiness to split into an endless number of identifications. This condition had set in acutely after an operation in her childhood for which she had been given no psychological preparation. On recovery from the anæsthesia she asked if she were really herself, and then developed a state of depersonalization which lasted a year and turned into passive suggestibility which concealed a crippling anxiety.

Common to all these cases is a deep disturbance of the process of sublimation which results both in a failure to synthesize the various infantile identifications into a single, integrated personality, and in an imperfect, one-sided, purely intellectual sublimation of the instinctual strivings. While critical judgment and the intellectual powers may be excellent, the emotional and moral part of the personality is lacking.

The etiology of such conditions is related first, to a devaluation of the object serving as a model for the development of the child's personality. This devaluation may have a firm foundation in reality or be traceable, for example, to shock at discovery of parental coitus at a period of development when the child is engaged in its last struggles against masturbation and needs support in its efforts towards sublimation. Or, as in the case of the boy described above, the successful sublimation may be interfered with by a sexualization of the relationship to an object who should serve the child as a model for its ego ideal, in this instance, a grossly sexual identification with his mother.

Another cause of this kind of emotional disturbance is insufficient stimulus for the sublimation of the emotions, as the result either of being given too little tenderness, or too much.

Infantile anxiety may suffer a similar fate. Too harsh or too indulgent treatment may contribute to failure in the economic formation of defense mechanisms resulting in remarkable passivity of the ego. It will be recalled that in the case

of the boy reported, an attack of anxiety not only mobilized the transference but also opened the way to his recovery.

The question must be raised as to how the tendency of 'as if' personalities to identification with current love objects differs from the same tendency in hysteria. The great difference between the latter and the 'as if' disturbance lies in the fact that the objects with which the hysterics identify themselves are the objects of powerful libidinous cathexes. Hysterical repression of affect brings freedom from anxiety and so represents a way out of the conflict. In 'as if' patients, an early deficiency in the development of affect reduces the inner conflict, the effect of which is an impoverishment of the total personality which does not occur in hysteria.

The patients described here might make one suspect that we are dealing with something like the blocking of affect seen especially in narcissistic individuals who have developed loss of feeling through repression. The great fundamental difference, however, is that the 'as if' personality tries to simulate affective experience, whereas the individual with a blocking of affect does not. In the analysis of the latter it can always be shown that the once developed object relationships and aggressive feelings have undergone repression and are not at the disposal of the conscious personality. The repressed, affectively toned segment of the personality is gradually uncovered during the analysis, and it is sometimes possible to make the buried part of the emotional life available to the ego.

For example, one patient had completely repressed the memory of his mother who died when he was four, and with whom, it was clear, the greater part of his emotions had been involved. Under the influence of a very weak but none the less effective transference, isolated memories gradually emerged. At first these had a negative character and denied all tenderness. During analysis this patient showed also another form of emotional disturbance, namely, depersonalization. Before analysis his self-satisfaction had been unshaken. He defended himself against the transference with all his power. In the analytic

hours, when clear signs of a transference *in statu nascendi* were perceptible, the patient would complain of sudden feelings of strangeness. It was clear that in him the depersonalization corresponded to the perception of a change in cathexis. It remained a question whether this was due to a new libidinal stream emerging from repression, or to a suppression of feelings connected with transference. The inner conflict in such an instance of repression of affect has little similarity to that of an 'as if' patient. The analogy rests only on the affective impoverishment in both.

The narcissism and the poverty of object relationships so characteristic for an 'as if' person bring to consideration the relationship of this defect to a psychosis. The fact that reality testing is fully maintained removes this condition from our conception of psychosis.

Narcissistic identification as a preliminary stage to object cathexis, and introjection of the object after its loss, are among the most important discoveries of Freud and Abraham. The psychological structure of melancholia offers us the classical example of this process. In melancholia, the object of identification has been psychologically internalized, and a tyrannical superego carries on the conflict with the incorporated object in complete independence of the external world. In 'as if' patients, the objects are kept external and all conflicts are acted out in relation to them. Conflict with the superego is thus avoided because in every gesture and in every act the 'as if' ego subordinates itself through identification to the wishes and commands of an authority which has never been introjected.

From the beginning, both the personal impression given by the patients themselves and the psychotic disposition in the family, especially in the first two analytically observed cases, make one suspect a schizophrenic process. The tracing of the severe psychic disturbance directly back to the developments of early childhood seems to me completely justified, and whether this speaks against the diagnosis of a schizophrenic process must, for the time being, be left undecided. My observa-

tions of schizophrenic patients have given me the impression that the schizophrenic process goes through an 'as if' phase before it builds up the delusional form. A twenty-two-year-old schizophrenic girl came to me after a catatonic attack, oriented for time and place but full of delusional ideas. Until the onset of the confusional state she had led an existence almost indistinguishable from 'as if' patients. Her bond to objects with whom she identified herself, and who were always outstanding women, was extremely intense. As a result of rapid shifting of these relationships, she changed her place of residence, her studies, and her interests in an almost manic fashion. Her last identification had led her from the home of a well-established American family to a communistic cell in Berlin. A sudden desertion by her object led her from Berlin to Paris where she was manifestly paranoid and gradually developed a severe confusion. Treatment restored her to her original state, but despite warnings, her family decided to break off the analysis. The girl was not able to summon enough affect to protest. One day she bought a dog and told me that now everything would be all right; she would imitate the dog and then she would know how she should act. Identification was retained but was no longer limited to human objects; it included animals, inanimate objects, concepts, and symbols, and it was this lack of selectivity which gave the process its delusional character. It was the loss of the capacity for identification with human objects which made possible the erection of a new, delusional world.

Another schizophrenic patient for years had had a recurrent dream in which in great pain and torment she sought her mother but could not find her because she was always faced with an endless crowd of women, each of whom looked like her mother, and she could not tell the right one. This dream reminded me of the stereotyped, recurrent mother figures in the sculpture of the second 'as if' patient.

Freud [5] speaks of 'multiple personality' as the result of a process in which numerous identifications lead to a disruption

[5] Freud: *The Ego and the Id.* London: Institute of Psycho-Analysis and Hogarth Press, 1927.

of the ego. This may result in manifest psychopathology, or the conflicts between the different identifications can assume a form which need not necessarily be designated as pathological. Freud refers to a purely inner process of ego formation, and this does not apply to the 'as if' identifications with objects in the outer world. However, the same psychological process will also in the 'as if' personality on one occasion have a more 'normal' resolution and on another a pathological outcome which may be more or less severe.

Anna Freud [6] points out that the type of pseudoaffectivity observed in 'as if' patients is often found in puberty. I believe that the depreciation of the primary objects (also typical of puberty) who served as models for the ego ideal, plays an important rôle in both. Anna Freud describes this type of behavior in puberty as incurring the suspicion of psychosis. I believe that the reflections which I have presented here will also serve for puberty. At one time the process will lie within the bounds of the 'normal' and at another it bears the seeds of a pathological condition. The type justifies the designation 'schizoid', whether or not schizophrenia later develops.

Whether the emotional disturbances described in this paper imply a 'schizophrenic disposition' or constitute rudimentary symptoms of schizophrenia is not clear to me. These patients represent variants in the series of abnormal distorted personalities. They do not belong among the commonly accepted forms of neurosis, and they are too well adjusted to reality to be called psychotic. While psychoanalysis seldom succeeds, the practical results of treatment can be very far-reaching, particularly if a strong identification with the analyst can be utilized as an active and constructive influence. In so far as they are accessible to analysis, one may be able to learn much in the field of ego psychology, especially with regard to disturbances of affect, and, perhaps, make contributions to the problem of the 'schizoid' which is still so obscure.

[6] Freud, A.: *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.* London: Hogarth Press, 1937.

In the great delusional formations of the psychoses we see primitive and archaic drives returning from the depths of the unconscious in a dramatic manner. Regression takes place because the ego has failed. We speak of this as a 'weakness of the ego' and assume that the reasons for this failure are psychological, constitutional, or organic. Psychoanalysis can investigate the first of these, especially in prepsychotic conditions to which these cases belong.

IS THERE A HOMEOSTATIC INSTINCT?

BY DOUGLASS W. ORR (SEATTLE)

Dr. Edoardo Weiss once made a remark [1] which I recall as follows: 'The trouble with psychoanalytic theory is not, as some assert, that it is too biological in its orientation, but rather that it is not biological enough.' He added that it was not inconceivable to him that even such phenomena as man's apparent need to bring order out of chaos and to set up moral and social laws might be derivative expressions of fundamental biological forces. His point was that many functions now attributed to the ego might really arise from the id, appearing in the ego as derivatives or id representatives. Weiss's remarks recalled to me Cannon's writings about homeostasis. Further reflection has led me to raise the question which gives title to this paper.

The concept of instinct in psychology is somewhat comparable to that of force in physics: a hypothetical something by which phenomena are most conveniently and usefully explained. The question might be rephrased: 'Is there any point in considering homeostasis as the manifestation of an instinct?'. Before going further let us review Cannon's ideas about homeostasis, and the psychoanalytic concept of instinct.

Homeostasis

Homeostasis was first used by Cannon to characterize the 'principle of stability' seen in organic matter, even in the most complex organisms. The evidence for this principle may be found in many technical writings of Cannon and his coworkers, while the theory and the evidence for it are summarized in semi-popular form in Cannon's book, The Wisdom of the Body.[2] In this work, Cannon not only applies the principle of homeostasis to the human organism, but also speculates upon some

[1] Personal communication.

[2] Cannon, Walter B.: *The Wisdom of the Body.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1932.

psychological and sociological implications of his theory. It will be enough for our purposes, however, to consider his formulation in its broad outlines.

Cannon takes as his starting point the observation:

> 'Organisms, composed of material which is characterized by the utmost inconstancy and unsteadiness, have somehow learned the methods of maintaining constancy and keeping steady in the presence of conditions which might reasonably be expected to prove profoundly disturbing.' (pp. 21–22)

Later (p. 24) he gives the name of homeostasis to this quality:

> 'The constant conditions which are maintained in the body might be termed *equilibria*. That word, however, has come to have fairly exact meaning as applied to relatively simple physio-chemical states, in closed systems, where known forces are balanced. The coördinated physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states in the organism are so complex and so peculiar to living beings—involving, as they may, the brain and nervous system, the heart, lungs, kidneys, and spleen, all working coöperatively—that I have suggested a special designation for these states, *homeostasis*. The word does not imply something set and immobile, a stagnation. It means a condition—a condition which may vary, but which is relatively constant.'

Cannon reviews the physiological evidence for the principle of homeostasis: metabolism, the maintenance of fluid balance, the operation of the autonomic nervous system, and the like. The details of this evidence are not germane to our discussion, but the principle that there appears to be a universal tendency in living organisms to maintain a relatively stable, yet dynamic, balance both with respect to various parts of the organism itself and with respect to its environment is all-important.

It seems clear that this brings us very close to the psychological conception of 'adjustment'. We are, after all, quite accustomed to speak of adjustment with reference to various parts of the total personality and with reference to the personality in relation to the environment or 'total situation'. We

therefore elaborate our original question to ask: 'Is there any point in attempting to correlate the physiological conception of homeostasis with certain well-known psychological phenomena, and to assume that a common instinct underlies them?' First, however, it will be necessary to restate the psychoanalytic definition of instinct.

Instinct as a Psychoanalytic Term

A few years ago someone wrote a paper in which he claimed to have found 472 different definitions of the term *instinct;* or perhaps the number was 742. Even in the psychoanalytic literature, the use of this term would distress Stuart Chase or any other faithful student of semantics. Henry A. Murray has somewhat burlesqued the situation in his article, What Should Psychologists Do About Psychoanalysis?,[3] in which he points to Freud's dictum that 'a sound theory of instincts' is indispensable to psychoanalysis, and then indicates the confusion into which some psychoanalytic authors have fallen in writing about instincts.

Freud speaks variously of 'instinct' and 'instincts'. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle he discards the older dichotomy between the sexual instinct and the ego instinct and postulates the newer dichotomy of eros and death. But in some passages it is clearly implied that eros represents a collection or group of instincts, and one gets the impression also that the death instinct is likewise multiple in character. Thus, for example, he defines (p. 41) the 'instincts' of the organism as 'the representatives of all forces arising within the body and transmitted to the psychic apparatus'. Later (p. 67) he adds: 'Our standpoint was a dualistic one from the beginning, and is so today more sharply than before, since we no longer call the contrasting tendencies egoistic and sexual instincts, but life-instincts and death-instincts.' Here we note a plurality within the duality of instincts.

Freud held essentially to the same view of the instincts in

[3] Murray, Henry A.: *What Should Psychologists Do About Psychoanalysis?* J. Abnorm. & Social Psychol., XXXV, 1940, pp. 150–175.

the posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis [4] where he speaks of the id as containing 'everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution—above all, therefore, the instincts originating in the somatic organization, which find their first mental expression there in forms unknown to us' (p. 28). He defines (p. 31) the instincts as 'the forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id'. It is possible to distinguish an indeterminate number of instincts which, he says, is commonly done; but he reasserts his belief that ultimately all are derived from two fundamental ones: eros and the destructive (death) instinct.

Freud makes it very clear that the instincts are biologically rooted but that they also have their psychological counterparts or representatives. Thus, libido was defined as 'that force by which the sexual instinct is represented in the mind'. But, he says, 'There is no term analogous to "libido" for describing the energy of the destructive instinct' (p. 32). Nevertheless Freud clearly implies, and various other analysts have accepted this view, that instincts are basic, biologically rooted urges or drives which have their counterparts or representations in all parts of the total personality. As Brown and others have stated,[5] 'biological and psychological development are inseparably interconnected'. Our question may now be reformulated: 'Is there a homeostatic instinct in the sense of its being a basic tendency within the total personality, biologically rooted yet equally represented in the psychic life of the individual?'

Possible Psychological Manifestations of a Homeostatic Instinct

In adopting a psychosomatic conception of human personality, one avoids the older body-mind dichotomy and assumes that physiological and psychological phenomena are but two facets of the same underlying organism-as-a-whole. It is possible to adhere to such a psychosomatic point of view, it seems to

[4] Freud: *An Outline of Psychoanalysis,* Int. J. Psa., XXI, 1940, pp. 27–84.

[5] Brown, J. F.: *The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behavior.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940, p. 157.

me, even though we use the language of Freud which often suggests that 'mental life' is epiphenomenal. If we were quite accurate we should perhaps say that everything about a human being is biological and that two important facets of the biological individual are the physiological and the psychological, never forgetting that the individual does not live in a vacuum and is also constantly interacting with his surroundings.

At any rate such a view makes it possible to say, for example, that the instinct called eros is something that belongs to the organism-as-a-whole, and that libido is its representative in the psychological sphere or, to put it differently, that libido is the way we see eros when we observe the psychological facet of the total human personality. We are well acquainted with the various expressions of libido and its many unconscious and conscious derivatives. If, now, physiological homeostasis turns out to arise from some equally fundamental instinct, what are the forms of expression or representation of this instinct in the psychological sphere?

Here there are five principal possibilities which will be considered briefly. First, it is possible to dismiss the matter entirely and to aver that, while the concept of homeostasis may have some value in the realm of physiology, it is of no use in the field of psychology. A second possibility is to maintain that, psychologically speaking, homeostatic phenomena are already encompassed by Freud's conception of eros, and that there is no need to distinguish them further. A third choice is to equate, as Ives Hendrick has done, the physiological principle of homeostasis with the psychological conception of the pleasure principle. Fourth, it may be stated, on the contrary, that homeostasis is closely related to Freud's conception of the death instinct, and can be thought of as a physiological expression of that force. Finally, it might be claimed that a homeostatic instinct can be marked off from all other instincts (as these are understood in psychoanalytic psychology), and that certain psychological manifestations of homeostasis may logically be segregated. Let us review these possibilities.

Shall we dismiss the possibility that homeostasis may have

some importance for psychology? The best argument against doing so, it seems to me, is the psychoanalytic definition of instinct itself. As pointed out above, the psychosomatic view of human personality, which most psychoanalysts accept, assumes that the psychological and physiological are but two aspects or facets of the same biological organism. What is represented in one sphere is more than likely in some way or other to be represented in the other. Sex, for example, is obviously important in both. It might then be assumed *a priori* that any important physiological phenomenon, such as homeostasis, will have psychological concomitants as well. We do not, therefore, dismiss the matter at the outset, but rather ask ourselves what psychological data might be related to the physiological tendency to maintain a 'steady state' and whether a common instinct may not underlie them both.

There is certainly some basis for the assertion that any psychological implications of homeostasis are already taken into account by Freud's conception of eros. Freud states: [6] 'The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called *instincts*'. Reaffirming his belief in the existence of two fundamental instincts, eros and the destructive instinct, he continues: 'The aim of the first of these is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the other, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to destroy things'. It might thus appear, on the surface, that eros, in establishing 'ever greater unities' and preserving them thus, closely parallels the physiological phenomena of homeostasis; but in another place, as we shall see, Freud differentiates this from the tendency on the part of organisms to maintain a state that has once been established—all of which would seem, on the surface of things, to be an integral part of establishing greater unities. In any case, it is not clear from Freud's writings whether homeostasis can clearly be related to the erotic instinct.

The third possibility, of identifying the physiological concept of homeostasis with the psychoanalytic concept of the

[6] Freud: *Loc. cit.* p. 31.

pleasure principle, has been suggested by Ives Hendrick in the following passage: [7]

> 'This induction of a fundamental property of life [the pleasure principle], derived from psychoanalytic observation, coincides with the ultimate conclusions of scientists in other fields. For example, the physiologist Cannon, after a life of investigation of organic function, maintains that all bodily processes are devised to maintain a definite physico-chemical equilibrium which he terms *homeostasis*. The essence of Cannon's conclusions about homeostasis coincides remarkably with the significant statement of Freud's most speculative work, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, (1920). Their investigations have been in separate realms, yet their final conclusions in regard to the fundamental processes of life are the same: the psychoanalyst, that psychological processes are initiated by the need to restore an emotional equilibrium which is experienced as pleasure; the physiologist, that all organic processes are initiated by the need to restore a physico-chemical equilibrium which is experienced as health.'

This is, indeed, a very suggestive parallelism. The question arises, however, whether it does not suggest too ubiquitous a rôle to homeostasis. There seems, too, to be some confusion of terms in such an equating of concepts. Pleasure is a quality or attribute of experience; in our usage a quality arising from the gratification of instinctual derivatives, or relief from unpleasant tensions. Homeostasis, however, is not a quality or attribute of organic experience; it is rather a form of experience itself, a fundamental tendency within living organisms. How, then, can they be equated?

Is it possible, after all, that homeostasis is more nearly related to Freud's concept of the death or destructive instinct? On the face of it, one might be sceptical of such a possibility. And yet there are passages in Beyond the Pleasure Principle which at first glance lend themselves to such an interpretation.

It is not necessary here to recapitulate all of the arguments

[7] Hendrick, Ives: *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1939, pp. 93–94.

of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud discusses the repetition compulsion and notes its almost relentlessly instinctive character, even at times in violation of the pleasure principle. Then he continues (pp. 44–45):

> 'In what way is the instinctive connected with the compulsion to repetition? At this point the idea is forced upon us that we have stumbled on the trace of a general and hitherto not clearly recognized—or at least not expressly emphasized—characteristic of instinct, perhaps of all organic life. According to this, *an instinct would be a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition,* one which it had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces—a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the manifestation of inertia in organic life.
>
> 'This conception of instinct strikes us as strange, since we are accustomed to see in instinct the factor urging towards change and development, and now we find ourselves required to recognize in it the very opposite, viz. the expression of the conservative nature of living beings.'

And a little later (p. 47):

> 'The conservative organic instincts have absorbed every one of these enforced alterations in the course of life and have stored them for repetition; they thus present the delusive appearance of forces striving after change and progress, while they are merely endeavoring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new. This final goal of all organic striving can be stated too. It would be counter to the conservative nature of instinct if the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient starting point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development. If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say "The goal of all life is death", and, casting back, "The inanimate was there before the animate".'

As is well known, Freud's hypothesis of the death instinct arises from these reflections; but he does not, of course, argue the existence of that instinct alone. In opposition to it, he places eros, the sexual or life instinct, and the interaction of these two—eros and death—are described fully in the last third of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. What interests us here, however, are certain characteristics attributed to derivatives of the death instinct, and how closely they resemble homeostasis.

Cannon designated the tendency on the part of organisms to maintain a steady state, a physiochemical equilibrium, as homeostasis. We know from physiology how many processes are set in motion when that equilibrium is threatened or actually disturbed; numerous compensatory activities come into play and, normally, the equilibrium is quickly reëstablished. Is this essentially different from Freud's observation that '. . . an instinct would be a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition, one which it had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces—a kind of organic elasticity, the manifestation of inertia in organic life'? If then we wish to assert that homeostatic phenomena are already encompassed by the psychoanalytic theory of instinct, it seems apparent that they must be most closely related to the death instinct.

But this does not satisfy us either, and the situation is altogether somewhat confused. We feel that so important a biological tendency (physiologically speaking) must have some implications for our psychological understanding of the organism, and yet it is difficult to identify it clearly with the erotic instinct, the pleasure principle, or the death instinct. If we must make a choice, it seems that, from Freud's point of view at least, the choice must be the last. But this is not convincing. The death instinct itself is still too hypothetical; besides, homeostasis seems conservative in the direction of continued life rather than in the direction of disintegration and death. If homeostasis means anything, it appears to mean a postpone-

ment of death, a warding off of whatever internal or external forces would threaten the integrity and dynamic balance of the organism. Perhaps, therefore, we must choose our fifth possibility and ask whether homeostasis has psychological implications somewhat different from the currently accepted instincts of psychoanalytic psychology.

Homeostasis as Arising from a Separate Instinct

In the following paragraphs we propose to set forth the hypothesis that homeostasis can be considered as arising from an instinct separate from but more or less on a par with the sexual instinct (eros) as described by Freud. The sexual instinct is, as Freud says, biologically rooted and is represented in the psyche by libido which operates under the pleasure-pain principle conditioned only by the reality principle. The present hypothesis holds that the homeostatic instinct is likewise a biologically rooted phenomenon, similarly represented in the psyche, but by a number of secondary or derivative drives (of the sort that used to be called 'instincts') all of which also operate under the pleasure-pain principle conditioned by the reality principle.

At a physiological level, the function of the homeostatic instinct is achieved by the consumption of various elements essential to the maintenance of the organism, by the elimination of useless by-products of metabolism, by a variety of defenses against internal and external threats to the dynamic equilibrium of the organism, and by a never-ending succession of adjustments and readjustments on the part of the organism to keep the dynamic balance within certain limits which are characterized by what is variously known as 'health', 'safety', 'satisfactory adjustment', and the like. Many of these functions and activities of the organism have more or less constant psychological derivatives or representations; others may be called into play only under special circumstances. Thus, hunger and thirst are rather frequently encountered at the psychological level, while 'air hunger' is less frequently so encountered. Excretory impulses are likewise manifested psy-

chologically in somewhat periodic fashion. Defenses against real or imagined threats to the organism are called into play only under special circumstances, and may take the general forms of flight (with which the emotions of fear, anger, and anxiety may be associated) or attack (with which the same emotions, perhaps in varying proportions, are usually associated).

In addition to these is that tendency, already referred to, which can hardly be better described than in Freud's words: '. . . towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition, one which (the organism) had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces—a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the manifestation of inertia in organic life'. This, it would appear, is the essence of homeostasis; and it seems apparent that this type of 'inertia' is apparent at the psychological level as well. The tendency to cling to what has been tried and tested, to maintain (or return to) familiar types of adjustment, and, in the neuroses, the 'repetition compulsion' would thus appear to be manifestations of the homeostatic instinct.

What phenomena of life are encompassed by homeostasis considered as an instinct? In our sense of the term, the *homeostatic instinct* becomes a basic drive or tendency of the organism while *homeostasis* is the state of dynamic balance that results from this instinct. At the physiological level, as Cannon suggests, homeostasis is effected by all metabolic processes, by antibody formation, by phagocytosis, by everything, in a word, that preserves the 'steady state' and prevents disintegration. To these we add other activities of defense—whether attack or retreat—since these too prevent disintegration and preserve the organism's dynamic equilibrium.

At the psychological level the same tendencies and processes are represented. There are definite psychological manifestations of hunger, thirst, elimination, defense (whether by flight or fight), and preservation of the *status quo*. Beyond these are subtly and intricately modified derivative tendencies, molded by environmental pressures, found in such activities

as earning a living, saving for future needs, social and economic organization, and the like. The homeostatic instinct thus appears as a force that influences the total behavior of the human organism in the direction of what we are accustomed to call 'adjustment'. Just as a simple organism effects a balance in a relatively simple physiochemical environment, so the complex human personality achieves a *modus vivendi* in an extremely intricate physical-chemical-social-economic environment in ways that make for safety, security, and a maximum of pleasure. The homeostatic instinct, considered in this way, seems to utilize processes that make for order, for conservatism, for repetition of the familiar, and, in times of crisis, for going back to what has proved successful in the past, but all for the purpose of setting up or maintaining a state of balance or equilibrium, the psychological characteristic of which we are accustomed to speak of as integration, security, or safety and the sociopsychological characteristic of which we call satisfactory adjustment.

That the homeostatic instinct is not always fulfilled or gratified in its aim is obvious; personality disintegration occurs and maladjustment is common. The operations of the homeostatic instinct, just as much as the sexual instinct, have to accept modifications in accordance with the reality principle, and where this is omitted difficulties arise. Likewise, reality may be (or appear to be) more dangerous or difficult for some than for others, resulting in fixations at or regressions to immature modes of integration or adjustment. Clinically one sees this in many manifestations of the (pathological) repetition compulsion or, to mention a detail, in the anxiety or hostility aroused in analytic patients at any change in the analyst, the time of appointment, the position of the couch, or what not. In such instances, one might say that the homeostatic instinct has become too narrowly channelized or too rigidly molded by the real or apparent dangers of the environment; but we realize, at the same time, that every so called maladjustment, whether a psychosis, neurosis, or behavior disorder, is the

best adjustment the individual concerned is able to make in his particular situation.

Freud, of course, used the evidence (or some of it) discussed above to adduce the presence of a death instinct. Such an ultimate interpretation of this 'conservative' tendency on the part of organisms is perhaps not inconsistent with the phenomena of homeostasis. For those who have found it difficult to accept the hypothesis of death instinct, however, the correlation of such tendencies with the concept of a homeostatic instinct may prove more plausible. As one reads Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Freud's Outline of Psychoanalysis one is confronted with the question: why this jump from a 'principle of stability' to death, or from the 'conservative nature of the instincts', to destruction? The principle of homeostasis, considered as an instinct, is, in any event, more closely related to observed facts of both physiology and psychology; and it does not necessarily follow that, because the ultimate fate of living organisms *is* death, there is necessarily an instinct whose object is death. If one argues teleologically, on the basis of accepted biological data, it is somewhat more logical to assume that the two fundamental instincts are sex and homeostasis, the apparent 'purpose' of the latter being to maintain the organism in a state of equilibrium and health at least until the 'purposes' of the former have been achieved.

To some it may appear that any attempt to postulate such a division of the instincts—sex and homeostasis—only carries us back to Freud's early separation of 'self-preservative' and 'species perpetuating' tendencies. Perhaps this is retrogressive. The important question is only: what best accounts for what we know at the moment? In this spirit we might claim only that the homeostatic instinct effects a degree of organic self-integration and adjustment to the milieu through the preservation of a dynamic equilibrium, and that tensions (expressing themselves at the psychological level) arise whenever this equilibrium is threatened or disturbed, at which time various self-preservative activities come into play; and that this sort of process tends to continue until the principal aim of sexual

instinct has been fulfilled. The sexual instinct, on its part, gives rise to certain tensions peculiar to it, and these are ultimately allayed ('normally') in sexual intercourse which has the general consequence of preserving the species. The fact that both sex and homeostasis, and their various derivative tendencies, suffer many vicissitudes, especially in highly complex human cultures, is a well known fact, but one that is outside the scope of this discussion.

On the face of it, the conception of a homeostatic instinct just presented might appear to limit Freud's teachings as to the universality of the sexual instinct and its derivatives. But this is not necessarily true. One sees at once that the two sets of strivings (and their derivatives) are so inextricably bound together from birth onward that, in reality, it will often be difficult to separate them. Both are governed by the pleasure principle, and both, so to speak, have to 'come to terms' with the reality principle. And both suffer together from the restrictions and complex adjustments required by contemporary occidental civilization.

Summary

The question is raised for further discussion: 'Is there any pragmatic virtue, from the standpoint of psychoanalytic psychology, in postulating a homeostatic instinct?' Various possibilities are explored. The conclusion is reached that many known physiological and psychological phenomena may indeed be correlated by regarding homeostasis as instinctually rooted. Thus regarded, homeostasis arises from an instinct whose aims include a stable but dynamic adjustment of the organism and, psychologically speaking, a maximum of security in a complex environment. The derivative tendencies of this instinct (both physiological and psychological) make for conservatism, order, repetition of the familiar, and, in times of crisis or threat, regression to what has proved successful in the past.

TRANSITION RITES

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

INTRODUCTION

In 1909 was published Arnold van Gennep's *Les Rites de Passage* in which he claimed that certain formal elements of ritual—especially the sequence, the structure, of the rite—were conditioned by the fact that the rite emphasizes a change or transition of some kind. If we analyze these rites into their elements we find that there is always a *rite de séparation* followed by a *period de marge* (transition) and a *rite d'agrégation.* There is a marked tendency for the ritual to proliferate; a rite like a marriage ceremony, which in itself is in a sense a marginal rite between adolescence and manhood, will develop a *séparation* and a *marge* and an *agrégation* rite of its own.[1] Van Gennep's theory has met with no opposition; indeed, in these days when so many anthropologists protest against the classical evolutionary and comparative type of anthropology, transition rites are much in fashion.[2]

It is my purpose to present the comparative method, and to prove that it is far from a negligible approach in understanding the psychology of mankind. I know very well that in taking rites out of their context, as I propose to do, I am neglecting certain factors, but after all there can be no knowledge without the process of abstraction. I believe that there is something common in ritual sequence wherever it occurs, but that the common elements which reappear in all kinds of human communities are not dependent on any specific features of the societies in question but on the eternally unchanged fundamental aspects of the human psyche.

[1] *Cf.* van Gennep, Arnold: *Les Rites de Passage.* Paris: Nourry, 1909, pp. 13–16.

[2] *Cf.* Mead, Margaret: *On the Concept of Plot in Culture.* Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1939, Series II, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 29.

In the Problem of Anxiety, Freud comes to the conclusion that object loss is the conditioning feature of anxiety, and that all anxiety is ultimately separation anxiety. Infants most commonly show anxiety in two situations: when left alone in the dark, and in the presence of a stranger. The common denominator in the two situations is the absence of the mother. If therefore anxiety is fear of separation, both castration and birth anxiety can be understood from this point of view; in each there is the loss of a valued source of pleasure. The real danger seems to be an increase in tension with which the infant cannot cope and in which the helplessness of birth is repeated. Displacement takes place from the economic (increase of tension) or quantitative aspects of the situation to the conditioning factor, and thus danger becomes synonymous with the absence of the mother. The narcissistic value of the penis is due to the function of this organ which guarantees reunion with a mother substitute in coitus. With growth the content of anxiety is modified; separation anxiety becomes castration anxiety. In the next phase of development, after the introjection of the parental images in the superego, castration anxiety becomes conscience and the content of the anxiety is fear of incurring the displeasure of the superego. Originally the child could not exist without being loved by the mother; now it is the ego that cannot face life without the love and support it gets from the superego. Finally, in the last stages of superego development, the penalty becomes exclusion from society, the latter having taken the place of the original object, the mother.[3]

The researches of Dr. Hermann in Budapest have brought us further valuable insight into the structure of primal anxiety. He found that the primal libidinal organization should be described as oral-manual rather than purely oral. He emphasized the importance of the grasping reflex and concluded that the human infant is prematurely separated from the mother.

[3] Freud: *The Problem of Anxiety*. This QUARTERLY, V, 1936, pp. 272-276.

Human beings retain throughout life the grasping tendency, the desire to cling to the mother, and each one is compelled to grow up only through a series of separation traumata. From the oral point of view the thumb or toe is the first substitute for the mother; for the grasping reflex any object the infant may seize. The typical sleeping posture of the infant with both hands held up to the level of the shoulder represents the infant clinging to its mother. The primal reaction to fright is grasping, that is, clinging to the mother.[4] Anxiety comes from being left alone and the reaction to it is the desire to restore the original unity of the mother and child. Hermann emphasizes that castration anxiety is also primarily fear of separation, of losing the object.

Another very significant observation of Hermann based on analytic material, is that this striving towards the mother is transformed into an opposite trend 'away from the mother', in consequence of a series of frustrations. The progressive aspect of the trend away from the mother develops into the search for a new object. An important conclusion which Hermann bases on both clinical and anthropological data is that the loss of hair or nails or any other particle of the body represents the primal object-loss anxiety because of the original mother-child unity or subject-object identification. Hermann postulates that the clinging to the mother and the trend away from the mother are partial libidinal impulses and discusses the impulse to wander away from home. Hermann shows that in the grasping trend love and aggression are combined; in other words that this trend is the forerunner of sadism, while masochism is an emphasis on the helplessness and loss of the object. Neurotic self-mutilation, such as tearing or biting the nails, pulling hair and particles of skin from the body, is a

[4] As an interesting illustration of this point, it is the custom of the *Marind anim* in New Guinea, when a child is frightened, for the mother to extend her arms towards the child and say, 'Milk, milk,' that is, 'Come and I will suckle you'. Wirz, P.: *Die Marind anim von Hollandisch Sud Neu Guinea.* 1922, II, p. 180.

kind of dramatization, repetition and prevention of the traumatic mother-child separation.[5]

BIRTH AND THE UMBILICAL CORD

The first transition of man is from the womb through the birth canal into the world. The tie which is metaphorical in all other situations is still tangible at this phase of development. It is the umbilical cord.

An Aranda woman goes to the *alukura* (women's camp) when her child is about to be born. If there be any difficulty in child birth, which happens very rarely, the husband without comment strips off all his personal adornments and empties his bag of knick-knacks on the ground. Later he may walk up and down to induce the unborn child to follow him. After birth the umbilical cord is cut with a stone knife at a distance of some inches from the body of the child. It is never bitten off. After a few days the attached part of the cord is cut off by the mother, who by swathing it in fur strings provided by her mother or father makes it into a string which is kept by the father's mother for a few days and is then placed round the child's neck. The necklace is supposed to facilitate the growth of the child, to keep it quiet and contented, to avert illness generally; also it prevents the child from hearing the noises made by the dogs in the camp. The child is supposed to have come out of a *ratapa* (child) stone and then to

[5] Hermann, Imre: *Sich-Anklammern — Auf-Suche-Gehen.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXII, 1936, pp. 349–370.

Cf. also Schilder, Paul: *Sich-Anklammern und Gleichgewicht.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXIII, 1937, p. 313.

Rotter-Kertész, Lillian: *Der tiefenpsychologische Hintergrund der inzestuösen Fixierung.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXII, 1936, p. 338.

Halverson, H. M.: *Studies in the Grasping Responses of Early Infancy.* J. of Genetic Psychol., LI, 1937, pp. 371–449.

Hooker, D.: *The Origin of the Grasping Movement in Man.* Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., 1938, pp. 597–606.

Levy, David: *Finger-Sucking and Accessory Movements in Early Infancy.* Amer. J. of Psychiat., VII, 1928, pp. 881–918.

have entered the mother. There is a small round hole in the stone and above this a black line is painted with charcoal. An identical black line, called *iknula,* is painted above the eye of the newly born child, as it is supposed to prevent sickness.[6]

The Mularatara [7] call the process of being born *mirka-tunanyi* (come out—lay it). They burn the hair on the head with a fire stick, cut a long umbilical cord, and then let it break off when it is dry. They tie it with a string and it is put around a boy's neck to make him grow big and fat; it also prevents him from crying too much. When he is growing in the bark cradle they call him *nguli-nguli.* When he can sit up they call him *nyina-nyina* (sit-sit). When he walks on all fours and they give him a stick he is *paka-rangarungara* (rises). When he walks properly he is *tjunta-tjunta* (leg-leg).

The Yumu are careful to cut the umbilical cord quite long and let it hang down. If they cut it too near, the child might bleed to death. They put warm sand or ashes on the mothers belly and then they smoke her. She sits with her legs wide apart and they smoke her to prevent her vagina from bleeding too much.

Among the Western Aranda and the neighboring *Luritja* speaking tribes (Ngatatara) the mother and the baby are smoked together after childbirth. By smoking the child they prevent it from demanding too much milk and they help it to lose its pale color and to become brown quickly and make its breasts grow. They say the inside of the woman stinks after childbirth; they must smoke her before she can go back to the men. The black mark on the child's eyes is made to make it look ugly so the demons will not eat it. Regulations of this kind are frequent among many peoples. There is a danger period in which the demons might kill the child or steal it and this period is ended with a ceremony [8] of some

[6] Spencer and Gillen: *The Arunta.* London: Macmillan Co., 1927, Vol. I, p. 272; Vol. II, p. 488.

[7] The following data are taken from my field notes.

[8] *Cf.* Ploss, H. and Renz, B.: *Das Kind, in Brauch und Sitte der Völker.* Leipzig: Th. Grieben, 1911, Chapters V, VI, VIII, IX, XV, XVI.

kind. Among the tribes of the western desert this is a real danger because the 'demons' are the parents and the siblings; it is the custom of the Pitjentara to eat every second child in the family, and the belief that the strength of the other children is doubled by eating their brothers and sisters.

When the child has been given a name, which takes place when it is about a year old, this danger is over; if it has not been eaten by then, they will not eat it. The Yumu, Pindupi and neighboring tribes have the same custom in a more irregular form. They eat the babies when they happen to be hungry. Here too the danger period ends with name giving. They have two names, one from the mythical ancestors, one from the *tamu* (grandfather). Among the Pitjentara they give first the ancestral name and then the grandfather's name because they say the child is still exposed to being eaten by the demons (not by the parents) after it has received the first name, and evidently it would not be appropriate to let him have the grandfather's name while the demons are still likely to eat him.

These data reveal some insight into the psychological mechanisms involved. In the situation of object-loss or separation anxiety there is a tendency for identifications to cover up the object loss. For the child to bear the same mark that is painted on the mythical stone from which it emerged, identifies it with a mythical mother; when the father walks and expects the child to follow him out of the womb, that is obviously a father-child identification.

Another typical feature of these rites is the protective function of the umbilical cord. It protects the child from anxiety (devils), from barking dogs, prevents its crying, and also makes the child grow, functioning in this respect like the mother. The Kakadu carry the cord about in a small bag suspended from the neck. When the child can move about freely, the cord is thrown into a pool of water; but up to that time it must be carefully preserved or else the child will become very ill and probably die. If the child dies before the cord is

thrown away, they burn the cord; but if they were to burn it while the child is alive, the certain result would be death. If the child dies while the mother is carrying the umbilical cord it is because the mother has broken some taboos; she must have eaten forbidden food or washed in deep water, with the result that the child's spirit has gone from it.[9] The real biological and symbolic psychological link between the infant and the mother is the umbilical cord and placenta. 'On the one hand the child itself may sicken if the placenta is found by the men or if the cord is lost; on the other hand both mother and child, whether the latter is a boy or a girl, may be harmed if they have contact with the men until four or five days afterwards. The cord and the placenta are part of the child; but they are also the tangible and visible manifestations of the link with the mother who herself sees to their safe disposal. But because of the psychic intimacy of the maternal tie the child would seem to be to some extent threatened by the same dangers that menace its mother and therefore it shares with her the seclusion from the main part of the camp, and more particularly from the men. Until the child is weaned, the woman continues to observe the food taboos in the belief that whatever she eats may harm the child indirectly, through the milk it takes from the breasts.' [10]

On the Pennefather River everybody has a *ngai* and a *choi*. The *ngai* is the soul; they can feel it palpitating; it talks to them and causes dreams, and it is inherited from the father after his death. Everybody has a *choi* from the time Anjea puts him into his mother's womb, and the *choi* has the same functions and causes the same sensations as the *ngai,* but a portion of it stays in the afterbirth. When a child is born the grandmother takes the afterbirth away and buries it in

[9] Spencer, B.: *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory.* London: Macmillan Co., 1914, p. 325.

[10] Kaberry, Ph. M.: *Aboriginal Woman Sacred and Profane.* Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1939, p. 244.

the sand with a structure resembling a cone on the top of it.[11] If the *ngai* as a soul indicates the link with the father, the *choi* connected with the afterbirth evidently represents the link with the mother, notwithstanding the fact that it descends in the paternal line.

The beliefs and practices connected with the umbilical cord can be explained by two principles:

A When the infant becomes *separated* from the mother, the link that once connected it with the mother becomes a *substitute mother.* It is invested with cathexes withdrawn from the original object.

B Object relations are replaced by *identifications;* instead of a mother, the infant has a double, and the double is a *protective double,* a belief in which the original infant-mother relationship is reflected.

If a Mordwinian woman is specially favored by Ange Patyai (Mother Goddess) she tells her daughter to weave a shirt for the child and it is born with a caul. As long as the child keeps the caul it is under the protection of its guardian genius and of the mother goddess. If the shirt is lost the individual loses the protection of the divine mother.[12] According to the beliefs of the Icelanders the child's guardian spirit or a part of its soul has its seat in the fœtal membrane, known as the *fylgia* or guardian spirit. It was customary to bury it under the threshold where the mother stepped over it daily when she rose from bed.[13] The Baganda think that every-person is born with a double which they identify with the afterbirth. They also think that the afterbirth has a ghost and that the ghost is in that portion of the umbilical cord which remains attached to the child after birth. This ghost

[11] Roth, W. E.: *Superstition, Magic and Medicine.* North Queensland. Ethnography Bull., V, 1903, p. 18.

[12] Ploss, H. and Renz, B.: *Das Kind, in Brauch und Sitte der Völker. Op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 55, 56.

[13] Frazer, J. G.: *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings.* London: Macmillan Co., 1911, pp. 199, 200.

must be preserved if the child is to be healthy. Hence when the cord drops off it is rubbed with butter, swathed in bark cloth, and kept throughout life under the name of the 'twin'. The plantain tree at whose root the afterbirth is buried becomes sacred until the fruit has ripened and been used (tree=mother, fruit=child). All the child's excretions are disposed of by the mother at the foot of the tree.

The cord ('twin') has also something to do with the process of naming the child. For this purpose it is dropped into a bowl, containing a mixture of beer, milk or water; if it floats, the child is legitimate, receives a name, and becomes a member of the clan.[14] The plantain under which the afterbirth was buried is carefully guarded because if somebody partook of the beer made from it he would be taking the ghost from its clan and the living child would then die in order to follow its twin ghost.[15] In the name-giving ceremony one of the clans takes the cord out in the evening. They seek out a plantain just about to bear fruit and then cut the top of the plantain just below the spot where the leaves branch out, and make an incision in the stem a few inches below, cutting right through the heart of the tree with a knife used to serve up the cooked plantain food. The cord is left there. Early next morning they go again to the tree and if the core of the tree has shot up during the night so that the cord is above the place where the tree had been cut, this is regarded as a good sign: the child is without doubt a member of the clan.[16]

In Southern Celebes, the placenta is the child's 'sister', the cord its 'brother'.[17] The Kubu regard both the placenta and the cord as brothers of the child. Their bodies are undeveloped but their souls are powerful and they are the guardian spirits of the child. But if the necessary rites are not per-

[14] Frazer, J. G.: *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 195, quoting Roscoe, J.: *Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda.* J. Royal Anthr. Inst., XXXII, 1902. *Idem.*: *Kibuka, the War God of the Baganda.* Man, VII.

[15] Roscoe, J.: *The Baganda.* London: Macmillan Co., 1911, pp. 54, 55.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[17] Crawley, E.: *The Mystic Rose.* 1902, p. 119, quotes Mathews: *Bijdragen tot de Ethnologie van Zuid Celebes*, pp. 57, 59.

formed the guardian spirits become persecuting demons.[18] The Tunguz and Jakuts unite the child to the father by the placenta which the father and his friends eat.[19]

But the ties that unite mother and child are not severed so easily. In Bohemia, when children are about to go to school, they are given their umbilical cords which have been carefully preserved tied in a knot, to insure that they will get on well in school.[20] The Székelys in Transylvania soak the cord in water and look through it; there they see the future of the child.[21] The Walachs of the Balkans think that showing the cord to the child will bring him success in all things.[22] In Hungary the child has to untie the knot at the age of seven; if he can do this he will be successful in everything.[23]

Birth is an enormously important transition and the prototype of all anxiety situations. This period is extended into the first transition period in life which ends with a *rite d'agrégation*. When the child is four months old, the Nandi slaughter an ox or goat, and after the mother, the child and the animal have been annointed with milk by one of the leaders of the clan, the child's face is washed in the undigested food in the animal's stomach. Then the elder prays:

> God give us health.
> God protect us.
> Our spirits protect this child.
> O Stomach protect this child.[24]

[18] Frazer, J. G.: *Balder the Beautiful.* London: Macmillan Co., 1911, Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.

van Dongen, J.: *De Koboe in de Residentie Palembang.* Bijdragen tot de Taal en Volkenkunde, LXIII, 1910, p. 229.

[19] Georgi, J. G.: *Beschreibung aller Nationen des Russischen Reiches.* 1776, p. 79.

[20] John, A.: *Sitte Brauch und Volksglaube im deutschen Westbohmen.* 1905, p. 104.

[21] For this and for further data on the subject see Róheim, Géza: *Az élet fonala (The Thread of Life).* Ethnographia, 1916.

[22] Sajaktzis, G.: *Gräco-walachische Sitten und Gebräuche.* Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde, 1894, p. 135.

[23] Róheim, Géza: *Op. cit.*

[24] Hollis, A. C.: *The Nandi, Their Language and Folk-Lore.* Oxford: Clarendon, 1909, p. 65.

The child that comes from 'the stomach' is dedicated to the protection of another stomach.

When a Shan mother has rested and slept a little her baby is handed to her. She first chews a peppercorn and rubs the inside of its mouth with her saliva 'to make it clean', and then it has its first drink.[25] Nature provides the first *rite de séparation* in birth and the first *rite d'agrégation* in sucking. The oral restoration of the mother-child unity is in the Shan mother's rite specifically emphasized. It was A. Dieterich, founder of modern classical philology, who first pointed out that the initial period of danger ends with the finding of a symbolic mother.[26] According to a widespread European custom an infant is deposited on the earth (*tellus mater*) whence it is lifted by its father. Sometimes the explanation is given that this will make the child strong.[27] Antaios, born of Gæa, the Earth, gains new strength whenever he touches the earth.[28]

The first marginal period in human life starts with birth and is often terminated by a special ceremony. Among the Thonga, about seven days elapsing from the moment of birth before the umbilical cord falls, this period of confinement for mother and child is called *bushahana,* and constitutes a true marginal period in which mother and child are absolutely outside the pale of society. The mother receives a special diet to expel the unclean blood and increase the production of milk. The pot and spoon used by the mother are fastened over the entrance of the hut at the end of the seclusion period. A fowl is killed during the first days, a hen if the child is a girl, a cock if it is a boy. Some medicinal powder is poured into the broth and the mother drinks it and eats part of the meat, the husband eating the remainder. The child's umbilical cord is anointed every day, and it begins to drink medicine to make it grow. The husband is excluded because the blood would contaminate him. All those are excluded who have

25 Milne, L.: *Shans at Home.* London: John Murray, 1910, p. 33.
26 Dieterich, A.: *Mutter Erde.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1913.
27 *Ibid.*: p. 10.
28 Roscher Lexikon: *Antaios.* Vol. I, p. 362.

regular sexual intercourse because their touch might contaminate the child. When the umbilical cord falls off the confinement period is ended and this is marked by two rites. The floor of the hut is smeared with clay by the mother's mother, and this cleansing act ends the marginal period. All the dangerous blood is now eliminated. The second act is the rite of the broken pot. On the threshold of the hut the medicine man puts pieces of skin of beasts of the bush into a broken pot. Then he roasts them until they burn. The smoke rises and he exposes the child to it for a long time—the body and face—to cause the baby to cry, sneeze and cough. Then the doctor takes the remaining pieces of the skin, grinds them and makes an ointment with which he rubs the whole body of the child, especially the joints. Having thus been exposed to all external dangers, represented by the skins of the beasts of the bush, the child may be taken out of the hut. He is now able 'to cross the foot prints of wild beasts' without harm; snakes and lions will now not kill him.[29]

The marginal period signifies a separation not only for the child but also for the mother. She has lost part of herself and she reintrojects it in the form of a cock if it is a boy or a hen if it is a girl. Cathexis of the symbol of transition is in the act of anointing the child's umbilical cord, and a typical introjection of the hostile world in the closing *rite d'agrégation.* Another similar rite, performed later, is a presentation of the child to the moon.[30] In the Memi ceremonial of the termination of the taboo period the cock or a hen, according to the sex of the infant, is killed and cooked by the mother who eats it all herself except small portions given to the spirits.[31] Among the Sema Nagas as soon as the child is born she eats a

[29] Junod, H. A.: *The Social Life of a South African Tribe.* London: Macmillan Co., 1913, Vol. I, pp. 40–42.

A cow is given a few hairs of her calf's tail in bread to stop her from crying for the calf.—Nemethy in Ethnographia, XLIX, 1938, p. 230.

Nothing should be taken out of the house within three days after the delivery.—Hegyi in Ethnographia, XLVIII, 1937, p. 472.

[30] Junod, H. A.: *Op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 51.

[31] Hutten, J. H.: *The Angami Nagas.* London: Macmillan Co., 1921, pp. 342, 343.

chicken of the same sex as the child. While in these rites the mother symbolically reintrojects the child, among the Kayans the fœtal membranes are dried and preserved by the mother. Pounded to a powder and mixed with medicines it is administered to the child in later years.[32]

A number of taboos in connection with very young children gain new meaning if appraised in terms of separation anxiety and the symbolic equivalence of a part of the body with the primary object.[33] In Wales, when a baby's nails first need paring the mother bites them off. If she cuts them the child will be a thief.[34] That is, if a part of the body is separated, it should go into the mother's mouth; otherwise the child will always be trying to retake something to make up for a traumatic separation. Children should not be weaned at the time when birds migrate because if they are they become restless and very changeable[35]—two separations at a time would be too much. In East Prussia, if a child's hair is cut before the end of the first year the child will die.[36] The nails should not be cut; by doing so, one cuts the child's luck or the child will be a thief. The mother should bite them off; in some places also swallow them.[37] In Silesia, the first milk tooth that falls out should be swallowed by the mother; then the child will never have toothache. The child's first nails should be bitten off by the mother to prevent the child from becoming a thief.[38] If one cuts an infant's first hair or

[32] Hose, Ch. and McDougall, W.: *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo.* London: Macmillan Co., 1912, Vol. II, p. 155.

[33] The same interpretation would also apply to some of the cases collected by Menninger, Karl: *Man against Himself.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938, pp. 232, 233, 237.

[34] Trevelyan, M.: *Folk-Lore and Folk Stories of Wales.* London: Elliott Stock, 1909, p. 267.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Wuttke, Ad.: *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube.* Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben, 1900, p. 392.

[37] *Ibid.* P. 329. A parallel taboo: the mother should not go on a journey before the child has been weaned otherwise the child will be a sleep-walker *i.e.*, always looking for its mother.

[38] Drechsler, P.: *Sitte, Brauch und Volksglaube in Schlesien.* 1903, Vol. I, pp. 213, 215.

nails, which should be bitten off by the mother,[39] one cuts its mind or luck off, or the child will be a thief; or it will wound itself with a knife or scissors.

The beliefs of the Ila-speaking people of Northern Rhodesia explain the significance of these separation taboos. For several days after birth the child is given a concoction made of the leaves of the castor oil plant as a preventive against the malign influence of pregnant women, and a string made of palm leaves is suspended on poles in front of the hut to give warning to keep these women away. This is called 'to fend off by means of a string'. A pregnant woman must not come to the hut lest the child die of *luvhumwe* (something split or parted asunder). If a pregnant woman passes through a calabash garden, the calabashes will all drop off their stalks and split; if she passes a tree laden with fruit, the fruit will fall to the ground; if she passes near a litter of pups, their heads will split; if she passes a hen sitting on a nest of eggs, they will all crack. Similarly, were she to enter a hut where there is a baby, its skull would part asunder.[40] The pregnant woman will soon undergo a split; therefore she induces separations. In Wales,[41] a spinster coming into the room at the time of birth is lucky for the same reason; she is a person who will not split.

PUBERTY RITES

Puberty rites are the rites of transition par excellence, because puberty is the greatest biologically conditioned transition in human life. The point of view in the explanation of these rites here introduced is not intended to supersede other explanations given by anthropologists, but only to supplement them, and the interpretation of them is an *addition* to the psychoanalytic interpretations hitherto given (dramatization

[39] John, A.: *Op. cit.*, p. 109. For further references see Róheim, Géza.: *Spiegelzauber.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1919, pp. 30, 31.

[40] Smith, E. W. and Dale, A. M.: *The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia.* London: Macmillan Co., 1920, Vol. II, pp. 10, 11

[41] Trevelyan, M.: *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

of the œdipus conflict, castration anxiety). These rites have been interpreted as transition rites by van Gennep, and following him by other anthropologists. Certain puberty rites are here to be presented as transition rites based upon the primal separation from the mother. The characteristic features of these rites are the repetition of the separation carried out on the body of the person who undergoes the rite, the aggregation (substitute mother) that terminates the rite, the formation of doubles as a defense against object loss, the libidinal (genital) cathexis of the transition period, and symbolic birth.

The following account is taken from my field notes. Beginning August 7th, 1929, the Pitjentara boy Tapaltari is to be initiated. His father, his uncle and the women set up a *death dirge* (separation). They are told to stop because the boy will know what it is about. Finally the boy is surrounded by all the men. He looks very sullen, and is playing with his penis. They seize him and run along with him with a show of military demonstration, shouting '*pu! pu!*' as they go along. Then they throw him up in the air (separation), and catch him. His father and uncle are not in the group of men; they are for the time being supposed to be in the same state as the boy. This is called *irkapari,* which can be translated as identification. They are lying on their stomachs on the ceremonial ground the way the boy will soon be lying. As the ceremonies started they let their hair hang loose, that is they have undone the *pokuti,* the protruding pigtail, made by inserting a pad and pulling the hair over it, worn only by initiated men. When they undo this, it means that the boy's foreskin will come off with ease. The mother is also lying on her stomach, but she of course is in the camp.

We are on the ceremonial ground, carefully chosen from the point of view of isolation so that it can be easily guarded against the approach of the women. On one side its boundary is the dry bed of the Palmer river, on the other some high

mountains. It has a third natural boundary, the bed of a small creek that would flow into the Palmer if there were any water in it. Tapaltari, the boy who is to be initiated, and his guardian have been living in the mountains where there is no chance of meeting a woman. A guard is posted to patrol the ceremonial ground because if a woman were to come there by accident they would have to kill her. Under a clump of trees at one end sit the old men who direct the performance and act as chorus but take no active part. I am seated among them. To the left towards the hills, the boy is lying on his stomach with his guardian. His face is supposed to be covered, but from time to time he looks up. Further to the left the father and the uncle are lying, *irkapari.* Every day the boy will be brought down from the hills to be present at the ceremonies. He sees little of them because he is supposed not to look except at times, as when, for instance, the men run backwards showing their subincised penises.

On August 18th we see two men standing together with no *andatta* (birds' down) ceremonial decoration, but plentifully covered with blood. They perform the *ngallunga,* running backwards flicking their penises which are in a semierect state, and shouting *'hau!',* with uplifted hands. They bring the big red and white *waninga warambalkana.* Kanakana is in the leading rôle and I take his photograph with the big *waninga.* The wind overthrows the big *waninga;* everybody is frightened and gloomy. They make a small fire in the middle of the ceremonial ground and three men with the *waninga* hop-dance right into the fire. There is pause while the official circumcisers are being prepared for the operation. The official title of the operators is *purka* (tired), but the boy calls them *pikata* (pain maker). The two operators are Warutukutu a Nambutji, of about twenty, who is the boy's *amba* (nephew), and Pana a Pindupi, of about twenty-five, the boy's *kata* (father). A red line running down their noses indicates their function. They keep chewing their beards to indicate that they are angry or excited. They stand aloof, fully con-

scious of their importance. Now the men run and fetch the women. The women run in front; the men behind them, as if they were driving them, bend sideways from their hips, shaking their spears and howling, *'Pau! pau!'*

The women have been dancing in the camp in honor of the boy every night. They are all here today, from the tiny girls to the old women; now they are having a last dance in honor of the boy, and they are very active with their hips. Kanakana whirls the bull-roarer; they run for their lives, howling and crying because of the boy.

Several men have gathered around the hero of the day who looks anything but heroic. The 'pain-makers' chew their beards with increased vigor and look decidedly awe-inspiring. A big fire is made in the center of the *amboanta* (that is, on the other side of the creek; not where the women were dancing), and two men standing on all fours form a kind of table. The men drag the boy to this operating table and throw him on it. face upwards. Each arm and leg is held by somebody because he is wriggling and kicking as hard as he can. Kanakana sits on the boy's chest, pulls the foreskin forwards, and Pana cuts it off with a penknife borrowed from one of the Aranda missionaries.[42] Now the boy is taken off the 'table' and seated on the ground beside the fire because the smoke will stop the bleeding. He is crying, groaning and rubbing his eyes. The men are consoling him, especially Kanakana. 'We have all endured the same thing', they say. Kanakana tells him, 'Now you see, you too have a *lendja* [*corona glandis*], like I have', and shows him his own penis. 'Now you'll get plenty of food', they tell him. It is about four o'clock in the afternoon, and the boy has not yet had anything to eat. But he scarcely listens; he goes on crying and looks at the blood running from his penis with an expression that is more sad than frightened. The men hold a pad made of hair to the back of his head and pull his own hair backwards over it.

[42] A stone knife would have been used otherwise.

They are making his *pukuti,* the coiffure worn only by men, and this is the beginning of the second phase of initiation.

After the circumcision the initiate receives a *mandagi* (bull-roarer) and the men pour their blood on him every day or every second day. He receives the *mandagi* when the first blood-pouring ceremony takes place. The boy's *Tamu* (grandfather) tells him, 'Don't shout. Always sit down in the dark; don't stand up because you might be seen.' He is therefore actually and not only ceremonially in a state of isolation. They tell him not to eat and drink hot things because that would make his penis hurt. He is not to eat porcupine (echidna); that would make his penis get stiff and difficult to subincise; nor a wallaby newly taken from a pouch because then he would have a rough forehead. One aspect of these sympathetic taboos is *the tendency to form doubles as a compensation for separation.* The spiny anteater becomes a double of the penis and the young animal newly taken from the pouch a symbol or double of the boy. He must walk on all fours in the scrub so that the women and the children will not see him. He is not allowed to make a fire in the ordinary way with the spear-thrower [43]; therefore he must not eat *nyintjiri* (black goana) because then his fire would go out. He states that when they showed him their bleeding penises in the *ngallunga* rite he did not know what might happen; he thought they might kill him after that. He keeps repeating this.

In some tribes the initiate is handed the bull-roarer immediately after the circumcision, but in the Pitjentara tribe only at the first blood pouring ceremony. When he gets the *mandagi* he is told there is no *apuju* (the uninitiated are told the booming sound of the bull-roarer is made by a demon, *apuju*) but that it is the men who make the noise by whirling the bull-roarer. He can do the same now, and later when his wounds are healed both from the circumcision and the sub-

[43] Probably because this rubbing would be equivalent to rubbing his sore penis.

incision he can attract women by whirling it; that is, he can use it for love magic. While his wounds are not healed he can not go about like other mortals. His body must be kept covered with a coat of blood which is supplied by the initiators. They need more blood than can be obtained from the subincision wounds so they get it from a vein in the arm. While the preparations are proceeding they discover that the boy has bolted. Pana finds him and brings him back, holding his wrist as was done when first he was brought to the initiation ground. Several men have made a ligature with hair string; they break twigs from the trees and stab the veins. Some do not bleed much; others are quite pale and bleeding profusely. They thump the chest of one man because he is showing signs of weakness. The boy is on all fours and Kanakana pours the blood on his back with great care, the idea being that not a single spot on his body should remain uncovered. They are especially careful to cover the penis, and the men's blood flows down on the boy's penis just like the boy's own blood after the circumcision. Then the boy is made to stand in the sun so that the blood may coagulate on him and form a sort of crust. Meanwhile the men are again stabbing their veins and pouring their blood into a piece of bark which they have just torn from one of the trees. This is for the boy to drink, and he certainly does not like it. He has to be dragged by the wrist again. Kanakana drinks first, or rather he eats the blood because it is now mixed with sand and clotted. This is to encourage the boy who has to do the same. Mataltji comes next; his beard gets full of it and he sucks it off the beard. Finally the boy does the same. It is the aim of this ceremony that the boy have a big body, and they compare it to the custom of giving blood to old and sick people.

Thus is seen clearly at work the system of fictive compensations for separation. First the boy is taken from the camp, from the society of women and introduced into a purely male society. Next, the foreskin is separated from the penis. For

this the boy is compensated by the *pokuti,* a pigtail that is a penis symbol;[44] by the blood-pouring (for the blood he has lost he receives blood from the men); and by a *tjurunga.*

In the Pitjentara ritual the *tjurunga* received at this point is the penis symbol. The small *tjurunga* used in love magic is actually called 'penis of the water' by the Aranda. In the Aranda ritual the boy receives this small bull-roarer only at the end of the initiation rites, and the *tjurunga* he gets after circumcision is the big one, the *tjurunga mborka* or body *tjurunga;* but it has a hole in it and can also be used as a bull-roarer like the small one. When the boy receives the *tjurunga mborka* they tell him, *'Nana umkwanga mborka* (this is your body); *knallapa* (don't break it); *itja unditjika* (don't give it away); *atua arpuna nyangura'* (another man ancestor) which means, 'This is another person (like you) and also your mythical ancestor'. Strehlow says that they tell the boy, 'This is your body; this is the same as you; do not take it to another place or you will feel pain'. So long as this *tjurunga* is in safe custody, the individual is not in danger. The *tjurunga* represents a mythical bond between the individual and his totem ancestor. In his nightly wanderings the *iningukua* (according to my informants, 'the hidden one') convinces himself that the *tjurunga* is safe but if it should have been stolen, loaned or shown to the women, the *iningukua* gets angry and stabs his human representative with a pointed stick so that he will get ill or die.

When the lizard totem ancestor was forming the shapeless primeval human beings he gave each of them a *tjurunga* and called it 'the body which was bound up with it'. Then, giving a kangaroo man a *tjurunga,* he said, 'this is the body of a kangaroo; you are derived from this *tjurunga'.* Strehlow summarizes the significance of the *tjurunga* as follows: 'The *tjurunga* is regarded as the common body of mankind and

[44] The *pokuti* is identified with the bull-roarer which, I have elsewhere proved in detail, must be interpreted in this sense; moreover, as stated, the loosened *pokuti* of father and uncle correspond to the looseness of the boy's foreskin.

the totem ancestors. It connects the individual with his personal totem and guarantees the protection which the *iningukua* bestows, whilst the loss of the *tjurunga* provokes the spirit's revenge. Everybody has therefore two bodies, a body of flesh and one of wood or stone.' [45]

Instead of the dual unity of mother and child we have in this ritual the symbolic separation of the child from the mother repeated in the separation of a part of the child's body from the child, and compensated by a symbolic omnipotent penis (bull-roarer for love magic), and by the father-son dual unity. The analysis of the ritual from this point of view brings out quite clearly the validity of Freud's thesis that anxiety progresses *from separation anxiety to castration anxiety,* through the displacement of cathexis from the object to the organ that ensures reunion with the object.

We need not discuss all the details of the ceremony. It ends with a ritual of rebirth in the *nankuru* and finally when the boy, now fully initiated, returns to camp he is given 'seed' prepared from his mother's milk. The rite starts out with a separation and ends with an aggregation. The boy has lost the mother of his infancy, but is to regain her by the permission to have access to women in general. The rite of aggregation is an introjection. It is modeled on life. The baby suffers the trauma of birth and the first compensation it receives is the nipple.

There is anxiety in the transition period between separation and aggregation. One mechanism for dealing with the anxiety is the rebirth symbolism of the transition period whose functional significance is to represent it as a danger successfully overcome. The other mechanisms are all based on withdrawal of libido from the object. One very important formula is: 'You have lost your mother and have not yet got your wives, but you have your penis'—the magic wand that bridges the gulf of the transition period. The rites center about the

[45] Strehlow, C.: *Die Aranda und Loritjastämme.* Frankfurt: T. Baer, Vol. II, pp. 76–77, 80–81.

penis and penis symbols *(tjurunga);* for the initiate it is essentialy a phallic ritual.[46]

These same mechanisms can be traced in Murngin rituals. 'All the ceremonies are associated with age grading, as being participated in by men initiated into certain age grades or serving to initiate a man into a higher status; and all are associated with moiety or clan totems.' [47] This is equivalent to saying that all ceremonies are transition rites.

The young Djungguan starts by making a ceremonial trumpet (*yur lunggur*); the little boys are then taken from their mothers and sent on a journey. The little boys are told that the Great Father Snake smells their foreskins and is calling for them. The boys believe this and they run to their mothers because they know that the men are going to take them away. The women form a ring around the boys, protecting them from the men, and say: 'Our sons have a great multitude of relatives and their people are to be found everywhere. Our sons have many kangaroos, wallabies and birds, and they have speared many fish and turtles. Our sons and brothers have gone many places and speak many languages and they have many presents from all people.' This is to ensure the boys' acquiring many presents on the journey. The neophytes are away for a month or two on their journeys. In later years a man always boasts about the great distances he traveled and the long period he was absent on his journey. Before leaving, the boys are given new armlets which are painted with white clay; white cockatoo feather hairdresses are put on them and their faces are daubed with white paint. A large hair belt, suspended from which is a painted opossum fur string pubic covering, is put on the initiate for the first time. Before this he had been completely nude. When the boy arrives in the camp they erect a ceremonial pole in the middle of the camp. The men's ground, where the pole is erected, is called *Djung-*

[46] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *The Riddle of the Sphinx.* London: Int. Psa. Library, 1934.

[47] Warner, Lloyd W.: *A Black Civilization.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937, p. 259.

guan Wonga (camp) or *maraiin wonga. Maraiin* means powerful, sacred, taboo, and applies to anything that is taboo to the women and the uninitiated boys.[48] Anything that is separated from the women has a surplus value from the religious point of view; in other words, *separation or object loss is dealt with by a compensatory cathexis of the state of being separated.*

Everything that is *maraiin* is also *dal.* This means 'hard', 'strong', magically powerful. The old men's camp or *Wongar Dal* possesses a concentrated portion of this magical strength, *wongar* being the totemic spirit itself. They are the beings who used to wander on earth, and now live in the subterranean waters, and it is from these subterranean waters that the children emanate. The spirit or essence or *wongar* is also in the totemic emblem and therefore the old men's camp where the emblems are kept is literally the camp of the *wongar.*

The triangular dance ground where the totemic dances are presented represents the snake's body and is also supposed to have the Wawilak sisters and their children inside it.[49] However the dance ground into which the neophytes go and from which they emerge is also the camp of the mythical women, so that we must interpret the whole rite as rebirth from a bisexual being. On the day before the circumcision a blood letting ceremony takes place in the old men's camp. Before a man offers his blood for the first time the ceremonial trumpets that symbolize the Snake Father, are blown all over his body—that is, when the boy suffers a separation (circumcision), the men suffer the same (bloodletting). The blood used in these rites symbolizes the menstrual blood of the women.[50] The men having been separated from the women (menstruation) now identify themselves with these women. A coitus dance to imitate the copulating snakes is performed in a trench called *kartdjur* (clitoris).[51] The boys are covered

[48] *Ibid.,* pp. 260–264.

[49] *Cf.* A myth about two sisters and their sons. Just when they were about to be circumcised they were all swallowed by the Great Father Serpent. *Ibid.,* p. 250.

[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 274–279.

[51] *Ibid.,* pp. 301, 302

with bushes; when these are pulled off the boys, it means that the snake has swallowed them and is now spitting them up. Various totemic dances are performed, and before circumcision the boys are painted with emblems of the totems. The men carry two boys who are to be circumcised on their shoulders the way very small babies are carried. The ground where the circumcision takes place must be well covered with grass because the boys would become ill if the blood from the wound were to fall on the ground. When the cutting actually takes place the women say, 'You boys are fish, you are kangaroos, you are turtles (or any other game animal), and all of your things go into these little boys' blood and all of the blood must go down to their penises so that it will be like cutting a turtle's head or a kangaroo's head off, and it won't hurt the boys'. Then the women whip themselves to bring the pain from the boys to themselves (duplicate formation).

The foreskin is put in a paperbark basket filled with water. Later it is taken out and wrapped with paperbark and a pandanus string. It is hung on a basket as one of its pendants and then it is kept by the father until the boy grows up and then it is given to him. Just after the circumcision is completed the leader approaches all the men who have participated in the ceremony and pulls a ceremonial feather from their bodies as a sign that the ceremony is over—thus repeating the separation (circumcision) on those who participated in the ceremony.

In the concluding part of the ceremony the boy is steamed. This corresponds to the *nankuru* of the Pitjentara, and in it the mechanism of introjection, through the pores as well as through the mouth, is prominent. Dampened lily leaves are thrown into the fire to produce a thick steam. This pours around the boy and is supposed to enter his anus, go all through his body, and come out of his mouth. This makes him 'strong'. Later a man brings a piece of paper bark on which several small pieces of food have been placed. Every variety of food obtainable in the camp at that time is repre-

sented on the bark tray. The boy is given a piece of kangaroo meat or some other food and an old man says, 'This is not kangaroo. You tell me the name of that which you are eating'. He then whispers the totemic (taboo) name of the animal into the ear of the boy. The boy then calls out this esoteric name as he swallows the food. As he says the totemic name all the men cry out, *'Yai yai!'*. The whole list of foods is gone through, the boy eating and being told the totemic name of each. The boy is told that if he imparts any of the information he has been given, something will happen to his mother.[52] Here we have the sacramental eating of the totem animal as the closing phase of a part of the ceremony. By giving the food a new name, it has become something different, something remote from the mothers and close to the fathers. The old men impart tribal morals to the boys, and the way they do it clearly shows the superego as based on the introjection of the father imago. The old men warm their hands over the fire and put them to the boys' mouths while addressing them. At the end of another phase of the initiation rites when the men squat over the fire, the natives say, 'This means we can eat any kind of food'. Several days later the women bake a large palm nut loaf. The ceremonial bread is divided and eaten by all the men who participated in the ceremony. Ironwood leaves are put on a stone fire and the neophytes are placed over it so that both mouth and anus are supposedly filled with purifying steam. This is to allow the young men to eat large game which up to this time has been taboo to them.[53] When at the end of the Dua Narra ceremony the leader sings over the palm bread or yams and calls out the names of the various totems, this is supposed to infuse the bread with the power of the totems and make it 'just the same as the totem,' which means that the totemic spirit resides within the bread. Only the men who understand can eat this, e.g. only near relations and only those who have been initiated.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 288, 289.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 328, 329.

The essence of the ceremony is to unite those who share in it.[54]

In the Kakadu initiation ceremonies the oral aspect of the separation from the women is strongly emphasized. They scrape the neophyte's tongue with a grass string and say, 'Mother's talk leave behind'. A special fire is made to burn the string and the scrapings from the tongue. They must not talk to the women, nor allow them to see them with their mouths open. They must not spit in such a way as to let the women see them doing it, and the women must on no account see their teeth.[55] When out in the bush during initiation and given the *bidu-bidu* (bull-roarer) by the old men, they must carry these in helping to secure food and must avoid the women. When they return to the tribe there is a ceremonial meal with the women.[56]

The attitude regarding the bull-roarer and the penis of the initiate in the Larakia tribe is the same; the women must not see these mysteries. The real penis is protected by a supernatural penis. The neophyte carries a small stick wrapped in fur string (*mammurung*). It has been 'sung' by the old men and is full of magic. If he should fall asleep in such a way that he might hurt his penis by pressing on it the *mammurung* strikes him and wakes him up. The foreskin is ochred red, wrapped in a paperbark, and put into a little dilly bag, which the boy is warned not to lose on any account. It plays the same rôle as the *tjurunga* in Central Australia. But this is only temporary, for when the circumcision wound is healed he hands the foreskin over to his guardian who then cuts it into small pieces and burns it out in the bush. After this he can take a wife. It is interesting to observe that at another ceremony of the same tribe which means a further advance in status, the bull-roarers are broken to pieces and burnt in the bush in exactly the same manner.[57] Among the Djauan, the

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 355.
[55] Spencer, B.: *Op. cit.*, p. 131.
[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 156.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

foreskin is placed in a small dilly bag and then handed over by the father-in-law to the father who cuts it in two. He keeps one half and hands the other to the youth who must remain out in the bush until the next cool season. The boy finally hands over his half of the foreskin to his father, who buries both pieces in a hole in the ground. No one tampers with this hole; if anyone should attempt to secure the foreskin, the father of the boy would kill him. The ceremony ends when the boy is brought back to the women who are awaiting him with a big supply of food on a special camping ground.[58] Among the Mungarai, the boy's guardian who has been taking care of him shows the foreskin to his mother. Then it is taken to the father, then to the guardian's father who is also the boy's mother's brother. He keeps it for some time and then places it by a water hole. Then the guardian keeps it for a year wrapped in paperbark, and then hands it to the boy who gives him spears and implements for it. Then he shows it to his mother, then to his father, and then he keeps it for a time and finally buries it by the side of a lagoon near which only old men may go. At the end of the ceremony he is brought back to the women and to his mother and is permitted to talk again. A similar ceremony with the foreskin is performed among the Nullakun in which the boy's mother buries the foreskin at a certain waterhole and henceforth only the boy's mother's 'fathers' and 'mother's brothers' are allowed to gather lilies at that water hole.[59]

In a number of tribes in the South and East, the initiation ceremony consists of pulling a tooth. Even in Central Australia, where circumcision and subincision are the outstanding rites of initiation, tooth evulsion coëxists with these as a rite of minor significance.[60] As a rite of separation from the mother, this emphasizes the oral significance of the mother-child relationship, the tooth playing a rôle similar to the foreskin in the

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[60] Róheim, Géza: *Australian Totemism.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, pp. 417–422.

circumcision ritual. The River Darling natives (Bungyarlee and Parkunji) place the tooth under the bark of a tree near a water hole by the side of a creek. If the bark grows over the tooth or it falls into the water, all is well; but if it should be exposed and red ants run over it, the youth will suffer from a disease of the mouth.[61] Among the Itchumundi (Darling River) the extracted tooth with hair that has been plucked from the initiate's private parts are placed under the bark of a tree which has its roots in a water hole.[62] Conspicuous in all these rites is the connection between teeth and water. Thus among the Aranda the ceremony is observed by the members of the rain or water totem and the explanation given, that the rite makes the face look like a dark cloud with a light rim,[63] is, as Frazer observes, certainly far-fetched.[64] The explanation given by some Queensland tribes seems equally curious, yet it shows the nucleus of the whole complex: the custom of knocking out the two front teeth is connected with their entry into heaven. If they have the two front teeth out they will have bright clear water to drink and if not they will have only dirty or muddy water.[65] Here the association of teeth and water has directly to do with drinking; further, the rite is evidently associated with the initiate's mother who must provide food for the puller of the tooth who in his turn gives food to the man he operated on.[66] When the tooth is out the man throws it in the direction of his mother's mythological camp. If a girl's tooth is extracted, she does the same with one addition: she springs to her feet and seizing a small *pitchi* (vessel) fills it with sand and dancing over a cleared place

[61] Bonney, F.: *On Some Customs of the Aboriginals of the River Darling Natives.* J. of the Royal Anthr. Inst., XIII, p. 128.

[62] Howitt, A. W.: *Native Tribes of South East Australia.* 1909, p. 675.

[63] Spencer and Gillen: *Native Tribes of Central Australia.* London: Macmillan Co., 1899, pp. 213, 450.

[64] Frazer, J. G.: *Totemism and Exogamy.* London: Macmillan Co., 1910, Vol. IV, p. 181.

[65] Palmer, E.: *Notes on Some Australian Tribes.* J. of the Royal Anthr. Inst., XIII, p. 291.

[66] Spencer and Gillen: *Native Tribes of Central Australia. Op. cit.,* pp. 450, 451.

moves the *pitchi* as if she were winnowing seed.[67] The ritual is clearly connected with concepts of mother and food. Amongst the Warramunga the woman who has knocked the girl's tooth out pounds it and places the remains in a small piece of flesh which has to be eaten by the girl's mother. A man's tooth is ground up, put into meat and given to his mother-in-law. The Gnanji perform the operation in the rainy season and the tooth is given to the mother who in return presents the operator with food and red ochre. She buries it beside a water hole. This stops the rain and makes the water lilies grow.[68] The obvious explanation seems to be that in knocking teeth out the operator is separating the young man from his mother, i.e., from the nipple. If in these rites the mother receives or eats the tooth, she is retaining the child who is taken away from her, and the child has the consolation that a part of him remains with the mother for ever. In another group of rites, the tree or water becomes a mystical double of the neophyte, a kind of supernatural or inseparable mother. The original theory put forward by Frazer contains the latent content of the ritual, translated from the language of the unconscious into the language of mythological beliefs. According to this theory the aim of tooth extraction and circumcision is to promote the reincarnation of the individual by severing from his person a vital or durable part, and then subjecting this part to a treatment which will ensure reincarnation by putting it into a tree or water hole.[69] The latent content is the reverse. The ritual dramatizes the breaking up of the mother-child unity in a genital (foreskin) or oral (tooth) symbolism, with a magical denial of this separation (tooth eaten by mother; hidden in mother symbol-tree or pool.)[70]

[67] Spencer and Gillen: *The Arunta.* Vol. II, p. 479.

[68] Spencer and Gillen: *Northern Tribes of Central Australia.* London: Macmillan Co., 1904, p. 593.

[69] Frazer, J. G.: *The Origin of Circumcision.* The Independent Review, 1904, pp. 204–218; and *Totemism and Exogamy. Op. cit.,* Vol. IV, p. 181.

[70] Other explanations of the rite may also hold good; *cf.* Róheim, Géza: *Australian Totemism. Op. cit.,* pp. 419, 420.

In some Australian tribes the rite of transition consists in depilation or shaving, the separation of the child from the mother being represented by separating hair from the body. Among the Narrinyeri the young men are stripped and their hair is combed or rather torn out with the point of a spear and their mustaches and a great part of their beards plucked out by the root.[71] In the Dolgaritty ritual of the north-western districts of Victoria the boys are placed on their backs on couches of green bushes. They have been kept awake for a long time so that they are now in a state of semislumber. A man sits down beside each novice and begins pulling out the hair from the pubes, under the arms, and the incipient beard. When one man becomes tired he is replaced by another. The men who do the hair plucking are the potential brothers-in-law of the men assigned to them. Beeswax or gum is used upon the ends of the fingers to facilitate catching the hairs, which are pulled out singly. The hair pulled out of each youth is kept carefully by itself and is given into the charge of one of his relatives in the same way that the extracted tooth is disposed of in other districts. When the plucking is finished the novices are invested with a brow band, a man's waist belt, and an apron. Kangaroo's teeth are fixed in the lad's hair and a necklace is placed around his neck.[72] In the Tyibauga ceremony a man steps up to a youth and catches hold of the hair on one side of the head while another man singes it off. Then they singe the hair off on the other side. Along the middle zone of the skull, from the forehead to the back of the head, a strip of hair about two inches wide is left intact and is curled into a ridge. Both sides of the head from which the hair has been removed are then daubed with pipeclay mixed with common earth. The hair in the armpits, the pubic hair and the incipient beard are singed off. The hair that has been singed off the head is then wrapped up

[71] Taplin, G.: *The Narrinyeri.* Adelaide: E. S. Wigg & Son, 1878, p. 17.
[72] Mathews, R. H.: *Ethnological Notes on the Aboriginal Tribes of New South Wales and Victoria.* Sydney: F. W. White, 1905. p. 131.

with green leaves and tied round with string. Then it is attached to the desiccated tail of a native dog and hung upon a necklace which is worn by the lad's mother's maternal uncle.[73] The Tongaranka knock out one incisor and depilate the private parts. The boy carries the tooth and hair with him for about three weeks, and then selecting a tree which stands with its roots in a waterhole he cuts a hole in the bark and conceals them therein.[74]

Separation from the mother is represented as a separation of a part of the body from the whole.[75] Another conspicuous feature of these rites is that they impose *drinking and food taboos* on the novices, thus accentuating the separation of the oral unity, mother and child. The Narrinyeri neophytes must neither eat nor sleep for three days and nights. They are allowed to drink water by sucking it up through a reed; the luxury of a drinking vessel is denied them for several months. Only animals which are most difficult to obtain are assigned for their subsistence.[76] At the Yuin ceremonies food restrictions accompany tooth evulsion. The *gum-bang-ira,* or raw tooth novice, may not eat any of the following: emu, because it is Ngalalbal (mother of Daramulun, the god of the mysteries); any animal which burrows in the ground, and therefore reminiscent of the foot holes; such creatures as have very prominent teeth, such as the kangaroo, because they remind him of the tooth itself; and a number of others.[77]

The fact that food taboos at initiation are a repetition of oral frustration is clearly brought out in some non-Australian parallels. While Tonga boys are enduring the hardships of the initiation period, the men dance round them and sing:

[73] *Ibid.,* pp. 121, 122.

[74] Howitt, A. W.: *Op. cit.,* pp. 675, 676. For further data on these customs see Frazer, J. G.: *Totemism and Exogamy. Op. cit.,* Vol. IV, p. 228.

[75] Among American children fingernail biting (punishment for masturbation, but also a symbolic separation) reaches its peak at puberty. Wechsler, D.: *The Incidence and Significance of Nail Biting in Children.* Psa. Rev., XVIII, 1931, pp. 201–209.

[76] Taplin, G.: *Op. cit.,* pp. 17, 18.

[77] Howitt, A. W.: *Op. cit.,* p. 560.

'The black cow kicks! It kicks against the jug of the baboon!' They act the part of the black cow which the boy is trying to milk and they kick the boy.[78] Various forms of torture and deprivation connected with the food brought by the mothers for the boys[79] emphasize the same thing. The adolescent boys of Bougainville wear a peculiar structure on their heads. It is called *upi,* and the ceremony in which the boys are endowed with this *upi* is the *wapi* (initiation). The dried leaves of a small fan-palm are stretched over a frame made of thin bamboo, the bottom of which is composed of two circles of stiffer cane. The leaves are stitched together with fibre string and the bottom of the hat is bound together with a thicker string. The whole looks a kind of balloon on a socket. The origin of the legend of the *upi* is as follows. A woman was walking in the bush when she saw a spirit with an *upi*. She desired the *upi* very much, so she said to the spirit, 'I like you, you are my man'. Then the spirit took his long breasts and gave them to the woman, and took hers, which were very small, for himself. Before that men had had big breasts and women small ones. The woman said, 'I don't want these big breasts. I want your *upi*'. The spirit said, 'I don't want to suckle a child. If you have a child you must put him to your own breasts and give him milk.'[80] In the ceremonies a female figure appears without breasts. It is quite evident that the boys, now being finally separated from their mothers, wear symbolic breasts on their heads. Among the Tami, the essential feature of the fast of the neophytes consists of abstaining from water,[81] that is, of a drinking taboo.

In applying Hermann's views on the significance of grasping as a partial impulse, to transition rites in general and specifically to Australian puberty ceremonies, we find the three phases of separation, marginal period, and aggregation postulated

[78] Junod, H. A.: *Op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 82.

[79] *Ibid.,* p. 83.

[80] Blackwood, B.: *Both Sides of Buka Passage.* 1935, pp. 194, 195.

[81] Bamler, G.: *Mythologie und religiöse Anschauungen der Tami,* in Neuhauss: *Deutsch Neu Guinea.* Berlin: Reimer, 1911, Vol. III, p. 499.

by Gennep. In this case the separation from the mother is precisely the manifest content of the rite. It is interesting however to observe that in the aggregation rite at the end of the period, the initial separation is canceled, the nipple is restored. This may take place simply in the form of a special meal or ceremonial communion, but among the Aranda and their western neighbors the food for this occasion is prepared with mother's milk. In the Burbung rites of the Wiradthuri, according to Mathews, because of the novices' short hair, and the white paint on their bodies, 'the mothers are sometimes unable to recognize their own sons. The old men conduct each mother to her son. His mother then approaches him and holds her breast to his face pretending to suckle him.' [82] Among the Broome tribes during the circumcision period the boy is not allowed to eat vegetables obviously because such food is gathered by the women. The mother-in-law tempts him with a hollow scoop of vegetable food: 'You hungry? Here is food. If you don't take it, I will hit you. All right, watch me eat it!'[83] When the boy after his journey with the men returns to his home ground, blood drinking again takes place, but for the first time he is allowed to eat a little vegetable food, gathered and prepared by his mother.[84] Between the separation and the aggregation (mother and wife)[85] we have an actual geographical marginal period. Under the guidance of one or two older men the boys wander about in the bush strictly separated from their mothers and wives, from their past and future. This period is characterized by anxiety; the boy is afraid that the men will kill him; he believes that he will be killed and resuscitated by a demon, etc. This anxiety is dealt with in various ways. One is the dramatization of the

[82] Mathews, R. H.: *The Burbung of the Wiradthuri Tribes.* J. of the Royal Anthr. Inst., 1896, p. 335.

[83] Bates, Daisy: *The Passing of the Aborigines.* London: John Murray, 1939, p. 36.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[85] From a ceremonial and symbolic point of view the rite indicates the 'mother regained'. From a reality point of view it takes the young man through a marginal period from the mother to the wife.

transition period as a rebirth, as a repetition of the primal and universal anxiety which has been overcome successfully. The other is the repetition of the separation (foreskin, tooth, hair) in which the trauma is dealt with on a narcissistic object level; that is, instead of the original object we have its narcissistic equivalent (a part of the body), and this paves the way towards new ties or a symbolic unconscious renewal of old ones. Thus the guardian may keep the foreskin or tooth, establishing a bond between the young man and male society, or it is given back to the mother. Also, an intermediary cathexis is formed: the foreskin is cut off, but it then acquires a protective value; or the youth while separated from the women is endowed with a supernatural penis (*tjurunga*). The rite starts with an oral separation trauma and ends with mother's milk. Halfway between the starting point and the end, the men's blood,[86] which in the ceremonial songs of Central Australia is sometimes called milk, is introduced.

Among the Karadjeri the neophyte is told to stand over a small fire upon which green leaves have been placed, the smoke enveloping the boy. He then sits down on the ground, his eyes being covered by a man's hand and bark or leaves being placed in his ears. He is forced to drink blood from a bark dish while a medicine man rubs his abdomen to prevent him from vomiting. While he is drinking the blood he is exhorted not to vomit lest he should offend a spirit which would kill his father, mother and sisters. After the boy has consumed a quantity of blood, his father's, mother's brothers (father-in-law), brothers and brothers-in-law also drink some, it being said that the boy believes that the blood will kill him unless he sees the older men drinking it.[87] When the men fetch the boy for the blood drinking rite he pretends to run away, but he must let himself be caught or his mother will die. On the eve of the blood drinking the boy lies with his head on his father's thigh. He must make no movement or he will die.

[86] *Cf.* above.

[87] Piddington, R.: *Karadjeri Initiation.* Oceania, III, p. 66.

The father blindfolds the boy with his hands because if he witnesses the proceedings his father and mother will die.

The death clause introduced into these ceremonies is evidently connected with the aggression evoked or reinforced by the separation. At any rate, the blood represents the father and the mother who are devoured by the boy in this act of introjection.[88] 'The vessel is brought to where the boy is lying. The father takes his hands from the boy's eyes, though they remain closed while the rude bark chalice is lifted to his lips. The boy then takes a long draught of the blood. Should his stomach rebel, the father holds his throat to prevent his ejecting it, as, if that happened, his father, mother, sisters and brothers would all die. The remainder of the blood is thrown all over him.' From this time the boy is allowed no other food than the blood of the men, and he continues to be in close contact with his father and the other men till finally he is brought back to the camp, to female society and vegetable food.[89]

Another peculiar rite, hitherto viewed only as a form of torture to which the boys are subjected, is the eating of excrement. In the Burbung of the Wiradthuri the old men give each novice some human excrements to eat. Urine is collected and given to the novices to drink when they are thirsty.[90] The place where the novices are initiated is called 'excrement place', and here quartz crystals, the excrement of the spirit Goign, are shown to the novices. The bull-roarer is called 'excrement eater', and the novices are also taken to a place called 'urinating place'.[91] At the Wonggoa ceremany (tooth evulsion) the novices are brought to the water pans, where they crouch down and rest their elbows on the bank and

[88] *Cf.* The Vedas. The hymn to the first teeth of the child says, 'They who have grown big and like a tiger *wish to devour father and mother,* the two teeth, Brhaspati, make them kind. Jatadevas.' Quoted by Ploss, H. and Renz, B.: *Das Kind. Op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 53.

[89] Bates, Daisy: *Op. cit.,* pp. 43, 46.

[90] Mathews, R. H.: *The Burbung of the Wiradthuri Tribes.* J. of the Royal Anthr. Inst., 1896, p. 278.

[91] *Ibid.,* p. 329.

bend their heads and necks over the rods, while they each suck a mouthful of water through the net-like covering of loose rushes floating on the surface. They must not swallow the liquid, but keep it in their mouths and rise to their feet. After this ceremonial sucking they drink a few mouthfuls of water and also eat some human ordure and animal flesh.[92]

I believe we may safely assume that the unconscious significance of these rites is the same as of blood drinking, viz., it is drinking 'male milk', or the introjection of the father. At the same time something else is also introjected—the ethical code of the tribe. When the Murngin initiates try to blow the trumpet (the trumpet is *Yurlungur,* the father) for the first time, the old men command all of them to 'respect their fathers and mothers; never to tell lies; not to run after women who do not belong to them; not to divulge any of the secrets of the men to the women and the uninitiated'.[93]

Instead of the original physiological introjection of the mother (sucking), we must assume a fantasied introjection of the pleasure-giving object in her absence. Soon, however, the actual frustration must make itself felt, as hunger can not be allayed by fantasy for any length of time. We then have the imago of the 'bad mother'. When the 'bad mother', or the absence of the mother, becomes associated with the father (œdipus phase), the tension or discomfort is again libidinized (emotionally accepted, 'loved'), and we have a full-fledged superego with introjection of the father and pride and pleasure in self-denial. Immediately after their commands to the boys, the old men rubbing the boys' navels (maternal rôle), tell them not to be greedy (self-denial), and then follows the characteristic totem sacrament of eating sacramental bits of the totem food, with revelation of the esoteric names of the totem animals.[94] At the Torres Straits initiation, when the boys are told not to steal, to be obedient and to look after father and mother, the

[92] Mathews, R. H.: *Ethnological Notes on the Aboriginal Tribes of New South Wales and Victoria. Op. cit.,* p. 112.

[93] Warner, W. Lloyd: *A Black Civilization. Op. cit.,* p. 284.

[94] *Ibid.,* pp. 288, 289.

initiators say, 'Father and mother all along same as food in belly; when they die you feel hungry and empty'.[95] Learning as such, the introjection of environment, also takes place during the marginal period. The boys see new places and learn not only traditional lore but also things bearing on everyday life from their elders. Here again we have the dramatization of an earlier process. Growing up or learning could never take place without the fundamental separation, i.e., the withdrawal of the nipple; and learning itself is a sublimated sucking.

The final characteristic feature of the transition rites is the formation of doubles. Libido is withdrawn from the absent objects (mother, women) and used for the cathexis of the ego. The novices are decorated, supplied with magical penis equivalents which also symbolize a bond with the fathers and a second body of the novice (*tjurunga*). Duplicate formations are based on the cathexis withdrawn from the object. The novice is given both supernatural (spirit) and real doubles (father and uncle in 'sympathetic' rôles) and through identification with the fathers and his contemporaries becomes a real member of society.

THE SOCIAL SITUATION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

There are two ways of interpreting the food taboos to which the young men in an Australian tribe are subjected. The method followed in this paper aims at discovering the latent content of the rite, the rite being interpreted like a dream or a symptom. The other method is limited to the alleged purpose of the rites, the manifest content, or rationalization, and overlooks the latent meaning and driving force that underlies it. This method interprets the ceremonies as social realities, a method of approach that appeals to the average person and to a certain type of philosopher. The man in the street or the naïve observer simply calls our attention to the fact that the old men keep the best food for themselves, and are also

[95] Haddon, A. C.: *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits.* Cambridge: University Press, 1904, V, p. 210.

acting in their own interest when they impress the young men with the dire consequences of stealing the wives of the *beati possidentes*. In more sophisticated language one might say that Australian and other primitive tribes are ruled by a gerontocracy.[96] The ruling class must defend its privileges; hence the young men are subjected to a terroristic rule and kept in their places by the united efforts of their rulers.

It may be taken for granted that every male, including the lower animals, finding himself threatened reacts with aggression to the younger rivals. Is this, then, the basic element of the ritual? In this case we should expect a society in which the best food is kept by the old men, and the best women too. The actual situation, however, is different. The old men restrict not only the sexual activity of the young men but also their own by the eight-class system, the upshot of which is that only every eighth woman is eligible as a wife. We must assume therefore that the tribal organization upheld by the old men is based not on their selfishness and anxiety but on their œdipus complexes and superegos. The aim of these complicated marriage restrictions is to avoid incest. They constitute a social organization based on an incest phobia which naturally presupposes the tendency towards incest and an endopsychic force (superego) erected against this trend. The dreams of my informants showed quite clearly that in the unconscious the old men are still young men fighting their œdipus battles with their fathers and identifying themselves with the younger generation, with their own sons. This is clearly shown in some aspects of the ritual. The initiators, for instance, resubincise themselves when they are performing the subincision on the initiates. I assume therefore that whenever old or middle-aged men are afraid of losing their wives, early infantile memories are revived in them. Each one was a rival of his father for the love of the mother, and now their

[96] *Cf.* Frazer, J. G.: *Lectures on the Early History of Kinship.* 1905, p. 107; and also Fenichel, Otto: *Über Trophäe und Triumph.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXIV, 1939, p. 258.

unconscious guilt feelings tell them that their sons are in the same position. In the wake of the œdipus earlier memory traces are revived. The danger that threatens them is, essentially, the same now as formerly: the danger of object loss or separation. They deal with it by projection. The greatest emphasis of the rituals lies in the dramatic separation of the young men from their mothers. Defense against the young men, projection, and identification with the neophytes act like the daytime residuals in dream formation; they start the whole process. The ritual itself, however, is determined by the latent processes and the content of separation anxiety, by libidinal cathexes withdrawn from objects to the ego, by super-ego formation, by the original mother-child dual unity [97] as represented in the relation of a part of the body to the whole, and by other mechanisms which have been discussed.

Without these mechanisms and unconscious motivations the old males might still have selfish interests to defend against the rising generation, but the measures taken to protect these interests would be very different. There would be no ritual to unite young and old, there would be no society at all and nothing that we could call human. When the old men are confronted with a new situation, they react on the basis of previous situations and deal with the new danger on the basis of mechanisms evolved in previous danger situations. By doing this they are also reacting in an adequate manner to the new situation for the simple reason that the danger comes from human beings like themselves. In other words, instinctual urges are turned to useful ends both for themselves and for the younger generation (learning). Id functions become ego functions.[98]

[97] *Cf.* Hoffmann, E. P.: *Projektion und Ich Entwickelung.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXI, 1935, p. 342.

[98] Freud: 'Where id was, there shall ego be.' *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1933, p. 112.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF HAVELOCK ELLIS TO SEXOLOGY

BY BURRILL FREEDMAN (NEW YORK)

It is almost impossible to appreciate today the repressive atmosphere with regard to sex which it was Havelock Ellis's main historical importance to have played a major part in dispelling. Even the noted Dr. Hack Tuke, editor of the Journal of Mental Science, to which Ellis was a contributor and who was a friend of Ellis, advised against the publication of his first volume of Studies in the Psychology of Sex. London medical publishers were confessedly afraid to handle the subject, and after he had achieved publication, even the Library of the British Museum, although it acquired Ellis, refrained from cataloguing him. The American Journal of Insanity was definitely unsympathetic to the first two volumes of the Studies. Reviewing them in 1902, it wrote briefly of the first that it did 'not seem to throw any specially new light upon the subjects', and of the second that it was 'of little real value', being filled with the 'pornographic imaginings of perverted minds', and that 'whether any practical results can come from such labor is doubtful'. But the 'purely scientific spirit' of Ellis was not, it was said, doubted.

In contradistinction to the great advances in neurology, the triviality of the medicopsychological literature of the time, further vitiated by theologism, was pronounced. In the years when Ellis attended medical school from which he graduated in 1899, the only instruction medical students received which might even inaccurately be called psychological, was an unqualified warning against contraception.

The Alienist and Neurologist of St. Louis—in which portions of the Studies were given advance publication—referred as early as 1899 to the arraignment of 'Havelock Ellis's great book, Sexual Inversion', and in 1902 reported at serious length on its second edition. In the interim—in connection with

references to the unwillingness of some medical men to treat patients having sexual symptoms, whether mental or physical—it was described in the Maryland Medical Journal as a classic having more of the scientific atmosphere, and showing greater study and research than any of the works hitherto published on the subject, not excepting those of Krafft-Ebing or Schrenck-Notzing. This was duly quoted in the London Lancet, from which it was in turn picked up and endorsed by the Southern California Practitioner as well as by the Alienist and Neurologist, which also warmly praised The Evolution of Modesty.

Freud ironically commented on the social effect of his own penetration into the realm of sex to which he had been led by his investigations in psychotherapy, that after 1893, 'A vacuum rapidly formed itself around my person'. It was a large part of the contribution of Ellis to have helped to dispel such prejudice. In Man and Woman, published in 1894, a year before the *Studien über Hysterie* of Breuer and Freud, Ellis had made the observation that the part played by the 'sexual emotions' in hysteria was underestimated. In the essay on Casanova in his Affirmations, published in 1898, Ellis had anticipated Freud in amplifying the thesis of art as a sublimation of sexual energies. The essay of Ellis on Psycho-Analysis in Relation to Sex in his Philosophy of Conflict, which appeared in 1919 after the completion of his principal services to this movement, returned to it again not, it is true, with unmixed edification. Not a psychiatrist, never trained in psychoanalysis, and only sceptically sympathetic to the most intricate of its investigations, Ellis nevertheless proclaimed the great discovery of Freud, that 'spirit is as indestructible as matter', and that the work of Freud 'is the revelation in the spiritual world of that transformation and conservation of energy which half a century earlier had been demonstrated in the physical world'. A posthumous article on Freud's Influence on the Changed Attitude Toward Sex, in the American Journal of Sociology in 1939, revealed the very inadequate understanding which Ellis had of the contributions of Freud to the last. But in his studies, he always presented psycho-

analytic findings as of scientific interest, and frequently confirmed them.

Sexual Inversion

The original inspiration of his work, writes Ellis, was the study of normal sexuality. His volume, Sexual Inversion, was the first published only because he happened to have for it the opportunity of collaboration on the scholarly and historical side, with the distinguished critic, John Addington Symonds. This volume appeared in a German translation in 1896, having to wait until 1897 for publication in England, with Symonds' material deleted at the request of his literary executor, Symonds having died four years before. An enlarged and largely rewritten edition was issued in 1915. Prosecution of the bookseller by the police was precipitated in 1898 by the original English edition under especially unjustifiable and offensive circumstances. This led Ellis to arrange for the publication of his studies thereafter in the United States, and with the transfer of the series to an American publisher, Sexual Inversion ceased to form Volume I. In medical and scientific quarters, this study was reviewed with mild approval when originally published in 1897. It appeared at a time when homosexuality still was generally supposed a symptom of degeneration, hereditary taint, of insanity or other disease. Scientific examination of the subject can hardly be said to have been attempted until after the middle of the nineteenth century. In England, there were only a few minor publications on the subject, privately printed, by Symonds and by Edward Carpenter, and an essay by Richard Burton. In 1895, the trial of Oscar Wilde had driven serious discussion of the subject further underground.

Among the signal services of Ellis were his dispassionate approach to the subject of inversion and the massive quality of his researches in sorting and extending the work of Westphal, Ulrichs, Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Hirschfeld, Schrenk-Notzing, and others, and his discerning recommendations. Ellis's study contained accounts of the numerous moral leaders

and persons of intellectual and artistic prominence who have been homosexual or revealed inverted sympathies. At the other extreme, it reviewed the manifestations of homosexuality observed among many of the lower animals. It was especially valuable, like the observations of Freud, in showing the prevalence of rudimentary inverted tendencies even in persons who are not homosexual, and in relating this to the undifferentiated state of sexuality, or bisexual disposition of very young children, to which it contributed evidence. It reported the convictions of Schrenk-Notzing, vigorous clinical champion from the early 1890's of the doctrine of acquired inversion (and perversion in general) and its amenability to suggestion. The case histories which were presented by Ellis demonstrated early sexual segregation, seduction, and disappointment in normal life as 'exciting causes' of inversion. Decisive confirmation was thus afforded that sexual inversion was not a disease, and not, as Krafft-Ebing had considered it, a condition of degeneration. This assistance in discrediting the whole concept of degeneration was a matter of wider than sexological importance.

Emphasizing, however, that not all persons who appear to have been exposed to the same 'exciting causes' become or remain homosexual, Ellis persisted in the opinion that sexual inversion was an anomalous variation based on a congenital predisposition to experience attraction to individuals of the same sex. It was on evidence of the kind furnished by Ellis that the generalizations of psychoanalysis were built. The latter proved the alternatives of 'congenital' and 'acquired' to be incomplete. The methods of Freud demonstrated homosexual attraction to be a general transitional stage in the normal development of the child, and showed the nonexistence of any fundamental line of demarcation between 'absolute' or 'true inverts', 'psychosexual hermaphrodites', and 'occasional inverts'. '. . . We are forced to the conclusion', Freud wrote in his Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, 'that there is indeed something congenital at the basis of perversions, but it is something *which is congenital in all persons,* which as a predisposition may fluctuate in intensity; and that it is brought

into prominence by influences of life . . . which control the processes of development of the infantile sexuality up to its termination in a perversion, a neurosis, or a normal sexual life.' In unraveling the genesis of inversion, psychoanalysis discovered, among other mechanisms, that an intense but short-lived fixation on the parent of the opposite sex in infancy gives way to an identification with this parent, and the taking of oneself as the love object, after which other persons of one's own sex are sought as love objects. To Sadger, Ferenczi, and Freud is owed the greatest understanding of details and variations.

Ellis lacked the experience with the psychology of the unconscious to appreciate the universality of the congenital factor in inversion, and the decisive importance of infantile conditioning in bringing it into prominence. But he valuably promulgated the actuality 'in particular cases' of the processes which psychoanalysis illumined. He performed the invaluable further service of teaching society to 'enable an invert to be healthy, self-restrained, and self-respecting', and of disseminating the confidence that an appeal to his 'dignity, temperance, even chastity' could find a response. Dr. Hirschfeld, the leading authority on the anthropology of homosexuality, wrote that a sexologist must have brains and heart together, that Ellis had both and 'on account of this we love him'. In Appendices, Ellis included a pseudonymous contribution on Homosexuality Among Tramps, and reviewed materials on The School Friendships of Girls. He accepted the estimate of the incidence of homosexuality as two per cent or more of the population.

Modesty, Periodicity, Auto-Erotism

The year 1900 saw the publication in book form, of The Evolution of Modesty, The Phenomena of Sexual Periodicity, and Auto-Erotism: A Study of the Spontaneous Manifestations of the Sexual Impulse. These studies were greatly enlarged in a 1910 edition, with a strengthening of their original essential conclusions.

Among the factors in the evolution of modesty, Ellis found

fundamental 'the primitive animal gesture of sexual refusal on the part of the female, when she is not at that moment of her generative life at which she desires the male's advances'. But he also recognized 'the other great primary element of modesty, the social factor'. This he unraveled into the fear of arousing disgust, rules of decorum originating in the fear of the magic influence of sexual phenomena, the development of ornament and clothing, and 'the conception of women as property, imparting a new and powerful sanction to an emotion already based on more natural and primitive facts'. 'Civilization', he concluded, 'tends to subordinate, if not to minimize, modesty, to render it a grace of life rather than a fundamental law of life. . . . In the art of love, however, it is more than a grace, it must always be fundamental. . . . Without modesty, we could not have, nor rightly value at its true worth, that bold and pure candor which is at once the final revelation of love and the seal of its sincerity.'

In The Phenomena of Periodicity, Ellis deduced the probability that absence of sexual feeling during menstruation is in large part apparent only, being essentially an adaptation to social expectations. He examined evidences of physiological cycles in men as well as in women, and concluded that there was little doubt of the existence at least of a weekly cycle in men. The degree and manner in which such cycles might be socially conditioned, however, were largely uninvestigated by Ellis. He suggestively interpreted the phenomena of periodicity of numerous kinds in civilized society in the light of those of animal species, the orgiastic traditions of primitive peoples, and the rhythm of the seasons. In an Appendix was included a series of related observations on Sexual Periodicity in Men by F. H. Perry-Coste.

Auto-erotism: A Study of the Spontaneous Manifestations of the Sexual Impulse, with which should be mentioned an Appendix on The Auto-erotic Factor in Religion, contains a number of Ellis's major contributions. He is said by Iwan Bloch to have been the first to direct attention to the 'involuntary' manifestations of the sexual impulse, which Bloch some-

what inaccurately characterized as 'peculiar to mankind, occurring without relation to the other sex'. Ellis revealed masturbation, erotic daydreaming, erotic dreams, aspects of hysteria, neurasthenia, and religion, and some of the finest elements of art, poetry, and morals as among such manifestations. He characterized them all as autoerotic in the sense of being generated in the absence of external stimulus. This observation gave impetus to other investigations, and Freud adopted the 'happy term invented by Havelock Ellis', as he called it, in the somewhat different sense of self-dependent gratification, that is, without the use of any person as an object. In this sense, Freud applied the term to his discovery of the organization of the sex instinct as a whole in its earliest infantile stage of development.

'. . . The tendency for the sexual emotion to be absorbed and often entirely lost in self-admiration' was said by Ellis to be 'the extreme form of auto-erotism', and called a 'Narcissus-like tendency'. From this Näcke coined *Narcismus* or narcissism. Ellis's observation stimulated other investigations, and 'narcissism' was later adopted by Freud to sum up his discovery of the second stage in the development of the organization of the sex instinct, in which, as distinct from autoerotism, the person's own ego is the chief object of his unified erotic impulses—prelude to the third stage, of choice of an external object.

Ellis was one of the most influential of those who helped to liberate medicine and civilized mankind from the incalculably harmful fallacies regarding the evils of masturbation, and its alleged connection with insanity or depravity. His observations, mainly ethnological and biological, included references to masturbation in animals, and led him to the conclusion that the phenomena of autoerotism, in his sense, are 'the inevitable by-products of the mighty process on which the animal creation rests'.

Another of Ellis's pioneer investigations was The Influence of Menstruation on the Position of Women. Here Ellis noted that the 'primitive view of women's magic function' involved,

on the whole, a higher 'estimate of women's nature and position' than has obtained since. 'Woman has always been the witch . . . but she has ceased to be the priestess.' He regarded the evolution as 'from one extreme of the magical doctrine to the other. . . .'

Analysis of the Sexual Impulse—Love and Pain

In 1903 were published in book form the Analysis of the Sexual Impulse, Love and Pain, and The Sexual Impulse in Women. In a second edition (1913) these studies were enlarged without any modification of their main doctrines. Ellis defined sexual impulse as 'the internal messages which prompt the sexual act'. He used 'impulse' and 'instinct' both very loosely. The Analysis of the Sexual Impulse disposed empirically of the cynical definition of the 'impulse' as one merely or mainly of evacuation. The definition of a 'reproductive' instinct he found incomplete and often euphemistic. He perfected the description of the two components of the sexual process, previously discovered but not adequately evaluated nor recognized as closely related stages by Moll. Ellis stressed the predominant importance of the first stage which he called 'tumescence' in place of Moll's 'contrectation'. 'Taking on usually a more active form in the male', it has the objects of making the second stage imperative and 'arousing in the female a similar ardent state. . . .' 'Images, desires, and ideals' accompany the physical turgescence of this stage, and in it, Ellis found the whole psychology of the sexual instinct to be built, and sexual aberration mainly to arise. He showed that it is with the direct object of discharging the tension of this first stage, and only indirectly of effecting propagation, that the stage which Moll termed 'detumescence' arrives amid profound excitement, followed by organic relief. The gratifications of 'forepleasure' and 'end-pleasure' which Freud distinguished in his Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex are in effect those of tumescence and detumescence respectively. Freud called more precise attention to the fact that forepleasure is furnished by infantile as well as by the

mature sexual strivings, especially by means of extragenital erogenous zones, and is associated with pathogenic dangers if overactivized before the primacy of the genital zones has been established.

In the same study, Ellis pointed out some of the sexual implications of mother-love, and the partial but close analogy of suckling to the sexual act. This helped to confirm the more radical discoveries of Freud, of a definite sexual object of the nursing period, an infantile preparation for the finding of the sexual object at puberty, and the importance in this preparation, of erogenous zones other than the genital.

A study of Love and Pain established reasonable limits within which it might be said that, in erotic relationships women normally tend 'to delight in suffering pain', 'or the simulacrum of pain', and men in inflicting it. A woman 'only desires to be forced toward those things which are essentially and profoundly agreeable to her. A man who fails to realize this has made little progress in the art of love.' It seems likely, however, that Ellis a little overestimated the biological determination of 'the masculine tendency to delight in domination, the feminine tendency to delight in submission'.

For the terms sadism and masochism (Krafft-Ebing), Ellis preferred Schrenk-Notzing's designation, 'algolagnia' (active and passive) which combines the Greek words for pain and sexual excitement, that is, pleasure in pain. Recognizing, as had others, that traces of both were constantly found in the same individual, Ellis considered, perhaps too categorically for diagnostic purposes, that between sadism and masochism 'there is no real line of demarcation'. He considered, again perhaps too categorically, that the masochist generally desires that the pain which he experiences shall be inflicted in love, and the sadist that the pain which he inflicts shall be felt as love. This generalization, in order to be made completely valid, requires to be implemented by recognition of the phenomena of repression and the unconscious. Freud was to find this of value in his development of Bleuler's concept of ambivalence which is the coexistence of opposing impulses or attitudes. It also

remained for Freud and psychoanalysis to demonstrate the predisposing influence of 'sexual polarity', or the coexistence of active and passive trends, at a pregenital stage of sexual development in an anal-sadistic phase.

Ellis did not overlook the predisposing influences of childhood experiences. Evidences led him to the conclusion '. . . that in some cases the sadist is really a disguised masochist and enjoys his victim's pain because he identifies himself with that pain'. He reminded that, 'Pain acts as a sexual stimulant because it is the most powerful of all methods for arousing emotion', and observed that in an abnormal organism, 'The parched sexual instinct greedily drinks up and absorbs the force it obtains by applying abnormal stimuli to its emotional apparatus.' Freud was to give unimagined precision of detail to the understanding of the mechanisms of identification and displacement through which, in connection with earliest childhood conditioning, abnormality develops. Ellis helped in bringing about professional recognition of the paradoxical facts through which these psychodynamics are revealed.

Sexuality in Women and in Savages

When The Sexual Impulse in Women appeared, the very existence of a sexual instinct in women may almost be said to have been widely questioned. Two streams of opinion regarding women were traced by Ellis: one, a tendency to regard them 'as a supernatural element in life, more or less superior to men'; the other, 'a tendency to regard women as especially embodying the sexual instinct and as peculiarly prone to exhibit its manifestations'. In the most primitive societies, where veneration of the generative principle is usual, Ellis remarked that the two views were not differentiated. But Christianity, with its condemnation of sexuality, completed the differentiation and glorified the virgin while viewing with indifference or contempt the woman who exercised sexual functions. 'We may trace the same influence', Ellis wrote, 'subtly lurking even in the most would-be scientific statements of anthropologists and physicians today . . . but it seems to

have been reserved for the nineteenth century to state that women are apt to be congenitally incapable of experiencing complete sexual satisfaction. . . . This idea appears to have been almost unknown to the eighteenth century.' Gall, Lombroso and Ferrero, Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Näcke, Löwenfeld were among the authorities, including gynecologists, who taught either that sexual sensibility was normally less pronounced in women, or that it was pathological. Some held that any other opinion would be 'degrading' to women.

An examination of medical, psychological, and sociological literature, together with original case materials which were made available to him, enabled Ellis to declare that 'sexual anesthesia, relative or absolute, cannot be considered as anything but abnormal', and that the sexual impulse in women is 'natural . . . whatever difficulties may arise in regard to its complete gratification'. Such difficulties he attributed to 'the immense social force working on women to compel them to even an unnatural extension of' the passive part in courtship. 'Under the artificial conditions of civilization the inhibitory influences of training speedily work powerfully, and more or less successfully, in banishing sexual phenomena into the subconscious, sometimes to work all the mischief there which Freud attributes to them.' Ellis went on, moreover, to outline 'the special characters of the sexual impulse in women'. He showed first the intense energy which lies behind the passive part which women in love have been called on to play, then called attention to the greater complexity of the sexual apparatus in women, its greater physical and mental diffuseness, the slower development of the orgasm in women, their often more gradual attainment of the maximum sexual vigor, their higher threshold of excess, and the greater variability and periodicity of female sexuality.

It was one of the historically more important conclusions of Ellis, that courtship 'may properly be regarded as the natural preliminary to every act of coitus'. He reminded that, 'To the man coitus must be in some degree pleasurable or it cannot take place at all', but that to the woman 'the same act' might

be '. . . a source of anguish, physical and mental'. His data supported the general conclusions of Freud regarding the importance of repressed sexuality in the causation of mental and emotional disorders. His exposure of the evil of teaching women 'that the whole function is low and impure, only to be submitted to at her husband's will and for his sake . . .' amounted almost to a rediscovery. The extent to which the facts of female sexuality are today largely matters of common knowledge, is in considerable degree a measure of the educative contributions of Ellis.

The Sexual Instinct in Savages added to the generally sound conceptions which Westermarck, Frazer, and Crawley were tending to introduce in this field. Ellis proclaimed the comparative 'weakness' of the sexual instinct among primitive peoples, and apart from civilized contamination, the conspicuous absence of licentiousness or promiscuity in any true sense among them. In effect, this was a blow against theories of 'inferior races'. He regarded the greater importance of sexual phenomena among the civilized as not, however, to be deplored, but as linked 'with all that is most poignant and difficult, indeed, but also all that is best, in human life as we know it'.

Numerous histories of sexual development which Ellis published in Appendices, beginning with the 1903 volume of Studies, were the first ones recorded in Great Britain outside mental hospitals or prisons. Including women and men of various occupations, they were recorded in the conviction that 'we cannot even know what is normal until we are acquainted with the sexual life of a large number of healthy individuals'. They showed, among other things, that the majority of sexual perversions are only 'exaggerations' of the impulses and emotions of normal human beings. As Freud pointed out, however, the histories 'naturally show the deficiencies due to infantile amnesia' which can be recovered only by psychoanalysis.

A hitherto unsuspected frequency of infantile seduction in the backgrounds of normal men and women was revealed in

Ellis's histories. It was information of this nature which caused Freud to modify his opinion of the etiological significance of infantile seduction in mental disorders, and to modify his emphasis on the concept of 'infantile sexual trauma' to one of the 'infantile psychosexual disposition'. The historical importance of Ellis's case materials, and of his interpretations of them, can be still further appreciated in the light of the general ignorance which prevailed regarding child sexuality. Except for Sanford Bell's article in 1902 in the American Journal of Psychology, Ellis and Freud were the only scientific writers to recognize the normality of the sexual instinct in childhood, and to regard sexual manifestations occurring before the age of puberty as other than 'signs of degeneration', until G. Stanley Hall published his two volumes on Adolescence in 1908.

Sexual Selection in Man

Sexual Selection in Man was first published in 1905. In this Ellis expanded the thesis that love is only to a limited extent a response to beauty, that it develops in response to a number of stimuli culminating in tumescence, and that æsthetic preference is not in itself fundamental to sexual selection. He felt that students who eliminated the æsthetic element from Darwin's doctrine of sexual selection were placing an essentially sound principle on a firmer basis. This volume assembled an exhaustive quantity of historical and scientific data on the senses of touch, smell, hearing, and sight as direct and indirect channels of sexual stimuli, a subject which had hitherto been explored only at isolated points.

Of the sense of touch, Ellis generalized that it 'is at once the least intellectual and the most massively emotional . . . the readiest and most powerful channel by which the sexual sphere may be reached'. He related it in rich detail to kissing, laughter, bathing, and massage. He reviewed the subject of the skin as 'the mother of all the senses', and noted that sexual intercourse is largely a specialized skin reflex. This chapter confirmed additionally the association between suckling and

sexual emotion and the importance of this association, both normally and in the development of perversions, facts of which Freud extended greatly the clinical and educational significance. Ellis's description of 'secondary sexual skin centers', or 'secondary sexual foci only inferior in sexual excitability to the genital region', added clarity to the conception of the erogenous zones as normal aids to tumescence. The further importance of the erogenous zones as organs of which the overstimulation, the repression, or the subordination give the clues respectively to perversion, neurosis, and normal sexual life, was, again, a preëminent discovery of Freud's. Ellis here and elsewhere stated wisely and influentially, as did Freud, that the practice of erotic variations generally has not the significance of sexual perversion except as they may be practiced to the exclusion of genital sexual intercourse. The gradual social diffusion of this understanding has been an important indirect preventive of neuroses.

Ellis was not original in concluding that the part which odors play in sexual selection is comparatively small, the sense of smell having given place, in man, to that of vision. 'In practical life and in emotional life, in science and in art, smell is, at the best, under normal conditions, merely an auxiliary.' The chapter on this subject assembled the main facts relative to the predominance of smell as a sexual stimulus among the lower mammals, its emotional rather than practical significance in man, the antipathies and abnormalities of the sense. He likewise assembled the main facts about the specific body odors and their psychological effects, the influences of perfumes, the ill effects of excessive olfactory stimulation, and many other pertinent data.

A review of rhythm as a physiological stimulus introduced the subject of hearing as a channel of sexual selection. It is not a powerful factor in human mating, Ellis concluded, but plays a part nearly always subordinate to vision. He agreed with Darwin and the evidence of others, that animal sounds play a very large part in bringing the male and female together. Darwin found, however, with surprise, a dearth of good evi-

dence that the vocal organs of male mammals, although exercised chiefly in the breeding season, were used to charm the female. Ellis regarded it as difficult to believe that, at least in man and the animals most nearly related to man, the sexual differentiation of the voice at puberty was quite without influence on selection. Music and the female voice, according to his evidence, although they seldom have specifically sexual, often have romantic and sentimental effects on men. He noted, in this connection, that the voice of the female is but little differentiated from that of the child. Ellis also held that there was ample evidence that music often exerts a slight but definite sexual influence on women.

Vision was considered by Ellis the 'supreme sense' from the point of view of sexual selection. The importance of beauty, he observed, lies in its being mainly a visual impression. To the fact that there exists a sexual element in the constitution of beauty, which was well recognized, Ellis added his own conclusion that the things which to man are most beautiful throughout nature are those intimately associated with or dependent on the sex instinct, and that it is this which furnishes a fundamentally objective element to beauty throughout the human species. He noted that to some extent beauty consists primitively in exaggeration of the sexual characters. In this connection, he reviewed the subjects of mutilations, adornment, and garments. He brought to a wider audience the rich anthropological observations of Stratz, Ploss and Bartels, and others on the figures and beauty of women.

Beauty, says Ellis, by no means comprehends the whole of the influences which make for sexual allurement through vision. Beauty in men is not ordinarily so sexually stimulating to women as beauty in women is to men. Women admire a man's strength rather than his beauty, probably as 'a tactile quality which has been made visible', women appearing to seek pressure more than do men. And for men, beauty in women is not the sole sexual allurement, vivacity or languor, each a kind of 'translated' tactile quality, possessing a sexual value.

The abhorrence of incest was referred to in Sexual Selection

in Man as 'really . . . exceedingly simple', and interpreted as the dulling by familiarity, of the sensory stimuli of vision, hearing, and touch which normally produce tumescence. This interpretation, which leaves unexplained such phenomena as happy marriages of childhood sweethearts, and sheds but an uncertain light at best upon *indifference* to incest when it occurs, sheds none at all upon *abhorrence* of incest. Freud elucidated this abhorrence as a taboo demanded by society, operating through the violent psychological implications of infantile incestuous tendencies. Ellis, lacking experience with depth-psychological methods, imagined, as he put it later in a short study of The History of Marriage, that such tendencies ordinarily 'die out naturally and normally under the usure of familiar life. . . .' He seemed unaware that this left unexplained the abhorrence of incest.

Ellis adduced evidence of a tendency for persons to seek mates who resemble themselves 'racially and individually', and who differ from themselves in the secondary sexual characters. He called attention to the fact, however, that the individual often finds himself responsive to stimuli which are other than those of the ideal which he had cherished or even the reverse of them. He also found constitutional vigor, physical or mental, a factor heightening success in securing partners.

Adequate investigations are yet to be made of sexual selection in man, and in particular of its evolutionary tendencies. For in the human species, unlike the lower animals, the considerations on the basis of which selection preponderantly takes place, especially in civilized societies, are not sensory at all. Intellectual, occupational, and temperamental characteristics probably play a larger part in human selection and propagation than physical characteristics. And in human selection, the distinction here requires to be made between love and sexual attraction, between both of these and actual mating, and between mating and the propagation which results in the transmission of biological characteristics. The influence of infantile conditioning on selective preferences must be correlated with any apparent findings of biological tendencies in human selection or selective preferences.

Psychoanalysis has established the basis on which two types of choice of love object are made. One, the 'anaclitic' or 'leaning' type, is in general the resemblance of the love object to a person or persons who ministered to the needs of the individual in early childhood. The other, the 'narcissistic' type, is conditioned by the resemblance of the love object to oneself. It is clear that considerations of these associative types may so largely 'contaminate' purely physical or sensory considerations, as to render impossible any accurate evaluation of the latter in the processes of human selection independently of an evaluation of the former. The service of Ellis in the field of sexual selection in man was mainly in stating the problem, and organizing pertinent material and references on the function of senses in sexual selection for students of the future. He took pains to state that his task was of a tentative and preliminary character.

In an Appendix, he reviewed compendiously The Origins of the Kiss. The tactile and the olfactory kiss were distinguished from one another, and their various usages, salutatory, erotic, and sacred among numerous different peoples, were outlined. Ellis observed that, 'It is only under a comparatively high stage of civilization that the kiss has been employed and developed in the art of love'.

Erotic Symbolism

In 1906, the studies of Erotic Symbolism, The Mechanism of Detumescence, and The Psychic State in Pregnancy were first published as a volume. Under the heading, Erotic Symbolism, Ellis included 'practically all the aberrations of the sexual instinct'. He discerned their common quality in the preponderant deflection of erotic value from the whole of a beloved person of the opposite sex, or the sexual act, to some part of the person, or to other related types of objects or acts. His conclusion that the forms of erotic symbolism, or 'perversions', are 'simulacra of coitus', shared this invaluable discovery with Freud. The Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, in which Freud with greater precision laid bare the etiology of the sexual aberrations, had appeared in its first

edition in 1905. It had not, however, been used in the study by Ellis. The recognition by Ellis of a psychological process behind every aberration, was an independent and important extension of the static concept of 'erotic fetishism' of objects, introduced by Binet and followed by Lombroso, Krafft-Ebing, and others. Nor did Ellis neglect to extend the concept in another direction, by noting, as did psychoanalysts, that the essential foundation of the process was 'absolutely normal', only its extreme manifestations becoming abnormal and 'fantastic'. Like Freud, he pointed out that it is only in the condition 'in which the symbol becomes all-sufficing, that we have a true and complete perversion'.

Data on shoe, foot, hair, various garments and 'stuffs' fetishisms, masochistic pleasure in being trodden upon, various zoöphilic practices, and exhibitionism were presented in Erotic Symbolism. Ellis's data brought out clearly the importance of specific childhood experiences in the etiology of fetishism and perversions in later life. His observations also made more comprehensible the coördination of perverted, neurotic, and normal psychodynamics which Freud effected. Among the points which were demonstrated by Freud in this field were that a perversion represents an immoderate attachment to some otherwise normal pregenital phase of the infantile sexuality, that a neurosis is the compromise between a perverted trend and the repressive demands of the individual's morality, and that normality is achieved through the subordination of the pregenital impulses, the sublimation of them, or reaction-formation, against them. Ellis partly discerned the evidence which underlay Freud's concepts of penis envy and the castration complex, and which led Freud in 1925 to recognize a special phallic phase of infantile sexual development. The evidence was used by Ellis to justify the perspicuous term, 'penis-fetishism'.

The erotic content of the urinary and excremental functions were illuminated by Ellis with particular sanity and humanity. In the muscular release of their accumulated pressures and tensions, he perceived with psychoanalytic acumen 'the

simulacrum of the tumescence and detumescence of the sexual process'. For a lover to find these functions and their orifices acutely disturbing, must, Ellis asserted, be considered abnormal. He referred to the morbid preoccupations with them of such writers as Swift and Huysmans. An idealizing influence may be exerted by the sexual focus on the adjoining excretory processes without passing over into fetishism. He cited reflections of this attitude in Gœthe, the early Henri de Régnier, the Song of Songs, the poet Herrick, and elsewhere. 'It may be wholesome for some of us to meditate', he remarked, 'on the more humble uses of the same hand which is raised in the supreme gesture of benediction and which men have often counted it a privilege to kiss'. He reviewed some of the special features of the perversions related to these functions, including a comparative account of the 'medicinal' uses of urine and fæces. These portions of the study increased the intelligibility of the much more intricate clinical findings of urethral, anal, and oral erotism which were traced by Freud, Abraham, and other psychoanalysts to corresponding pregenital phases of sexual development.

The subject of scoptophilia does not find reference in the study of Erotic Symbolism, except as directed towards animals. It was given consideration in Sexual Selection in Man, under Moll's term, 'mixoscopy', where it followed a discussion of 'pygmalionism', and elicited from Ellis the same general conclusions as those quoted regarding other aberrations. Fellatio and cunnilingus had already been dismissed by Ellis in Sexual Selection in Man, as of 'essentially normal character . . . when occurring as incidents in the process of tumescence' and having 'little psychological significance, except . . . when practiced to the exclusion of normal sexual relationships. . . .'

Appraised and utilized in the study of Erotic Symbolism were materials from Stanley Hall, Féré, Ploss and Bartels, Garnier, Moll, Krafft-Ebing, and other observers. It introduced references to Bourke's compilation of Scatalogic Rites, and Schurig's early eighteenth century Gynæcologia and Spermatologia. In it, Ellis himself adduced much original

illustrative material. From a fresh point of view, this study illuminated aspects of the studies of Auto-Erotism, Love and Pain, Sexual Selection in Man, and Sexual Inversion. In a sense, they together provide, although undesignedly, a magnificent anthropological embellishment of the Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. They cannot but have played a major part in clinical advances, and also gradually in humanizing, at least to whatever extent this has taken place at all, the attitude of the law towards sexual aberrations.

Mechanisms of Detumescence—Pregnancy

The Mechanism of Detumescence examined what Ellis defined as, 'The one physiological act in which two individuals are lifted out of all ends that center in self and become the instrument of those higher forces which fashion the species. . . .' He described this as '. . . the end and climax of the whole drama . . .' in which 'the reins slip from the control of the will . . .' and 'a man and woman are no longer two sensitive organisms vibrating . . . to all kinds of influences and with fluctuating impulses capable of being directed into any channel . . .' but 'are now two genital organisms which exist to propagate the race. . . .' His examination of the sexual climax brought Ellis into the field of anatomy and physiology, which he oriented with his characteristic thoroughness. The circulatory, respiratory, and essentially motor phenomena, voluntary and involuntary, of coitus were set forth in detail, as well as the activities of the pelvic organs. He also gave a description of the constituents, functions, and properties of the semen, followed by a discussion of aphrodisiacs and sexual sedatives.

Of particular historical usefulness was his sympathetic review of Freud on the erogenous qualities of the clitoris and the anus. There is also an ironic but socially perspicacious observation on the hymen, which 'has taken the place of the soul' of the unmarried woman, and the presence of which 'gives all her worth and dignity . . . her market value'. He described the different postures in coitus among various peoples, and found

most of them within the normal range of variation. He also referred to the injurious effects of incomplete forms of coitus, a subject to which the later study of The Art of Love returned. An original contribution by an anonymous psychologist, on the sensations accompanying the orgasm in the male, was included. Of particular hygienic importance for the period were the teachings of Ellis, that detumescence must be preceded by an 'abbreviated courtship' in every repetition of the act of coitus if it is to be normally and effectively carried out, and that under reasonably happy circumstances, there is no pain, or exhaustion, or sadness, or emotional revulsion, upon detumescence. He incidentally explained on what grounds the 'abbreviated courtship is mainly tactile'.

Ellis found a qualified justification for affirmative answers to the questions of 'aptitude for detumescence' and 'erotic temperament'. 'Experienced observers agree', he summarized, 'in attributing to persons of erotic type certain general characteristics which accord with those negative and positive standards we may frame on the basis of castration, puberty, and of detumescence'. He warned, however, that no signs taken separately could be regarded as significant. It should be noticed that Ellis did not take into consideration the influences of early conditioning, the interaction of which with constitutional factors is what determines the erotic temperament and the effective aptitude for detumescence.

The comparatively short Psychical State in Pregnancy began with a fresh recognizance of the interrelationship of maternal and sexual emotion. Loss of virginity and its anciently accepted 'signs' are discussed incidentally. The pervading effects of pregnancy on the organism were then considered in some physiological detail. The psychic state induced is 'in healthy persons, one of full development and vigor. . . .' The longings of pregnant women, and the evidence for and against the influence of prenatal 'maternal impressons' on the child, were recorded as manifestations still imperfectly understood. The reverence in which she is held is such that 'The pregnant woman has been lifted above the level of ordinary

humanity to become the casket of an inestimable jewel'. He concluded that our ignorance of the changes effected by the achievement of 'that function for which her body has been constructed, and her mental and emotional disposition adapted, through countless ages . . . still remains profound'. Here 'we stand at the threshold of a door it is not yet given us to pass'.

Sex in Relation to Society

The studies of Sex in Relation to Society which were intended to constitute the final volume, appeared first in 1910. These dealt with a much less neglected field than the previous ones. They accordingly had the object not so much of accumulating details, as of placing each subject as clearly as possible in relation to the conclusions already reached. Ellis recognized he had to record not only what people felt and did, but also his estimate of what they were tending to feel and do. He had in particular to separate out the long-range trends which signify social progress. The extent to which he succeeded may be judged by the fact that developments in the Soviet Union are nearly identical with those which were anticipated by Ellis.[1] In this volume, numerous quotations from James Hinton paid effective tribute to the inspiration which the writings of Hinton had furnished Ellis in his youth, and might still furnish future generations. Sex in Relation to Society comprises and remains the most thorough and rational codification of the social implications of sex.

[1] Although many writings have been published in bitter disparagement of the Soviet Union, many scientists who have studied the country in various of its aspects, have reported on its trends and achievements with unequivocal commendation. The most comprehensive and detailed study of the Soviet Union is that of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*. Others of pertinence are by Henry E. Sigerist, M.D.: *Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union*; Fannina W. Halle: *Women in Soviet Russia* and *Women in the Soviet East*; Frankwood E. Williams, M.D.: *Russia, Youth, and the Present-Day World*; Albert Rhys Williams: *The Soviets*; The Very Rev. Hewlett Johnson: *The Soviet Power* (1940). Favorable conclusions of medical interest have also been published by Dr. Walter B. Cannon, Dr. Ira S. Wile, J. G. Crowther, and Prof. J. B. S. Haldane.

In The Mother and Her Child, Ellis emphasized that each parent's choice of the ancestral and hereditary character of the future child, as foretokened in the other parent, was a serious and sacred duty. The mother was termed the child's 'supreme' parent, by Ellis. He found the ideally beautiful woman to be the pregnant woman, and attributed the denial of this by women themselves to an unfortunate infatuation for following after masculine ideals. By this he did not mean that woman's activities should be confined to the home. On the contrary, he supported those writers who asserted that a woman is not adequately equipped to fulfil her functions as mother and trainer of children unless she has lived in the world and exercised a vocation.

Among the topics to which attention was given in this study were the social causes of infantile mortality, the inadequate rest and economic protection of the pregnant woman, married and unmarried, the dangers of coitus during pregnancy, the value of the mother's suckling of the child, and the harm of such state nurseries as would separate mother and child from their most intimate relations. Ellis charged, with documentation, that, 'The development of an industrial system which subordinates the human body and the human soul to the thirst for gold, has, for a time, dismissed from social consideration the interests of the race and the individual. . . .' In no country, he found, was the principle of rest from employment after confinement, with provision for remuneration of the mother during this enforced rest, carried out so thoroughly nor for so long a period as is desirable. But 'it is the business of the community to ensure that that rest is duly secured . . . her employer, we may be certain, will do [his] best to cheat the community . . . '. In great industrial states like England, the United States, and Germany, he accused that 'a tacit conspiracy tends to grow up to subordinate national ends to individual ends, and practically to work for the deterioration of the race'. The necessity of enabling mothers to suckle their children is not the least urgent reason, he asserted, for putting women, and especially mothers, upon a sounder economic basis.

He made a political contribution in affirming the necessity of the state to intervene against employers whom he ironically described as 'too "practical", they know how small is the money-value of human lives'.

Sexual Education marshalled in their most effective form the most beneficent principles and powerful arguments which had been evolved on this subject, but which were far from having won even professional acceptance. In it was restated the normalcy, and in large measure the significance of sexual impulses in children, especially the sexual inquisitiveness of children. It stressed the importance of nurture in addition to 'breed', and 'the absolute necessity of taking deliberate and active part in the sexual initiation of the child'. As early as the fourth, and not later than the sixth year, truthful information should be given on sex, mainly by the mother, in accordance with the child's intelligence and desire for knowledge. The harmfulness of omitting to give such information was demonstrated. The principles of later sexual education, specifically regarding masturbation, menstruation, adequate physical exercise for girls, and sexual education through literature and art, were enunciated with a persuasiveness which has played a considerable part in their having become almost common knowledge today.

The need for educating adults as well as children was a leading theme of Sexual Education and Nakedness. Ellis recounted in a vein elevated to a pitch of lyricism, the values which the best of previous thinkers and students had discerned in the cultivation of nakedness. Among these he noted as especially important, the acquiring of familiarity with the naked body of the other sex without consciousness of indecorum or wrongdoing. Familiarity with the sight of the body, he pointed out, substitutes a wholesome knowledge and incuriosity for prudery and pruriency, cultivates the sense of beauty, and furnishes the 'tonic and consoling influences of natural vigor and grace'. Particularly did Ellis place emphasis on the moral value of familiarity with nakedness in aiding the strenuous conquest of what Ellen Key termed 'erotic clepto-

mania', and avoidance of the unnatural extremes of license and repression. He included a far-flung historical resumé of attitudes toward nakedness, correlated with the general cultural and moral condition of various societies. Recommendations with regard to nakedness from the point of view of physical hygiene were also given.

In The Valuation of Sexual Love Ellis stated his conviction that 'The metabolic processes of the body, from one end to the other, whether regarded as chemically or psychologically, are all interwoven and all of equal dignity'. 'The person who feels that the sexual impulse is bad, or even low and vulgar, is an absurdity in the universe, an anomaly. He is like those persons in our insane asylums, who feel that the instinct of nutrition is evil and so proceed to starve themselves. They are alike outcasts in the universe whose children they are.' In man and woman the sexual activities 'belong not to that lower part of our nature which degrades us to the level of the "brute", but to the higher part which raises us towards all the finest activities and ideals we are capable of'. He called attention to the need for rehabilitating the concept of lust in the sense of wholesome and normal sexual vigor, and reminded that it is an essential element in sexual love, which 'flowers' when lust is 'irradiated'. He attacked the insidious conception of love as an illusion, declaring it 'the most solid of realities', and finding this to be the conviction of the best of the world's intellectual giants. Historically interesting is an account of attitudes towards the subject, including those of the Fathers of the Church.

Function of Chastity—Prostitution

The Function of Chastity discarded the unjust and unnatural forms in which this concept has been understood or imposed, and restored to it its biological dignity. Chastity as a 'state of permanent abstinence from sexual relationships having a merit apart from any use' is only the 'degraded modern sense' of the word. Ellis redeemed the estimation in which chastity is held by savages 'as a method of self-control

which contributes towards the attainment of important ends'. He added that the grounds on which asceticism is largely practiced by savages are impractical, but we often 'have to revive old observances and furnish them with new reasons'. He drove home the point that asceticism by no means necessarily involves perpetual sexual abstinence, but is properly to be understood as a discipline which can be 'beautifully exercised only in the actual erotic life'. He advanced the view that the real place of the sexual impulse must best be learned through an understanding of the natural restraints on the impulse. Additions to the literature of sublimation were incidentally made in a few paragraphs illustrating the special value of chastity 'for those who cultivate the arts'. During the early centuries of the Christian era, Ellis found, chastity manifested itself in two aspects. One was an obsessive preoccupation with subjugating all sexual feelings, the other a romantic cultivation of refined forms of sexual intimacy, without intercourse, which were condemned by the Fathers of the Church but not without traces of sympathy. Some of the most appealing of lessons in the psychology and sociology of repression and sublimation are to be found in Ellis's pages on this subject and on the extinction of the primitive Christian attraction to chastity in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation.

Abstinence in the negative sense of a constraint imposed by social and religious traditions, was the subject of The Problem of Sexual Abstinence. The concept is the reverse of individual erotic discipline which was examined in the preceding study. With an exhaustive resumé of the conflicting opinions of authorities on the effects of such abstinence, Ellis may be said to have established the conclusion that while sexual abstinence 'is not incompatible with health, there are yet many adults for whom it is harmful, and a very much larger number for whom when prolonged it is undesirable'. He gave prominence to a number of Freud's observations on the limits within which sublimation is a possibility although, as occasionally elsewhere, he garbled the psychoanalytic terminology a little. He also quoted the opinion of Freud, that 'the intellectual

inferiority of so many women is due to the inhibition of thought imposed upon them for the purpose of sexual repression'.

The further point of clarification was made by Ellis—of which the medicopsychological professions were astonishingly in need—that the act of sexual intercourse under the name of incontinence cannot be physiologically pernicious, if it is beneficial under the name of marriage, any more than 'a meal becomes good or bad, digestible or indigestible, according as a grace is or is not pronounced before the eating of it'. He declared unequivocally however that, 'The physician is never entitled to advise his patient to adopt sexual intercourse outside marriage. . . . In giving such a prescription the physician has in fact not the slightest knowledge of what he may be prescribing. He may be giving his patient a venereal disease; he may be giving the anxieties and responsibilities of an illegitimate child. . . . He is in the same position as if he had prescribed a quack medicine of which the composition was unknown to him.' These social aspects of extramarital relations were more plainly seen and stated by Ellis than by many of his colleagues, even of the succeeding generation. 'The utmost that a physician can properly permit himself to do', Ellis believed, 'is to put the case impartially before his patient and to present to him all the risks'.

In his study of Prostitution, Ellis first gave attention to the phenomenon of the orgy. Describing its pagan, Christian, and primitive forms, he found it in its largest sense a universal manifestation of organic relief from more or less inevitable social restraints. Such relief is demanded no less from the tension, routine, and monotony of 'modern life'—as he undiscriminatingly conceived of the contemporary social order—but the purely cerebral form which the orgy has tended to take on is less wholesome in so far as it leads to no harmonious discharge along motor channels. Prostitution, Ellis concluded, is encouraged by the latter-day suppression of the more primitive and muscular forms of the orgy.

Ellis defined the prostitute as 'a person who makes it a pro-

fession to gratify the lust of various persons of the opposite or the same sex'. He stressed the criterion of 'various persons' as marking the critical social distinction between the prostitute and the mistress or the women who every day 'become wives in order to gain a home and a livelihood'. The prostitute of civilization, belonging to a pariah class, is a social phenomenon completely different from any of primitive times. He supported the general principle of Schurtz, that prostitution arises whenever the free union of young people is impeded under conditions in which early marriage is also difficult. The inadequacies of state-regulated prostitution came in for unpalliated discussion, as well as the failure of attempts throughout history to suppress prostitution. As usual, Ellis did not fail to bring together rare anthropological and historical material on religious and ritual prostitution and about the courtesans of the Renaissance and of antiquity. In writing, however, of the social position of prostitutes in general in various lands and periods, Ellis neglected the subject of the lot of no longer employable prostitutes, and of the relationship between prostitutes, brothel keepers, procurers, and in later developments vice lords and vice syndicates.[2]

The central generalization which Ellis illuminated was that prostitution is an inevitable outcome of a marriage system based essentially on a dependent social status of women. He did not find evidence that economic desperation was a predominant factor in the making of prostitutes, so much as the 'very severe and exacting routine of dull work', the delays imposed on marriage, and related stimuli rendering more imperative the need for 'substitutes for marriage'. He proclaimed that there could not be 'the slightest doubt that it is this motive—the effort to supplement the imperfect opportunities for self-development offered by our restrained,

[2] The slight and popularized volumes, *Cities of Sin*, by Hendrik de Leeuw (Modern Age Books, Inc., New York), and *In Woman's Defense*, by Mary Inman (Mercury Printing Co., Los Angeles) give indications, respectively, of these phenomena.

mechanical, and laborious civilization—which plays one of the chief parts in inducing women to adopt, temporarily or permanently, a prostitute's life.' Ellis artificially separated this motive from the 'economic factor', of which he wrote only in the narrow sense of abject poverty, ascribing it simply to 'the conditions of urban life' associated with 'the stress of competition'.

Among the most original and valuable pages of Ellis are the ones devoted to these and the related considerations which influence men in resorting to prostitutes. In particular, he called attention to the unavailability, to 'thousands of men', of 'respectable' women with whom intimacies beyond or even of mere conversation may be exchanged. Among other factors in the making of prostitutes, Ellis included a slight tendency to biological predisposition, based on organic constitution. The part which unconscious components play in the origin and development of prostitution, both as a social and as an individual phenomenon, is not gone into in the study, the psychoanalytic approach not being considered.

Ellis examined the view, numbering many illustrious names among its proponents, that prostitution is a necessary evil, or even a beneficent institution, serving as a bulwark of the home, of monogamy, and of the chastity and 'purity' of 'respectable' women against the depredations of male lust. Against this view, he counterposed the social axiom of James Hinton and others that that cannot be virtue which can be practiced only at the expense of another's vice. He clarified the corollary, that the prostitute herself merely renders a professional service, although a degraded one, and cannot with accuracy be said to 'sell herself', and should not be regarded as a pariah. He reinforced the observations of Hinton and others, that the dynamic picture of society which is thus implied is incomplete without recognition of the group of women who are neither wives nor prostitutes, and yet may also be entitled to erotic satisfaction and to motherhood if they desire. He expressed confidence that as an essential part of the progress of civiliza-

tion, prostitution would be eliminated through the competition of 'higher and purer methods of sexual relationship freed from pecuniary considerations'.

Without making any intrinsically original contribution to the subject, The Conquest of Venereal Diseases reforged the best of existing knowledge and thought into a weapon of unprecedented keenness. How greatly it was needed may be understood from the facts that the view still was extant that consideration for sufferers from venereal diseases was 'immoral' and 'indulgent', and that even in medical quarters venereal diseases were said to differ from other infectious diseases in being 'the result of voluntary action'. Ellis, besides presenting historical and medicosocial data, showed the necessity of separating the question of venereal disease from that of prostitution, of combating attitudes of social reprobation and false delicacy and removing all encouragements to concealment, of extending the principles and facilities of compulsory notification and free treatment, of training the individual to a sense of moral responsibility, of legally punishing the knowing transmission of venereal disease, and assisting the recovery of damages for venereal injuries, and of spreading hygienic knowledge, especially to adolescents, youths and girls alike. It was a large part of the service of this study to demonstrate that these recommendations could no longer be regarded as Utopian. It concluded with an endorsement of the prophetic assertion that the country which takes the leading place in the march of civilization will be that which carries through such practical movements of sexual hygiene.

Sexual Morality—Art of Love

Sexual Morality demonstrated the underlying interconnections, in custom and in theory, of marriage, prostitution, extramarital and premarital relationships, procreation, and maternity. The unsoundness of marriage from the biological point of view was stated, the frequent moral equivalence of marriage to prostitution was repeated, and marriage based on other considerations than a united life of complete mutual

love—such as marriage for economic considerations or for those of ambition—was represented as injurious to the offspring and to the interests of the race. Reviewing the position of women among numerous peoples and systems of antiquity, including matriarchal systems, he concluded that Teutonic custom and Christian religion had been on the whole unfavorable to the marital and social equality of women with men. He noted that existing social conditions were especially unfavorable to the development of high moral feeling in women, and averred that any tendency of women to deceit, if it existed, was largely the result of the subjection of women and therefore likely to disappear as the subjection disappeared. He discredited the idea, as argued by Krafft-Ebing, that the acceptance of 'sexual subjection' is 'natural' to women.

In reviewing movements for sexual freedom, Ellis emphasized the often unsuspected extent to which an active part is taken in them by women with regard to premarital conception as well as intercourse. He favored the point of view that it was an impertinence for the community to inquire into the sexual act any more than into any other private physiological act, but that procreation was its grave concern. The responsibility which the father and mother owe to society for the child which they place in its midst, was the recurring burden of a review by Ellis of trial marriages and related customs among various peoples. It is the opinion of this writer that individual sexual behavior is in some instances the legitimate concern of society when it tends to disrupt society as for example in cases of Don Juanism.

The interrelationship between sexual morality and economic conditions was definitely although imprecisely established by Ellis. He called attention in particular to the responsibility of existing economic conditions for the evil features of contemporary morality. He showed that from the existing legal point of view, marriage 'is primarily an arrangement for securing the rights of property and inheritance'. 'Our so called sexual morality' in arranging sexual relationships beforehand and offering to guarantee the permanency of sexual inclinations,

introduces considerations which are 'ridiculously incongruous in the sphere of sex' and 'attempts to ignore' the central fact that the sexual relationship is a physiological one. Our sexual morality, he concluded, is 'a bastard born of the union of property morality with primitive ascetic morality, neither in true relationship to the vital facts of the sexual life'. The overestimation of virginity as a sexual attraction, he observed, stems from the conception of woman as property, who by sexual intercourse is 'depreciated in her market value, exactly as a new garment becomes "second-hand", even if it has but once been worn'. Such an exaggerated attention to virginity 'can only be regarded as a sexual perversion, allied to pedophilia, the sexual attraction to children'. Any freedom and seeming equality of women which is not based on economic independence, he showed, is unreal, and also that moral responsibility in any fine sense can scarcely be said to have any existence in the absence of economic independence. He here called attention to the emphasis which Olive Schreiner placed on the evils of parasitism for women.

While Ellis noted that sexual customs and ideals are both in a constant process of change, he vaguely and contradictorily regarded them—at least the customs—as expressions of the 'majority' interests of a community. He recognized the tendency of women to win a greater economic independence, but did not explain how this was to be insured. Fundamentally, he failed to understand that the sexual subjection of women is a double one, growing out of the economic subjection of the majority of men and women alike. As to the exact psychological mechanisms by which morality normally develops, and under what conditions it comes into abnormal conflict with instinctual trends, these remained for Freud to illuminate in The Ego and the Id.

The Study of Marriage continued the subject of sexual morality reviewing the historical mutations of the institution of marriage, with a view to observing which of its characteristics were most unchanging and therefore probably deserving to be socially respected. Marriage had been everywhere the pri-

vate business of the persons concerned until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when it was 'captured' by Christian priests and made not only a religious but a public act; private marriage had become a sin and almost a crime by the time of the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century. The original Catholic conception of marriage as a sacrament newly and properly exalted sexual unions, but this conception was fossilized by the Canonists who gave it its most unnatural feature, the facility of entry and difficulty of exit no matter how imperative. The Catholic conception was dethroned in the Reformation by the Protestant conception of marriage as a contract. But marriage, Ellis showed, is not a true contract, and in secularizing it, the Reformation ignored the exalted element in love. The importance of Milton and the Puritans was great, however, in advancing 'the first genuinely modern though as yet still imperfect conception of the marriage relationship' as a private matter, and insisting on the supremacy of the substance over the form of marriage.

Ellis subjected to a detailed and scathing analysis the anti-social implications of the existing divorce laws, the overestimation of virginity, and the barbarity of 'conjugal rights'. In the sexual unions not only of mankind throughout history, but also among lower orders of vertebrates, he found the tendency to monogamy among the most deeply rooted. However, he found the tendency to variations, in the sense of 'oscillations around the norm', to be socially, although not individually, inevitable and natural. He submitted that a practical conception of marriage as a social institution must be flexible enough to exclude neither of these tendencies, and must preserve the sacramental character of the relationship in its private inviolability, while limiting its contractual aspect to the reciprocal responsibility of parents and state for the new members of the state which might result from the union. These principles are among many which were not original to Ellis, but which found in him their supreme organizer and champion in a period when they were by no means as commonly accepted as they are at the present time.

One of the most original and important of the studies from the historical point of view was The Art of Love. This did not scratch the surface of the psychology of love, in the sense of how the choice of love-object is preferentially determined, and how object-choice and the early conditioning of object-choice are modifiable. The scientific investigation of the phenomenon of love in this sense has hardly been initiated except by psychoanalysis, and there more or less as a by-product of other investigations. Some insight into its mechanisms, however, has been afforded by other of Ellis's studies, and by novelists. The Art of Love described the technique of making love, the practicing of sexual relations. It was to win the first general recognition in modern times of the existence of an art of love and show that this art could and needed to be taught and learned. This was regarded as so indecent and immoral that as late as 1910, the British Lancet in a generally sympathetic and approving review of Sex in Relation to Society, disapproved of this particular chapter.

Ellis's originality lay not in the mechanics of the art of love which he brought together, but in his coördination and scientific validation of them. He reaffirmed the indispensability of courtship as a precondition of every act of intercourse, upheld the necessity of other than procreational aims in marriage, and established the primacy of pleasure in the sexual act which authorities then doubted. He supported Edward Carpenter and Bloch in the opinion that sexual love is a spiritual necessity quite independently of procreation. The need of both sexes for premarital sexual education, and the special rôle of the husband in sexual initiation were explained. The importance of the art of love as a bulwark against divorce was pointed out. Reassuring about variations in the practice of coitus, with reference to frequency, postures, 'best times', and the like, he described too the detrimental physical and mental effects of unskilful coitus and harmful methods. Flirtation for its own sake, and not as a part of courtship especially as it appeared in the United States and England, was decried as a

deteriorating influence. Only those Platonic friendships were asserted to be perfect, which had been 'reached through the portal of a preliminary erotic intimacy'. Jealousy he found to be an antisocial emotion, at least in more advanced stages of civilization. Of particular value was the observation that love-making is an art which is essentially natural from childhood, but repressed under existing social conditions. On these and other problems such as rape and the possibility of loving more than one person at a time are many of Ellis's wisest conclusions.

The Science of Procreation concluded the studies of Sex in Relation to Society. Here Ellis marshalled with consummate effectiveness the best knowledge which had thus far been contributed to the subject of contraception. In a lengthy discussion of abortion, the health and wishes of the mother were placed before other considerations, and the 'imprescriptible right' of the fœtus ridiculed. Unrestricted abortion at the existing stage of society was not favored, the main emphasis being prevention of conception. The generalization was brought to the fore, that 'The progress of civilization is in the direction of greater foresight, of greater prevention, of a diminished need for struggling with the reckless lack of prevision. The necessity for abortion is precisely one of those results of reckless action which civilization tends to diminish.' Attention, but without enthusiasm, was given to the eugenic possibilities of sterilization, including especially methods not involving the removal of sexual glands or organs, specifically opposing castration for punishment or without consent. The distinction was particularly made between the right to marriage and the right to procreation. He found considerable variation in the best ages and conditions for marriage and procreation. The growing sense of sexual responsibility among women as well as men, with regard to procreation, and the increasing adoption of contraceptive methods were given greatly needed support. Ellis must also be credited with noting the inadequacy of what was known of the laws of human heredity, and with stressing the necessity of first creating an enthusiasm

for health, a moral conscience in matters of procreation, and a general habit of registering human biological data from birth onwards, before legal compulsions were attempted.

That the value of eugenics lies primarily in its amelioration of social and economic conditions, to which he did not give sufficient importance, does not vitiate Ellis's practical conclusions about contraception. He did perceive such amelioration as among the aims and consequences of eugenics. The eugenic movement itself was valuable in combating the politicians, false moralists, and those motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by the desire to prevent any reduction of the population whether for the church, the army, as voters or for increasing the labor reserve. The Science of Procreation undermined the fallacy of racial suicide, and otherwise furthered this function of the eugenic movement.

In an English 1937 edition of Sex in Relation to Society, abridged and revised, Ellis called the attention of scientists to Soviet attitudes and regulations regarding sex, marriage, divorce, and the family. They were essentially, he said, those he had always himself striven to make matters of public acceptance. He referred to the opposition expressed against sexual promiscuity by Lenin, 'whose attitude to sex was idealistic, and he considered that physical attraction should always be combined with higher human elements'. Elsewhere in this volume Ellis also commended the Nazi legislation for sterilization of defectives, and Hitler's emphasis in *Mein Kampf* on 'the immense prevention of suffering' which would result from preventing defectives from procreating. Ellis was politically naïve enough to believe that laws which were 'carefully framed' could be trusted to be 'properly administered . . . on a quite independent foundation' under régimes which are otherwise fundamentally antisocial and terroristic.

Supplementary Essays

In 1928, the volume, Eonism, introduced supplementary 'essays and fragments left over from the main volumes'. Eonism was a term coined by Ellis to designate the predilection for

dressing and behaving in other respects like the opposite sex associated with envy of the opposite sex but without manifest sexual attraction to the same sex. Ellis coined the term 'eonism' (in conformity with the eponymous origins of 'sadism' and 'masochism') after the eighteenth century Chevalier d'Eon de Beaumont, one of the most famous subjects of the anomaly. Hirschfeld had distinguished it from manifest homosexuality, terming it transvestism, or as translated by Edward Carpenter, 'cross-dressing'. Ellis showed that it was a matter of essentially more than cross-dressing, and could be better understood as a matter of 'sexo-æsthetic inversion'. On account, however, of what Ellis too believed to be the distinctness of the anomaly from homosexuality, he discarded this term. He interpreted eonism as an abnormal exaggeration of 'the element of sympathy and identification, . . . the secondary component of the normal heterosexual impulse', the first being the 'aggressive component' to which 'in civilized human courtship there is a tendency . . . to be subordinated'.

Ellis presented voluminous case material and noted the frequent moral superiority of eonists. He stressed as usual, evidences of constitutional and hereditary predisposition, to the minimization of the determining etiological influence of early conditioning experiences. The deeper interpretation of eonism afforded by psychoanalysis was sketched by Ernest Jones, reviewing this volume in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. His own clinical evidence, according to Jones, reveals that the source of eonism does lie in sexual inversion; dislike for the idea of homosexual practices is found among many inverts. The apparent feeble character of the manifest sexual impulse of eonists may, says Jones, merely reflect an inhibition such as psychoanalysis has often proved to be removable.[3]

The Doctrine of Erogenic Zones briefly related the development of psychological understanding of the skin regions and mucous membranes which are particularly susceptible of pleas-

[3] Such observations have been presented in some detail by Fenichel, Sadger, Ferenczi and Freud.

urable feelings by predestination or conditioning. It instructively traced this development from the earliest doctrines of 'sympathy', through the observations of hysterogenic zones to which Charcot gave prominence, of the erogenic centers first referred to by Chambard, and the analogies between these two which were noted by Féré. How much is owed to Freud for the general acceptance of the existence of erogenous zones was presented in some detail. Ellis suggested that the significance of these zones under normal conditions and the natural art of love was yet insufficiently appreciated. The study erred insignificantly in ascribing the term 'erotogenous', instead of 'erotogenic', as a variant usage of the English psychoanalysts.

Some of the simpler observations of psychoanalysis were sympathetically illustrated, but its intricacies were referred to with inadequate comprehension and misleadingly in The History of Florrie and the Mechanism of Sexual Deviation. This was a long study of a case on which Ellis exerted, through interviews and correspondence over a period of three years, an incomplete therapeutic effect. Florrie was a married woman with fantasies and desires of being whipped. Her treatment ended in her being no more than reconciled to normal sex relationships, never obtaining any intense gratification from them. She did appear to attain a good deal of contentment and peace of mind, associated with a fuller understanding of herself. Ellis held that Florrie could never be expected to become more normal than this, and that the therapeutic result in general 'lies in enabling the subject to see himself or herself understandingly'.

These dicta reflected Ellis's fundamental lack of understanding of the psychotherapeutic process. He did not perceive this as a matter of recanalizing specific quantities of the impulsive energies produced by bodily tensions. The relations between these id energies, as they are described by the psychoanalysts, and the energies of the ego, or organized part of the mind, were evidently never even clearly recognized by him. Only the latter were the subject of his clinical attention, and in consequence, any therapeutic effects which he achieved

were bound to be accidental and but little more than cathartic. This was the logical counterpart of his characteristic premise that Florrie's disposition arose on the basis of 'her congenital psychophysical organization', and his layman's underestimation of such influences as the brutal whippings which Florrie received in childhood at the hands of a deeply loved father. In particular, his depreciatory remarks about transference harmfully disseminated the rationalizations of one who really sought justification for avoiding a signally arduous and unwelcome task of mastering the minutiæ of a specialized technique in a field in which he was not primarily interested. This study did make available a certain amount of useful new material on the mechanism of the perversion of whipping which is susceptible, just as it stands, of a much more valuable analysis than Ellis gave it. On the whole, however, the study cannot but have exercised a retrograde effect on the progress of scientific psychotherapy.

The Menstrual Curve of the Sexual Impulse, another of the shorter articles, presented both factual and theoretical material on this subject. It made available to English readers an account of Adolph Gerson's reconstruction of the conditions of primitive conflict at the recurring periods of full moon, under which the menstrual cycle might have developed. Ellis critically noted, however, that Gerson ignored the existence of a rudimentary menstrual cycle among many of the monkeys and lower apes, which appears to necessitate placing the origin of the phenomenon in pre-Pliocene times. He also pointed out that Gerson, in his description of primitive intercourse as a brutal attack by the male, ignored the universality of some form of courtship in the animal world. The investigations by Arrhenius on the possible correlation of atmospheric electricity with the lunar periodicity of menstruation were discussed but the conclusion reached was that the nearly lunar periodicity of menstruation 'still demands a satisfactory solution'. Direct information regarding sexual desire in relation to menstruation revealed that there is usually a heightening of desire immediately before and immediately after the period, com-

monly at both times, and often during the period itself. He confirmed the discovery of Dr. Marie Stopes, of the existence of two wave crests in the menstrual cycle of sexual desire. The establishment of this curve seemed to Ellis to represent a notable advance in knowledge of the psychophysiological life of women.

The Synthesis of Dreams credited Freud 'on the whole' with discovering dream analysis. The thesis, however, was advanced that there is another method of dream study which is 'of the same psychological validity': the charting of consecutive dreams in the same subject. This Ellis termed 'dream-synthesis'. Suggestively but rather uncritically, he compared the relationship between the two methods with the relationship between geology and geography. His investigations of dream synthesis were offered as no more than an attempt to 'present a reliable series of dreams extensive enough to reveal an unconscious soul'. 'None can know better than I know', he admitted, 'that I have not succeeded'.

The dreams investigated were those of a normal and intelligent thirty-two-year-old married woman. Comparisons were made by Ellis of recent and remote memories, of 'real people' and 'imaginary people', and of the 'natural human functions' represented in these 'manifest dreams' (manifest content of the dreams). They at least revealed the predominance of the patently erotic over the parental, eating, vesical, filial, vocational, and intestinal 'functions'. A particular group of strongly erotic dreams, which Ellis called 'Marriage-by-Capture' dreams, brought out the frequency of the primitive sexual desire of a normal woman to be wooed by force during a period of considerable sexual deprivation. The possible correlation of this type of dream and desire with the social position of women since primitive times, was not considered by Ellis. Like Paul Federn and Mourly Vold, Ellis found flying dreams to lie 'in part' on the borderline of the erotic, and to originate in the 'muscular rhythm' of sexual activity. This he had not in earlier years believed. But in some such dreams he still considered a respiratory factor alone to be the 'muscular rhythm' opera-

tive. Freud related flying dreams to childhood experiences of swinging. Ellis also found vesical dreams, on the basis of a number which he presented, to be often closely connected with sexual impulses, although he placed them in a separate group. He added observations on dreams of eating, of dressing, and of traveling, but completely missed the exhibitionistic factor in dreams of nakedness or undress, which Freud had revealed. Wish fulfilment was shown by Ellis to be present oftener than it was apparent but he assumed, on the basis of their manifest content alone, that wish fulfilment could be shown to be absent in many dreams. In its unintentional misrepresentation of the fundamental mechanisms of dreaming, and of the all importance of the latent content, this study in general served the interests of confusion at least as greatly as those of progress.

An interesting history of literary and ideological manifestations of the spirit of the myth of Narcissus made up the first several pages of The Conception of Narcissism. There followed a brief history of the first generalized description of the 'Narcissus-like tendency' as a psychological attitude, and of the etymology of the term narcissism, which had been the contributions mainly of Ellis himself in his early study of Auto-Erotism. More important, the great enrichment of the concept by psychoanalysis, on the basis of observations of both abnormal and normal psychology beginning with the second edition of Freud's Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex in 1910, was recapitulated in considerable detail and with very fair although not complete precision and appreciation. As a signpost to the works of Freud and psychoanalysis, this study was most valuable, and it will probably long remain a useful and a stimulating work of reference. Especially worthy of attention in it is Ellis's own brief but brilliant cognizance of 'group-narcissism', and his distinction between 'patriotism and the vulgar hatred of foreigners' which he called a manifestation of national narcissism, and 'every glorification of humanity and the future of mankind' which 'would be a manifestation of specific narcissism'.

The study of Undinism was essentially a literary and anthropological investigation of what psychoanalysis calls urethral erotism. Undinism was coined by Ellis from the legendary Undines or water nymphs, and is in effect an anthropological term for the exaggerated attraction which human beings feel for water in any of its forms. Ellis found the ultimate source of this attraction in the salt water origins of 'the remote ancestors of Man', and included urinary interests or urolagnia as a subordinate form of the appeal exerted by water in nature generally. He emphasized this point of view at the expense of the emprical findings of psychoanalysis that the attraction to water in nature originates by sublimation from infantile urinary interests. Nevertheless Ellis reviewed with much sympathy many of the findings of psychoanalysis, Sadger in particular, on the erotic implications and the sublimations of urinary interests. He presented many pages of case material including dreams, which confirm the psychoanalytic findings often despite Ellis's interpretations. These were most seriously confusing on the subject of penis envy and the exact place of urethral erotism in the psychosexual development and disposition.

Kleptolagnia rather briefly discussed with a historical background 'theft associated with sexual excitement'. The term had been devised about 1917 by Dr. J. G. Kiernan of Chicago on the analogy of 'algolagnia'. Kiernan had called attention earlier, as had Lacassagne before him in 1896 and other investigators in the following decade, to the frequent associations of sex and cleptomania. They had little influence, however, on the established views that cleptomania was a syndrome of irresistible and motiveless impulses to theft based on constitutional 'degeneration'. In 1908, Stekel observed that irresistible and apparently motiveless thefts were substitutive forms of sexual gratification consequent to sexual deprivation or repression. Ellis's concept of kleptolagnia represented the theft as a means of generating fear and anxiety to 'reinforce' the 'feeble sexual impulse' in its drive for gratification. Lacking understanding of the psychodynamics which comes from clinical training and experience, Ellis could not appreciate that the

states of anxiety which to him appeared to 'overflow into the sexual sphere' are in actuality, as is the theft itself, a form of defense of the ego against sexual impulses which threaten to overwhelm it. Ellis separated his concept of kleptolagnia from essentially similar cases of other investigators and the fundamental conclusions of Stekel. But his observations were influential in ending the obscurantism regarding cleptomania. The understanding of pyromania, for which Ellis in a footnote proposed 'pyrolagnia', following Kiernan, must also have been indirectly furthered by this study, although not comparably with observations by Stekel on the subject.

Future of Marriage

The first part of The History of Marriage was a discursive review of Westermarck's classic. The second part sought to shed light on the future of marriage. In comparison with Ellis's earlier study of marriage, this was concerned in less detail with the features of marriage, past and present, than with tendencies to be anticipated from these. Ellis noted that Westermarck almost completely ignored psychoanalytic explanations of sexual and social phenomena. On the other hand it is here that Ellis endorsed the psychologically naïve interpretation of Westermarck against Frazer and Freud on the problems of exogamy and incest. He also quoted Malinowski in proof of the ignorance of some primitive peoples regarding the rôle of the father in conception without considering the psychoanalytic explanation of this ignorance as a form of repression, evidence for which is to be found in the observations of Malinowski himself. It is nevertheless a tribute to the inspiration which Ellis was to anthropological research that so thorough and original an investigator as Malinowski, regards himself as a pupil and follower of Ellis, and such an authoritative scholar as Westermarck called Ellis's studies 'a classic without a rival'.

Ellis reclarified, in passing, the concept of marriage as a social institution not based on sex alone, and not strictly exclusive of other sexual relations. He explained the need for greater freedom of divorce, including legal facilities, and gave

credit to the Russian Revolution in this connection. He advocated that the 'companionate marriage', or non-legal union of two persons for sexual companionship without intention of producing offspring, should be openly recognized as worthy and beneficial. On this subject, Ellis called attention to the writings of Mrs. Havelock Ellis and of Judge Ben Lindsey. The advanced view was expressed by Ellis that the reduction of legal marriage to a mere formality might be witnessed without anxiety. On the other hand, he reëmphasized that society has a very intimate concern with the children produced by its members. The study valuably dissected the characteristic fictions of the Catholic and of the Protestant churches regarding marriage. It also pointed out with fresh and still needed emphasis many of the social and psychological determinants of adultery, and of normal and abnormal attitudes towards it. He separated the ideal of a 'happy marriage' from greedy self-absorption, and found it to lie rather as conceived by Keyserling and others, in the 'intensity of life' which the relationship enhances in the partners whose respective individualities ought to be cherished, and whose 'generous contact with the world' ought to be enriched and ennobled.

In 1933, Ellis published A Manual for Students, with the title, Psychology of Sex. Not merely a summary of his studies, it contained materials, observations, and references not in them and included bibliographies.

Among the medical and psychological professions, the influence of the work of Ellis was additionally disseminated in earlier years both by the prior publication of some of the studies in journals and also through a chapter on Sexual Problems, Their Nervous and Mental Relations in The Modern Treatment of Nervous and Mental Disease, edited by White and Jelliffe, and through contributions to Moll's German *Handbuch der Sexualwissenschaften,* and Marie's French *Traité International de Psychologie Pathologique.* The languages into which Ellis's works have been translated include German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and Japanese.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CATHOLIC DOCTOR. Fr. A. Bonnar. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1938. 172 pp.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. Thomas Verner Moore. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939. 604 pp.

These two books are written by two monks, one of whom is a Benedictine, a priest, and a physician. It is obvious that in matters of religious principles and purity of dogma Fr. A. Bonnar, O.F.M., D.D., and Dom. Thomas Verner Moore, Ph.D., M.D., will find no points of disagreement. Yet from the standpoint of the rational approach to human psychology, these two authors are great distances apart.

Fr. Bonnar is concerned primarily with the preservation of the Catholic tradition. One cannot quarrel either with his intent or with his arguments. He is opposed to the use of contraceptives, to euthanasia, and to sterilization, all of which contradict the Catholic dogma. The difficulties begin when Fr. Bonnar makes a brief excursion—about forty-five pages—into psychology, particularly into freudian psychology. The freudian topography is accepted: the id, ego, superego, conscious, preconscious, unconscious. The usual pseudophilosophical argumentation rejects the empirical findings because of the Catholic attitude towards the problems of determinism and free will.

It is more than regrettable when authoritative Catholics addressing Catholics as well as those outside the Church fail to realize that that which the philosoper, lay or religious, chooses to find in Freud as dealing with philosophy has really nothing to do with empirical, clinical psychoanalysis. The fact that Freud or Jones chose to assume a definite and mostly negative attitude towards religion does not make the clinical system of psychoanalysis false, any more than does Galileo's deflection from the dogma of the Church disprove his optics. Psychoanalysis does not thereby become immoral any more than medicine becomes immoral when it cures a criminal of pneumonia or of a gun shot wound without admonishing him to abandon his criminal career. That Freud never dealt with the problem of the soul, but rather with the psychic apparatus, remains

apparently unknown to a number of Catholics, although the facts are easily available in psychoanalytic literature. Consequently, Fr. Bonnar falls into the regrettable mistake of creating his own principles of psychotherapy and even his own psychopathological nosology. He speaks of 'scrupulosity' as a neurosis; he clings to the age-long view that a neurosis has something to do with morality, that psychological, clinical issues are moral issues, and he would keep them in the hands of the priest. He admits that *'as a most fundamental principle it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the priest's ministrations, and especially the administration of the sacraments, have no medical purpose'.* The author himself puts these lines in italics. Yet in some way he claims the ability as a priest to restore health. Sexual information he claims is essential, but full information should not be imparted till the age of eighteen, this despite the author's own admission that sexual curiosity in children is natural, that it should be met with honesty, that one should not lie to children.

I am afraid that a great deal of ignorance is uttered by ignorant lips which are frequently mistaken for authoritative Catholicism. To be sure, official Catholicism objects to Freud, but it objects to Freud because he was an unbeliever and not because the Church has verified the facts discovered and found them false. I venture to say that the time will come when good and courageous Catholics will study psychoanalysis seriously, as seriously as they study the Galilean optics and the heliocentric system, and will find nothing in clinical psychoanalysis that would contradict their religious faith.

In contradistinction to Fr. Bonnar's *ad hoc* psychopathology and *ad hoc* nosology, which he could easily correct by consulting such an excellent psychiatrist and good Catholic as Edward Strecker, we find Father's Moore's book scholarly, thoughtful, earnest, and illuminating. Father Moore has made a real contribution to psychological literature. We see here a sound historical approach. The author follows carefully and succinctly the development of psychology from the Greeks to *Gestalt.* He is judicious and not prejudiced in limiting his subject matter to *cognitive psychology,* leaving the reader with the inferential assertion that there is also a psychology of affects, of instincts. That he does not deal with this latter psychology and that he mentions Freud very, very briefly,

and that he dismisses the whole question of anxiety in a little more than one paragraph, is due to the limits of the investigation which Father Moore set for himself rather than to prejudice or ignorance. Throughout the book, which is well documented and annotated, there is the spirit of enlightened neo-Thomism which the modern thinker has learned to respect.

The book is too concise and too full of solid psychological and philosophical data to make a brief summary possible. Suffice it to say that the chapters on Locke and Leibnitz are particularly good, not to speak of the rather masterly simplicity with which Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas are discussed. A psychoanalyst will find hardly anything with which he would disagree fundamentally in this book by a good Catholic, medical scholar. One would wish to find some day a good Catholic who would look into clinical psychoanalysis with the investigative, critical eye of a religious scholar who seeks the truth about man as he, man, finds himself to be. For scientific medicine has never controverted the Church or its dogma. It could not if it would, because the moment it attempted to do so, it would stop being medicine and become an apostasy in religion and a philosophy, not a clinical science. It does seem that Father Moore, like many worthy Catholic scholars, never abandoning their true religious position, could accept psychoanalysis as freely as these Catholic scholars reject today the fantastic epidemiology and climatology of Pope Innocent VIII.

GREGORY ZILBOORG (NEW YORK)

LECTURES ON WAR NEUROSES. By T. A. Ross, M.D. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1941. 116 pp.

This interesting and well written little book, consisting of a series of lectures delivered in England to battalion medical officers and general practitioners, is well adapted to its purpose of helping them deal with patients under strain of war. The book reflects the wide experience of the author with military and civilian cases in both the present and past wars.

Although Dr. Ross uses many psychoanalytic concepts he is critical of the attitude of many unnamed freudians. He protests their suggestion that 'his own unconscious unkindness' lies behind his stress of the rôle of unconscious gain through illness and of the unconscious desire to be discharged from military service. He

takes issue with analysts who insist that no practical therapeutic results can be obtained without an 'unending enquiry into the unconscious'. In many cases explanations become effective if repeated over and over. This despite the fact that 'analysts hold that that which has become unconscious cannot be reached through consciousness . . . and that one must wait until the repressed wells up.' Dr. Ross comments 'I think that if you start with this view you will not make much of explaining to patients'.

He pleads for the exclusion before induction of the likely candidates for war neuroses. This can best be done he believes, if family doctors will send in to the authorities the histories of cases showing repeated illnesses. Once men are in service many breaks can be prevented through the proper care of the men by understanding medical and company officers.

Acute neuroses he feels should be treated in forward hospitals. The doctor must have confidence in his diagnosis and carry his conviction to the patient. He cannot bluff. Hysterical paralysis can be cured in a single sitting which must not be stopped until the man has full use of his limbs. If he is mute he must be able to speak at one sitting. Amnesia responds to immediate treatment by hypnosis. Patients should not be with the wounded or physically sick and should be treated by doctors who have had experience with this type of patient in private life. Results can be obtained under war conditions that cannot be duplicated in normal times.

Any case which has been sent away to a relatively safe place can be considered as a chronic neurotic. These cases do not get well until released from service and relapse very easily if returned to duty. Discharge during war times when employment is easy brings good results, whereas release during a period of unemployment brings very poor results. In the early stages, talking about war experiences can bring relief from tormenting anxiety dreams, but this very discussion is difficult to bring about at first because of unconscious factors.

As can be seen from these brief excerpts the book abounds with practical suggestions as to the handling of war neuroses. Disagreement about certain of the author's theories are inevitable. Nevertheless the book can be read with value by anyone who may have occasion to see such cases.

RICHARD L. FRANK (NEW YORK)

PERSONALITY AND PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT. By Kimball Young. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. 816 pp.

This book is full of our American variety of common sense, about two-fifths of which is devoted to theories of personality and methods of studying it, and the rest, as stated in the title, to everyday problems of adjustment. It is up-to-date, orderly, comprehensive; nothing pertinent is omitted. The author tells all that an elementary student or educated layman needs to know about the constitutional foundations of behavior, neural and glandular. The dynamics of learning, in the broader sense, are perhaps not accorded the detailed exposition they deserve; but there are some excellent sections on language development, thought and the rise of the self in interaction. The importance of anticipation as a determinant of behavior is well stated. Problems arising out of parent-child and teacher-pupil relationships are analyzed and judiciously appraised. Since the author has the solid middle-class majority in mind when he discusses mental hygiene for college students, adjustments in marriage, problems of the single woman and so forth, his conclusions are almost necessarily banal, though sensible. A hundred and sixty pages are devoted to delinquency, neurosis and psychosis.

Dr. Young, who is primarily a social psychologist, finds himself very often in accord with the social-interactional conceptions of G. H. Mead and W. I. Thomas, but he is almost equally hospitable to the ideas of Freud, Allport and a host of others. His intellectual attitude is that of an eclectic, a democratic liberal, friendly to many opposing theories which swim together in his text like so many boon companions. He is better at seeing similarities than differences. In fact he is a consummate peacemaker: he does not fret and fume, take issue with sectarians, or tilt at straw men. He picks out the best ideas, here, there and everywhere, and merges them; but when one reaches the end of a chapter it is rather difficult to make a mental inventory of one's acquisitions. There is lack of critical definition both in the use of common concepts (trait, habit, attitude, identification, introjection, idea) and in the inclusion of overlapping or contrasting theories. Thus the book is not destined, in my opinion, to instigate much rigorous thinking or to direct research to crucial issues.

The author is sympathetic to dynamic, organismic and *gestalt* conceptions. He advocates multiple procedures, the taking account

of physiological as well as sociological factors. He has a good word to say for intuition in diagnosis. He stresses the importance of fixity and flexibility as a pair of variables. He is one of all too few academic men who give psychoanalysis a respectable place in their frame of reference; and he does this without the preliminary gesture of digging his teeth into the scruff of its neck and shaking it.

It is impossible to treat problems of adjustment without some reference to values, implicit or explicit. Professor Young's standards are not stated, but his judgments seem to follow pretty closely the drift of contemporary opinion such as might be revealed by a poll of mental hygienists, educators and parents throughout the country. He concludes that 'as observers and commentators we can do little else but describe what is going on and wait to see what types of new cultural patterns will emerge'. This is the attitude that prevails today among psychologists, clinical and otherwise; and what it means is that the men who make it their business to study social norms, and so presumably know most about their consequences, retire on principle from the field of judgment, and allow their minds to be made up by the unwitting herd. 'The feeble tremble before opinion, the foolish defy it, the wise judge it, the skilful direct it.' Of these four varieties of men the psychologist, as counsellor, comes nearest to the first. But this passive acquiescence is not necessary. The scientific physician has proved that it is possible to do justice to objective truth and yet decide on what is best and work for it. If those who see the world most truly, take no part in its transitions, some day there may be no world at which even they can gaze without a shudder. Unfortunately, most of us are no different in this respect from Professor Young.

The appendix of the volume contains a useful outline for writing a case history and a satisfactory bibliography. On the whole and in spite of some of the defects I have pointed out, I think that this is about the best textbook that has appeared on the subject of personality and its dilemmas.

HENRY A. MURRAY (CAMBRIDGE)

PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. By William Brown. Fourth Edition. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940. 260 pp.

William Brown published the first edition of this little book in 1920 shortly after his experiences as a medical officer in the first World War. At the time of its original publication it was a really

needed work. There was little then available on the war neuroses and psychoses viewed from the standpoint of the new depth psychology. A slight revision was undertaken in 1921, a rather thorough one in 1934, and finally this edition, which is enlarged and somewhat rewritten and motivated to some extent by Brown's reactions to the present World War. Thus the book has grown from a simple presentation of the new psychology illustrated by the neuroses and psychoses of war times to a rather pretentious but sketchy introduction to psychology and psychotherapy in general. It even goes far beyond this as certain chapter headings show: Psychology and the Adolescent, Sublimation and Spirituality, Psychology of Peace and War, and Psychical Research and the Eternal Values.

Brown claims his position has grown more sympathetic towards psychoanalysis with the years, but he still considers himself an eclectic who has founded his own system. Most psychoanalysts will view his sympathy with some misgivings. The presentation of psychoanalysis is far from accurate and up-to-date and is in addition tempered with evaluative and moral judgments which do not belong to natural science. The whole earlier portion of the book describes the psychoanalysis of around 1910 and the only mention of the theory of aggressive urges and the metapsychology is brought in arbitrarily in the revision. Brown's own system, despite his claims of its lack of inner contradiction, leans on psychoanalysis to some extent but almost as heavily on 'spiritual values' and 'common-sense'. From the book it is hard to get a clear picture of it. This difficulty comes from the fact that the revisions are evidently 'paste and scissors' jobs with the addition of various occasional papers rather than thorough and honest rewritings.

There was undoubtedly a real need for Brown's work at the time of its first publication. For this revision, however, the reviewer can see no possible excuse. There are available both here and in England much better brief introductions to the topics in question which are fresh rather than rehashed. If Brown has something really meaningful to say at the time of the present crisis he should write a completely new book. Finally, this book is marketed at four dollars and seventy-five cents. This can only be described as exorbitant.

J. E. BROWN (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRY. By Edward A. Strecker, Abraham A. Brill, Nolan D. C. Lewis, Arthur H. Ruggles. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. 35 pp.

This booklet contains four papers given by the above mentioned authors at the Bicentennial Conference of the University of Pennsylvania. The subject matters given before a general medical and enlightened lay audience are presented in a clear and vigorous language. In the discussion of various forms of shock therapy, Strecker points out that their value has been not so much in curing patients, as in providing a background for a better understanding of schizophrenia and in establishing more accurate prognostic criteria which may apply to any method of therapy. Strecker puts it very aptly when he states that the by-product may be more valuable than the product originally sought.

In Lewis' paper on Psychosomatic Medicine, we can see the bewilderment of the psychiatrist when he faces the child he has created—psychosomatic medicine. It is becoming more and more obvious that as yet we have no precise method which can correlate physiological and psychological functions.

The papers by Brill on Therapeutic Advances in Psychoanalysis, and Ruggles on Psychiatry in Social Relationships are well presented.

J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

MODERN PSYCHOTHERAPY. By Noel Harris, M.D. London: John Bale Medical Publications, Ltd., 1939. 144 pp.

The author defines psychotherapy as methods of treatment which are dependent upon psychological processes for their origin, as contrasted with physical means, which are used by the rest of medicine. He states that the present conception of the neurosis owes a great debt to Freud. In his own therapy, the author operates with analytical concepts and techniques. He feels, however, that psychotherapy as such should not be limited to psychoanalysis; hence he uses all available means at his disposal, such as social service, occupational therapy, etc. His point of view is very much like the one used by our better psychiatric out-patient clinics in large general hospitals.

The author is obviously an experienced psychotherapist, and probably a very successful one. If a patient fails to improve by general methods, he advises psychoanalysis.

Since the aim of the book is to acquaint the general practitioner with psychotherapeutic methods, the author succeeds in his purpose.

J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

PSYCHOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY. By Wendell Muncie, M.D. St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1939. 739 pp.

A HANDBOOK OF ELEMENTARY PSYCHOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY. By Edward G. Billings, M.D. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1939. 271 pp.

The two figures which have most profoundly influenced the development of American psychiatry in the first half of the century have been undoubtedly those of Adolf Meyer and Freud. If we contrast these two men, certain striking differences come to the surface. Freud worked in splendid isolation for almost fifteen years before he presented the main body of his ideas to the scientific world. He checked again and again his hypotheses on his clinical material and on his students before he published his ideas. The initial hostility which he met in Vienna after he returned from France made him go into retreat, and perhaps accounts for the maturation of his ideas without interference of academic intrigues, personal entanglements, or even active contact with other schools of thought, as he put it in his autobiography. Meyer was more fortunate. His value was recognized more quickly. His solid scientific background was a novelty to American psychiatry, which already in the nineties was ready for scientific leadership. Yet, great as Adolf Meyer's influence has been, he has never stated his views completely and most of his ideas have been handed down by his students. Some of these modified them a great deal, others took certain liberties with them, and still others only remembered the peculiar type of verbiage and forgot what was behind it. Freud wrote freely and a great deal. He made many mistakes, acknowledged them, and did not hesitate to modify his views in accordance with the accumulation of new knowledge and experience. Dogmatic as he was, he was certainly less 'dominican' as Zilboorg puts it, than his students.

It is fortunate indeed that after many years two volumes on psychobiology have appeared—one by Muncie, with the approval of Meyer himself, and the other by Billings.

The future student of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, perusing the work of Adolf Meyer and Freud, will probably be less struck

by the differences, than the similarities, and these are very apparent in Muncie's Psychobiology and Psychiatry. Muncie begins his volume with a student's personality study, which is given in four chapters, and is the cornerstone of the psychobiological point of view. This is strikingly similar to Freud's demands that the analyst must be analyzed himself before he attempts to work with other people. The technique of review of one's own personality, to be sure, is quite different in the two disciplines, but nevertheless, the principle is the same. Muncie takes up the personality structure as outlined by Freud (to which he gives only a short paragraph) together with Adler and Jung. His objections are the ones we have heard before: (1) blindness to the plain facts of integration in favor of outmoded mind-body dualism; (2) the assumption of certain limited ideas as to what is the 'core' of the personality; (3) the vitalism inherent in all purely psychological approaches.

As a contrast, Muncie brings out the various tools of psychobiology, such as physiological approaches, psychometric tests, and an investigation of the cognitive processes with a good deal of discussion on the variability in the human personality.

At the end of the first part, the author attempts to give the criteria of a normal personality. This is expressed in common terms, useful to the average student.

Part II in Muncie's book is devoted to the description of abnormal behavior and deals with the methods of examination utilized by the psychobiological school. Most of the part is occupied with the description of the various reaction types, or as Meyer puts it: 'disturbances in the various types of ergasias'. In spite of the objections by practically all psychiatrists to a new and rather complicated classification introduced by Meyer, one must remember that the concept of ergasia is not much different from libido. The only classification which we use in psychiatry at the present time is the one which was suggested by Kraepelin with slight modifications. It seems to me that a classification of mental disease based on the concept of disturbances in the energy drives of the organism is much better than the older classifications which are devoid of any sound scientific basis. There is a tradition in American psychiatry that nobody can understand Adolf Meyer, his writings or his talks. This is exactly what has been said about Freud, with the difference that Freud had a large number of students who have popularized his writings, whereas Adolf Meyer never encouraged his students to publish very much in the field of psychobiology.

It seems to me that a good deal of the prejudice against Adolf Meyer, his teachings and his system of classification, is more the hostility of a conservative psychiatric group than the results of the difficulty of understanding his ideas. Muncie certainly presents the ideas of Adolf Meyer in very clearcut, lucid, and simple language. One can easily grasp the principles of psychobiology from this volume.

Part III of the book deals with psychotherapy, and here is the weakest link in the whole psychobiological system of thought. There is no question that the scientific study of an individual must include every possible variable or else we do not get a complete picture of the human organism. The pluralistic approach advocated by Adolf Meyer, which means the utilization of every conceivable method of investigating the human being, is the method par excellence in research. This method, however, is of very little value, especially in the psychoneurosis. In the chapter on the treatment of psychoneurosis the author is vague and in the case histories he cites, it seems that the patients have recovered by themselves rather than through any therapeutic effort of the physician. Here there is a lack of understanding of the fundamental problem of the neurotic patient, as for example when the author describes a woman who suffered from 'general nervousness' and has been vomiting for seven years. On the other hand he is extremely practical in the treatment of his mentally ill patients, and every possible resource is utilized to benefit the patient. The combination of various types of environmental therapy, with a certain amount of superficial psychotherapy is what psychobiology offers in the treatment of psychoses. This the author calls 'healthy eclecticism'.

Part IV contains a bibliographical review of the various reaction types, and cites the most important articles which have crystallized various disease syndromes, concepts, ideas, etc. Unfortunately, some of these have not been done by the author, and the selection of papers is not as good as one would like. This is especially true in schizophrenia where one misses such historical papers as the one by Sullivan on The Onset of Schizophrenia, or the one by Tausk.[1] On the other hand some papers are included

[1] Tausk, Victor: *On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia.* Translated by Dorian Feigenbaum. This QUARTERLY, II, 1933, pp. 519–556.

which are of practically no significance to the history of psychiatry.

The volume by Muncie is spread out on seven hundred and thirty pages, which is very unfortunate as more drastic editing would have brought this volume to about one-half the number of pages, greatly reducing the cost.

The book by Billings is a short, practical guide to psychobiology for medical students. Here one finds an introductory chapter on Psychopathology which is so condensed and so full of terms used only by the psychobiological school that it is practically meaningless. I doubt if the average student or practitioner reading the first chapter would have any idea of what the author is talking about. This is followed, however, by a practical chapter on the examination of the patient, and a fairly concise review of the major psychoses. The chapter on Psychotherapy is quite vague and gives very little clue as to what can be done with the patient, as for example when the author speaks about the 'management of the dynamic forces'.

J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS OF SPINOZA. A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. By David Bidney, Ph.D. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. 454 pp.

It is indeed original to interpret the Ethics by means of the method which Spinoza himself recommended for the interpretation of the Bible in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. In so doing the author arrives at the following conclusion: 'Contrary to the uncritical assumption of contemporary writers that Spinoza's philosophy constitutes a systematic unity, we maintain that an unprejudiced analysis of his work reveals no such inner harmony and consistency even though Spinoza's mathematical method of deduction gives one the impression of strict logical rigor' (p. 12).

The incoherences in Spinoza's work in general and in his psychology of emotions in particular resulted from the philosopher's attempt to reconcile his mechanistic premises with the scholastic, neoplatonic and stoic doctrines. The inconsistency in the theory of emotions was especially a consequence of the incompatibility of the psychophysical parallelism and the scholastic doctrine of the autonomy of the intellect. Dr. Bidney, nevertheless, assures us that this criticism does not 'refer to the truth value of Spinoza's work'. On the contrary he tries to show how great an influence Spinoza's

psychophysical theory exerted on the psychologists of the nineteenth century.

Criticizing Professors Murphy and Spearman for having overlooked this important fact in their respective works,[1] the author goes so far as to assert that Spinoza originated modern psychological currents by having created a dynamic psychology of emotions according to the Galilean law of inertia. The author then points out the striking similarity between Spinoza's mechanistic theory and the James-Lange theory of emotions, which Lange himself acknowledged.

Comparing the Spinozistic conatus with the freudian conception, the author finds only a slight similarity between them. One gets the impression that perhaps the only thing in common with both is their inconsistency; for, 'Both Spinoza and Freud conclude by maintaining the primacy and autonomy of reason and both are inconsistent in doing so. . . . They both begin as metaphysical monists and are forced into dualism' (pp. 403–404).

After criticizing those scholars whose opinions on the same matter differ greatly from his own, the author declares: 'The best illustration however of the freudian notion of rationalization and wishful thinking is the attempt to interpret Spinoza's psychology of the emotions as essentially freudian in character' (p. 404).

This reviewer does not feel competent to weigh the validity of the method employed by Bidney in the interpretation of the Ethics. This is a task for competent Spinoza scholars; however one thing appears to be certain and that is that Dr. Bidney's attitude towards psychoanalysis and hence towards the Spinoza-Freud assay is not one which could be called unprejudiced. He is opposed particularly to the psychoanalytic theory of aggression. For one who exhibits so much aggressiveness throughout his book this resistance is understandable. In addition Dr. Bidney, lacking understanding of the development of psychoanalysis as a clinical discipline, falsely bases his arguments on isolated quotations from Freud. It is noteworthy that some quotations from Spinoza which the author uses to demonstrate his viewpoint could serve to prove the reverse.

Despite our disagreement in many instances, it is greatly to be

[1] Murphy, G.: *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology.* London: Kegan Paul, 1932.

Spearman, Charles: *Psychology Down the Ages.* London and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937.

appreciated that Bidney undertook this important study of the psychology of the emotions in Spinoza's Ethics. He has at least broken with the tradition of treating the Ethics from an exclusively metaphysical viewpoint to the complete neglect of the essential psychology of the emotions.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN CONFLICT. By Edwin R. Guthrie. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938. 408 pp.

The trend of this work is revealed in the summary:

> '1. Intense and prolonged stimuli disturb the organism and result in excitement and heightened activity.
>
> '2. The animal responds to these and other stimuli encountered with whatever responses have been previously learned.
>
> '3. Every series of movement tends to be fixed as a habit and to be repeated if once started.
>
> '4. Excitement brings increased activity and this brings stimuli in new orders. Responses tend to become more varied.
>
> '5. Each response as it occurs is associated with the drive but loses this association to the next response.
>
> '6. Eventually a response (consummatory response) removes the drive. For this in turn the drive becomes an associative cue.'

Here may be discerned the influence of Thorndike as well as of W. B. Cannon and E. J. Kempf. The author's descriptive psychology is that of Janet who, he complains, 'has been neglected in the United States because of the momentum and popular appeal of the psychoanalytic movement'. One is at least mildly surprised to learn that Janet has explored the field of unconscious desires 'much more thoroughly than any of the psychoanalysts'. How little the author himself understands 'unconscious desires' may be gathered from the following quotation: 'Brothers and sisters do not normally develop such [erotic] interest in each other. . . Incest . . would be very rare even if no social tabus enforced it with punishment and social disapproval. The reason for the rare occurence of incest is that in human beings attitudes towards other members of the household are established before sexual maturity and before erotic drive attains its full effectiveness.'

One might have no quarrel with Guthrie's description of the process of learning and habit adjustment if he did not attempt to explain by its means the most diverse phenomena—interests, motivation, personality, 'the nervous breakdown', phobias,

'insanity', etc. As one might expect, his accounts are highly mechanistic, and he frequently drags the organic cat in by the tail when he is at a loss for explanations of motives which a little psychoanalytic insight would clarify. This is especially true in the chapters on psychopathology. One may justifiably look askance upon an author who complains that Freud is not objective or scientific, but most credulously assigns a decisive rôle to vitamin deficiencies and endocrine dysfunctions in mental disturbances. A careful examination of the evidence he adduces for the importance of such pathology shows that only a fraction of it is more than conjectural.

Possibly this trend towards oversimplification, so characteristic of academic psychology, may in part be explained by failure to establish adequate clinical contacts. Methodological limitations are of course primary. Certainly the experienced clinician who reads this book, impressed though he be by its lucid account of the learning process, cannot accept the following explanation of paranoia: 'The delusion of persecution is . . . founded on reality'. To illustrate, the author cites the case of a student who affected a peculiar walk. This attracted attention, and the student 'began to notice that people eyed him covertly and that there were occasional glances and whisperings when he entered a room with strangers'. This, according to the author, upset the student's self-esteem and in order to reëstablish the 'conservative state' which is necessary for a sense of well being (aptly compared by the author to the homeostatic state of W. B. Cannon) 'he conceives the notion that someone has been spreading malicious gossip about him'. Delusions of grandeur derive from the multiplicity and importance of the student's enemies, etc.

This instance is by no means an isolated one. It is entirely characteristic of the author's approach. It is not that he is unaware of the mechanism of rationalization. He defines it in an early chapter. But this does not prevent him from resorting to superficialities similar to the above to explain the most delicate problems in psychopathology. If pressed for the etiology of the above mentioned paranoid psychosis, the author would say that the student had 'learned' to assume a rôle which made him walk peculiarly or that he was perhaps suffering from some 'organic dysfunction'. However, to assume the validity of an organic attack upon the problem of schizophrenia is by no means to dispense with the

necessity of an infinitely more careful description of the dynamics of the disease than the author deems it necessary to provide. We all know of schizophrenics successfully treated by nonorganic methods. Assuming that the above mentioned student were accessible to psychotherapy, I wonder how far one could go by presuming that his difficulty consisted eminently of the mistaken 'rôle' he had 'learned' to play. Clearly, theories of etiology cannot be dissociated from therapeutics, and methods of treatment reveal the limitations of a hypothesis. For example, in accordance with Guthrie's theory of learning, a woman with a mouse phobia would be treated by accustoming her in succession to 'a china mouse, a more realistic mouse made of rubber, a stuffed mouse prepared by a taxidermist' and finally a mouse in a cage. A man with an 'elevator phobia' was treated by suddenly forcing him into an elevator. Here are betrayed not only profound limitations in the understanding of symbolic thinking and behavior but an antiquated conception of personality as an unrelated aggregate of habits and learned attitudes. To mention but a problem or two, one wonders how the author would account for castration fears arising in the absence of 'learning', how he would deal with the vexing question of masochism, or where he would look for the origin of the sense of guilt in the absence of a rigid upbringing. I am afraid one would not be particularly enlightened by a hypothesis which states that sexual perversion is simply 'learned'.

'Stimulus-response' as an elementary pattern of behavior is a *sine qua non* of psychology. Essentially, however, Guthrie goes no farther. Inevitably he leaves unexplored, because by his methods they are unexplorable, vast expanses in human behavior.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

SEX VARIANTS: A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUAL PATTERNS. By George W. Henry, M.D. New York and London: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1941. 2 volumes, 1208 pp.

This broadly conceived study of sex variants is sponsored by the Committee for the Study of Sex Variants. This Committee, of distinguished membership, undertakes to correlate the various scientific interests in the field of sex study and to serve as a scientific agency for the furtherance of research on sex variation. Dr.

Henry's study, in which he has the collaboration of specialists in the several pertinent medical fields, consists of clinical studies of forty male and forty female homosexual or bisexual subjects. These subjects voluntarily offered coöperation in the study, and include sexual deviants from all strata of society. Family histories and psychiatric interviews, recorded verbatim, in which 'a modified free association method' was used, were later supplemented by inquiries by a questionnaire method. All subjects were physically examined and pelvic examinations of the women were made. X-ray studies of head, chest and pelvis, photographs in the nude of some subjects offer data useful for endocrinological evaluations and morphological study. The semen of a number of the men and the effect of hormone therapy upon a few of them were studied.

The Terman and Miles 'Attitude and Interest Test', devised to show the psychological differences between men and women was given to most of the group. A large first volume is devoted to male subjects, the second to female subjects and to an appendix in which Dr. Henry's 'impressions' rather than conclusions are given together with the physical and anthropological data. A section on the gynecology of homosexuality, and a glossary covering the language of sexuality, conclude the work.

This is a study of first importance. Not being based on psychoanalytic studies, the psychological formulations are of somewhat general character, but the case histories present a rich and detailed material. The author states specifically that it has been his intention to 'state facts without personal bias' and he is most modest in presenting his own general impressions 'lest the reader be influenced in his own interpretations'. Presumably his own conclusions will be published in a promised third volume. Tentative conclusions include observation that the sex variant is a 'by-product of civilization'. Constitutional deficiencies and family patterns of homosexual adjustment are stressed as contributing factors in sex deviation. The author presents an excellent point of view with respect to sex education. Students of sexual behavior, whether their approach be psychological, physiological or social, will find much important data, well organized and clearly presented, in this first-rate study.

GEORGE J. MOHR (CHICAGO)

LANGUAGE IN ACTION. By S. I. Hayakawa, Ph.D. Chicago: Institute of General Semantics, 1940. 106 pp. (Reprinted: New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1941. 338 pp.)

There is nothing in the idea of a freshman course for English students at Armour Institute, nor in the idea of the newer austere semantics, that would prepare us for the peppy and cycloidal chapters of Mr. Hayakawa's Language in Action. For there is nothing about rhetoric and grammar in the book (though a tremendous lot about English and words) and the schizoidal austerities that mark so much of the diagrammatizing of language is not to be found. With piquant and telling examples from the everyday life and the current scene, the reader is instructed to distinguish between words as 'symbols' and as 'signals'. According to more conventional usage this would roughly correspond to the intellectual and the affective employment of words. The reader is shown the rôle of agreement in determining the value of words or any other symbols. Examples are given to show how persons who naïvely believe that symbol and the thing symbolized are one and the same may be misled (the example given is of the cowboy who rose and shot the stage villain); further how 'slanting' a report can insinuate one or more effects. ('Our army retires to prepared positions.' 'Their army thrown back five miles.'). The magical and musical uses of words are considered, and especial attention is given to what is called the directive uses of language, when language is used to make something happen, rather than to impart facts. Another chapter deals with the process of abstracting, and by means of Korzybski's 'ladder', it is shown how abstraction consists essentially in a leaving out of elements that are present in the empirical experience. There is a passing reference to the persistent area of the primitive within the most sophisticated and normal man.

In short this book is a very good introduction to linguistic psychology—a linguistic psychology which triumphantly supersedes the old aphasia-bound linguistics that one is accustomed to find even in very recent books. For the affective and the dynamic elements are constantly emphasized.

It must be conceded that Mr. Hayakawa has adopted a thoroughly dynamic approach and utilizes a dynamic psychology. Why then, the psychoanalyst would have to ask, has he not once quoted Freud, whose contribution to linguistics, though scattered are very

important, and who, as much as anybody, in his work on dreams, and the psychopathology of everyday life, has understood and elucidated the use of symbols, particularly for affects?

The answer is that there is a good deal of crypto-freud, not so much in Mr. Hayakawa's original matter as in the authors cited in his bibliography (Thurman Arnold, Jerome Frank, etc.) and probably scattered throughout his working atmosphere. For example, a case is referred to by way of explaining what is meant by 'projection of an abstraction' in which paper roses are reacted to with hay fever symptoms, and the theme of displacements is dealt with under other names. So much is really considered under what amounts to a partial psychoanalytic point of view that the reviewer can only regret missing what Mr. Hayakawa might have had to say about language and the freudian psychology.

B. D. L.

THE NINETEEN FORTY MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK. Edited by Oscar Krisen Buros. Highland Park, New Jersey: The Mental Measurements Yearbook, 1941. 674 pp.

The 1938 Yearbook, edited by Dr. Buros, was reviewed in this QUARTERLY by this reviewer.[1] At that time the essential orientation of the reviewer was towards a psychology that had meaning and usefulness in a normal world, a world without the cataclysmic aspects of total war. Consequently the use of tests was minimized and their limited predictive value emphasized. In total war with its 'overnight' need to mobilize millions of service men and industrial workers, this testing tool suddenly acquires tremendous magnitude. The individual personality, with its subtle and yet most dynamic meaning, must of necessity be sidetracked in a mobilization of the masses.

It was this same need in the World War of 1917 that called forth the resources of the psychologist, and the Army Alpha test was born. After the war, testing acquired an impetus and the psychologist seeking a more direct relationship to human behavior, because of his previous absorption with the sterility of the 'memory drum laboratory' technique, now felt he had the answer. So everything was tested with the almost daily introduction of more and more tests. We suffered from an overdose of tests but fortunately, with

[1] Volume IX, No. 1.

the revolt stimulated by the gestalt school and psychoanalysis, the significance of the total personality began to slowly return to the psychologists.

Now with the new World War and the need for and use of tests, we are apt to suffer again, especially after the war. It is, however, books like Dr. Buros's that can help us in demanding good standardization and validation with a healthy awareness of the limitation of the specific tool.

This book is a compendium of tests. Experts with recognized qualifications were asked to review the many, both old and new tests in the fields of psychology, industry and education. Evaluations were made so that one who uses the tests can get a rapid view of its structure, use and validity. A total of five hundred and two tests are evaluated.

Of considerable usefulness are the reviews of over three hundred books and monographs in the psychological field. A directory of journals, periodicals, names of publishers, all well indexed, makes for a comprehensive and timely bibliographical usefulness for all those interested in mental tests and measurements. The 1940 Yearbook is a great improvement on the 1938 Yearbook and is especially more helpful to those interested in the total personality. The addition of the thorough handling of the Rorschach test with its complete bibliography is indicative of this improvement. The book is a necessary addition to the library of every tester.

MICHAEL B. DUNN (NEW YORK)

PRINCIPLES OF CONDITIONING IN HUMAN GOAL BEHAVIOR. By Anthony J. Mitrano. Psychological Monographs, 1939, Vol. 51, No. 4. Columbus, Ohio: The American Psychological Association, Inc. 64 pp.

This study, a Yale doctoral dissertation in psychology, represents an interesting attempt to determine whether certain of Pavlov's principles of conditioning are also operative in the 'goal behavior' of human beings. By 'goal behavior' is meant conduct in a situation in which the individual has relatively few behavior restrictions and in which he can control his behavior in reference to a goal set up by the experimenter. This type of behavior is contrasted with the 'passive' behavior of human and animal subjects in the

typical conditioned reflex set-up in which the subject is usually strapped in and in which his behavior does *not* influence the appearance of the conditioned stimulus.

The findings supported the thesis that conditioning behavior as described by Pavlov is to be observed in human 'goal behavior'. Pavlov's statements concerning 'generalization of inhibition', 'experimental extinction' and 'spontaneous recovery' were confirmed. The author is not ready to conclude, however, that complex human behavior is reducible to principles of conditioning. It is his opinion that although some conditioning principles may be used as explanatory concepts, additional concepts are necessary.

Well planned and carefully done, this study should be of interest to those who are engaged in the attempt to apply conditioned reflex theory to problems of human behavior.

PHYLLIS GREENACRE (NEW YORK)

LATENT LEARNING AND THE GOAL GRADIENT HYPOTHESIS. By Claude E. Buxton. No. 6 of Contributions to Psychological Theory. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1940. 75 pp.

The field of learning has furnished the chief problems for theoretical controversy in recent experimental psychology. In the field of perception the superiority of the gestalt or field-theoretical approach is generally admitted. In learning, however, the associationistic and conditioned reflex type of theory still has many eminent supporters. The reviewer believes that the field-theoretical approach will also win out here. Dr. Buxton's monograph supports this viewpoint. In a series of ingenious and evidently carefully controlled learning experiments on rats he shows that learning occurs through previous 'familiarity' with the situation independent of the conditioning situation proper. His findings thus support the field-theoretical position of Lewin and Tolman, rather than the associationistic position of Hull. Since the field-theoretical position is much more easily reconcilable with psychoanalysis these findings may be of some general interest to psychoanalysts. Anyone who is interested in the delimitation of scientific problems, clever experiments and attempted precision of deduction, will find this monograph worth looking into.

J. F. BROWN (LAWRENCE, KANSAS)

REPORT ON THE SEX QUESTION. By the Swedish Population Commission. Translated and Edited by Virginia Clay Hamilton, M.D. Published for National Committee on Maternal Health, Inc., by The Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1940. 182 pp.

The transition from a rapidly growing population to one growing slowly and in the near future to one having an actual decline in numbers is taking place in almost all of the Western World. It so happens that the decline in the birth rate has proceeded further in Sweden than in most other countries. The Swedish Population Commission was appointed in 1935 and has produced a number of reports on different aspects of the population question including proposals for comprehensive social, political and hygienic reforms for facilitating the foundation of families, for helping families with children and for promoting the health of mothers and children. Most of these proposals have gone into effect and may have helped to increase the birth rate from 13.8 in 1935 to 14.9 in 1938. The investigation presented in this book demonstrates definitely that the decline in the birth rate is due to the intentional practice of birth control. This report sets a high standard in economic realism in its treatment of the relations between family problems and the economic life of the community. It calls attention to the treatment of contraception as a factor in the sex life of a nation and discusses contraception and other sex matters in a truly objective and scientific manner. The prohibition of voluntary birth control is not a feasible population policy. The Swedish nation has already brought propagation under the control of the intelligence and the will. The aim is now to insure the survival of the Swedish people. The Committee recommends social and economic reforms that aim to care for children and protect the family. Serious efforts to give youth a more favorable attitude towards family life are outlined.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (CHICAGO)

MODERN MARRIAGE. By Paul Popenoe. Second Edition. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. 299 pp.

This small volume is, according to the author, intended as a popular handbook for men. It is supposed to be written from the biological point of view. This reviewer has difficulty in detect-

ing any definite point of view, biological or otherwise, unless statistics may be called a point of view.

The style and tone is very popular indeed. Statements made are supported by statistics rather than scientific proof. The author quotes lavishly from his own experience as Director of the Institute of Family Relations of Los Angeles. The quotations as well as chapter headings have a strong tinge of the 'confession' magazine story. For example one chapter is headed Are You Old Enough to Marry? Another, Beware of Widows Still More of Divorcees.

Interspersed with the above is enough good common sense and insight in human behavior to mislead the unwary. This book will definitely enjoy a wide circulation and appeal to the reader who secures his 'scientific' information from Mr. Anthony's radio talks. It contains many generalizations, half truths and contradictory statements. To the type of reader who will be attracted to this volume it will prove most confusing. The author maintains that masturbation is harmful, but that the harmful effects are 'mental' not physical. The psychiatrist and psychoanalyst will find opinions quoted again and again in support of some obsession or phobia that are novel, to say the least.

In discussing marriage, the author touches on every human institution related to marriage, covering a great deal of territory in a most superficial manner. Finances he states wisely are seldom a real bar to marriage. When a couple are emotionally ready they get married. Also that in marriage it is the emotional and not the chronological age that is most important. On the other hand he discusses degrees and percentages of 'maleness' and 'femaleness', desirable traits one must look for and undesirable ones to avoid as though these could be measured with a yardstick. He then naïvely laments that an intelligent girl will naturally try to make the most of her assets and, unfortunately, sometimes try to conceal her liabilities.

He states as a fact that members of broken homes come from inferior stock and that divorced people are three to four times as likely to become insane, commit suicide, or be sent to prison, as married people of the same age. They also show a high degree of sterility and are inherently, biologically inferior. This inferiority is largely constitutional in character and of a sort that is not easily remedied. All the above statements are supported by statistics

which bring no note of hope for any of these people. In discussing the social life of young people he makes the statement, again supported by statistics, that the lack of social contacts is one of the commonest causes of an inferiority complex; obviously putting the cart before the horse.

He has a chapter entitled Beware of Bogus Romance where he discusses the delusion of the great lover and the glamour girl rather wittily. The modern girl he feels is 'too Vogue on the outside and too vague on the inside'. We feel that this description fits the volume under discussion only too well.

In discussing homosexuality he counsels naïvely, 'if a man is abnormal in this respect he should not allow a woman to marry him in ignorance nor should he allow himself to marry in ignorance, but should work out the problem with some competent advisor'. (Who might such an advisor be, one might ask. Not a psychiatrist or, God forbid, a psychoanalyst.) He goes on: 'Men who, before marriage have an attitude of disgust or aversion towards sex are less happy in marriage than those whose outlook is more normal, expressed in interest and pleasant anticipation . . . but such an attitude, as well as the much commoner attitude of indifference on the part of women has little relationship to later good adjustment in marriage'.

He shows an unusual lack of information on the subject of contraception and little sympathy with it. All students of contraception, as well as every psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, knows the strain and anxiety caused by the fear of pregnancy. One wonders therefore, why the author, a counselor in family relations, chooses to dismiss so lightly this very important phase of modern married life. On page 248 we get the answer. The author is 'mad' at the birth control movement. They are responsible for the small family of today and he does not like small families. The declining birth rate worries him.

In discussing the premarital examination he advances the quaint notion that a girl who has abnormal fears concerning sex and an abnormal sensitivity to her own reproductive organs will be more readily 'desensitized' if a premarital gynecological examination is performed by a man. He is sure such an examination will help to remove some of the unreasonable prudery and squeamishness of such girls. He makes a plea for large families and proves with statistics that the most successful men in any particular group are

the ones with the largest families; and that many women find that their enjoyment of life and sense of well being is greater during pregnancy than at any other time. Even if these statements were true, a woman can hardly be in a perpetual state of pregnancy. 'The woman who frets, fumes and makes herself miserable during pregnancy is often the neurotic woman.' Agreed! but is there no hope for the neurotic woman?

Throughout, the author makes loose statements mentioning many neurotic attitudes. Often he advises the improvement of these attitudes, but studiously avoids the mention of psychiatry. He mentions it in only three brief instances: An epileptic man or woman should not marry, much less have children, he states; in any case consult a psychiatrist. One who had a real mental breakdown at any time should not consider marriage without the advice of a psychiatrist. Finally, the manic depressive psychosis is recurrent and especially hazardous to women during pregnancy. A psychiatrist's prediction should be sought before marriage.

He goes on to say that the serious mental or emotional maladjustments which do not cause a complete breakdown or a commitment to a psychopathic hospital usually represent a combination of mental and physical factors. They run in families and are often more serious to marriage than insanity because the neurotic is much more likely to marry than is the person who is nearer the borderline of incapacitating mental disease. The statistics of divorce tell something of the price that must be paid each year for the thousands of marriages of persons who had no right to marry until after they had worked out some of their problems. He fails to mention where these people should go for assistance in trying to work out these problems.

This book not only contributes nothing toward the solution of the many vexing problems that beset modern marriage, but rather adds to the confusion.

SARAH R. KELMAN (NEW YORK)

ABSTRACTS

Zur Theorie des hysterischen Anfalls. (On the Theory of the Hysterical Seizure.) J. Breuer and Sigmund Freud. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 107–110.

This is a four page manuscript dated November 1892. Some of its paragraphs are included in Breuer and Freud's first short publication *Über den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänmonene,* 1893.

It is surprising in this very interesting short paper to see to what an extent Freud's later psychoanalytic discoveries are implicit. This paper establishes that the hysterical attack expresses an unconscious memory; that this memory is a repetition of the psychic trauma which was the basis of the hysteria. The conditions which decide whether an experience has a 'traumatic' effect are either a tendency to suppress this experience, or a certain psychic state ('affect, ecstasy, auto-hypnosis'); and that the hysterical seizure is a discharge of impressions whose normal discharge has been prohibited.

OTTO FENICHEL

Beiträge zur Ätiologie und Konstitution der Spermatorrhœ. (Contribution on the Etiology and the Constitution in Spermatorrhœa.) Eduard Hitschmann. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 197–205.

Of the author's cases of spermatorrhœa, one was a manifest homosexual, the remaining were latent homosexuals of various degrees as manifested by homosexual dreams, feminine traits, strong erogeneity of perineum and scrotum, ejaculatio præcox, and are regarded as 'intersexuals'. The histories reveal excessive masturbation, incomplete intercourse, weakness of erection, disgust with the female genitals, etc. Dynamically, Hitschmann found in some of these cases a strong mother fixation with frequent fantasies about the mother's genitals and urethral erotic tendencies. Two had undescended testes which according to Moszkowicz is a partial hermaphroditism.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

Chronische Schweiger in der Analyse. (The Chronically Silent Patient in Analysis.) J. Marjasch. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 111–124.

If a patient remains totally silent there can of course be no analysis. Usually the analyst can alter the disturbing taciturnity of the patient successfully, even before he is able to understand its deeper motivations. There being no generalizations that cover all instances, the author discusses certain clinical types of nonpsychotic patients who at the beginning of the analysis are unable to talk for an unusually long time. His considerations apply also to the more frequent silences, the common transient violations of the basic analytic rule.

Schematically they are divided into friendly-passive and active-aggressive taciturn types. The former may be helped by interpreting their inhibited orality as a new symptom of their neurosis. Characteristic of the second

group are repeated protests against the psychoanalytic method and suggestions for its modifications, such as not lying down. Marjasch advises yielding to such requests in order to create a positive transference. One wonders whether such disturbances could not be prevented by preanalytic interviews.

That both aggressive and masochistic tendencies are gratified by silence explains its persistence. Special emphasis is given to the effect which the struggle about masturbation has on the ability to talk in analysis. The author describes the clinically well-known masturbation without fantasies, and incestuous fantasies without physical masturbation. A compromise may be acted out by silence, making the analyst just such an impotent and passive observer as the patient himself had once been in the primal scene.

The nature of the stubborn silence of men with intense but strongly repressed passive homosexual wishes is similar to that of women who have the unconscious wish and fear to be conquered sexually. In many cases the inability to talk could be recognized as a highly ambivalent expression of this conflict and its oral and anal components. Passive surrender and aggressive refusal keep each other in balance. Finally, the author mentions patients who, because of their neurotic loneliness, demand by mute appeal that the analyst concern himself with them in the same way that they once tried to get the care and love of a neglectful mother.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

On Inspiration. Preliminary Notes on Emotional Conditions in Creative States. Ernst Kris. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 377–389.

Inspiration is an animistic conception of the experience in which a new idea from the unconscious breaks into consciousness. 'The voice of the unconscious is externalized and becomes the voice of God who speaks through the mouth of the chosen.' The subject turns from activity to passivity, and is thus released from responsibility. Close analysis always demonstrates the relativity of the 'suddenness' of the appearance of the new idea. The first case cited suffered from a compulsion to quote authorities, and when occasionally he was independent of such authoritative protection, he felt it as a triumph. The second case was able to work only when either he had had an alcoholic drink or some stimulating drug—or he sought an authority to give him 'advice' which he himself first suggested to the 'authority'. 'In both of these cases a homosexual fantasy forms the background of experience in the intellectual field, the sexualization being obviously responsible for the failures. The climax in the old fantasy is replaced in the first case by the intellectual fight and the deep satisfaction which eventually ensues, in the second case by the states of excitement. In this second case, however, the aggressive meaning of creative activity leads to the quest for an authority whose advice frequently represents the patient's own ideas. Here, *si parva licet componere magnis,* lies the analogy with the state of inspiration in the full metaphorical sense.'

Generally, in phenomena of this kind, pregenital experiences are genitally elaborated. A really creative 'inspiration' has to be desexualized. In principle there is not much psychological difference between ecstatic *unio mystica* and states of inspiration. The difference lies in the outcome: 'In ecstasy the

process results in an emotional climax only; in states of inspiration it leads to active elaboration in creation'.

OTTO FENICHEL

A Critical Analysis of the Concept of a Repetition Compulsion. Lawrence S. Kubie. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 390–402.

Kubie gives a very clear and satisfying criticism of the concept of 'repetition compulsion'. This concept often has been misused in a more or less 'mystical' way. Repetitive phenomena are reducible to the following possibilities: (1) Repetition is a manifestation of the periodicity of the instincts. (2) Repetition (neurotic) is due to the fact that warded off instincts remain unsatisfied and therefore strive for satisfaction again and again and meet the same repeated objections from the ego or the superego. (3) Repetition is a belated attempt to master a trauma. Such striving for belated mastery is not beyond the pleasure principle because its aim is the decrease of a displeasurable tension. An introductory review of the literature fails to mention several papers which present views similar to Kubie's.

OTTO FENICHEL

The Ego and the Conception of Reality. René Laforgue. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 403–407.

There are certain egos which do not perceive reality in the average way but in a much more archaic way. Strangely, Laforgue believes that those egos have 'not got enough libido at their disposal, both as regards quantity and quality'. In the anal phase, the ego perceives the world differently than in the genital phase; it works more with projections, is more theoretical and rigid and the perceptions are formed in a more schematic and static manner. The supposed interrelations between erotogenic zones and rigidity or mobility of thinking are not further investigated. Laforgue proceeds rather to coördinate certain social phenomena directly to the supposed erotogenically determined antagonism of thinking. 'It generates mental conflicts on the individual plane and wars on the social and political plane.' He hopes that a good ego psychology which studies these differences will 'be of assistance to the younger generation in its struggle to adapt itself to the hard realities that the present day must learn to face'. Social realities which are reflected in the antagonisms of qualities of thinking, are not mentioned.

OTTO FENICHEL

Contributions to the Etiology of Schizophrenia. Lily Hajdu-Gimes. Psa. Rev., XXVII, No. 4, 1940.

Fixation in the earliest oral stage, before the development of the world of objects, is not the only cause of schizophrenia. Later traumatic infantile experiences play a great part in the development of the schizophrenic personality. The schizophrenic reaction is characterized by the regressive withdrawal of libido from objects. Common features of the case histories are cold, sadistically aggressive mothers and soft, indifferent passive fathers. All

these patients went through a period of starvation in infancy, in consequence either of insufficient lactation or of the mother's cruelty and lack of devotion. Starvation during infancy, linked with introjection of the mother's breast, is regarded as the earliest trauma. Referring to similar observations by Annie Reich and by I. Hermann, the author concludes with Freud that inner urges like hunger, if not otherwise relieved, will be satisfied by hallucinating. She raises the objection that similar conditions exist in certain forms of hysteria and in melancholia. But in hysterical patients, she argues, the fixation arises in happy and 'real' circumstances where the surroundings favor the development of strong libidinal ties. In melancholia the oral fixation occurs at a stage when real object relations are already present; besides, the identification with the introjected object seems to be looser and less stable in schizophrenia than in melancholia.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

An Analysis of the Goal Concept Based upon Study of Reactions to Frustration. Thomas M. French. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, No. 1, 1941.

It is misleading to speak of goal-directed strivings as simple forces or tendencies. Seeking fulfilment of wishes is a highly organized process, and severe frustration of these organized strivings does not leave them intact but tends to disintegrate them into more elementary strivings which had previously been subordinated to the original goal. Wish-fulfilling fantasies and symbolic symptomatic acts are the products of such disintegrations of goal-directed strivings. The two fundamental techniques for successfully dealing with an obstacle are (1) attacking and overcoming it, or (2) yielding and modifying one's demands to correspond with what is really attainable. There are also two types of unsuccessful reaction. One may continue to struggle with the obstacle, refusing to recognize that the struggle is futile. This may be called fixation upon the obstacle. Neurotic substitution is the other unsuccessful method of adapting one's demands to reality.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Comments on Hypomanic and Related States. Bertram D. Lewin. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, No. 1, 1941.

In a former article on this subject[1] the author stated that the content of transient elations is a double identification with the parents in the sexual act. Now he emphasizes the significance of defense attitudes of the ego. The flight into superficial and verbal expression is the denial of a loss by fantastic assertion of narcissistic integrity. The hypomanic patient tries to establish a pseudo reality in religious, political or mystic activities. The instability of a hypomanic state pushes the patient to a redefining of reality in contrast to the more stable resistances of schizophrenia.

EDITH VOWINCKEL-WEIGERT

[1] This QUARTERLY, 1, 1932, p. 43.

A Dynamic Approach to the Study of Replacement Therapy in Cases of Castration. George E. Daniels and Edward S. Tauber. Amer. J. of Psychiat., XCVII, No. 4, 1941.

Replacement therapy should be given only after a careful psychological study of the patient's personality before and after castration. Indiscriminate administration of sex hormones may do more harm than good.

Four detailed case histories use as a measure of the effect of the therapy, the frequency of intercourse and the content of dreams. For a thirty-three-year-old woman, psychotherapy alone was used and with good results in alleviating the symptoms of insomnia and diminution of sexual drive which appeared after both ovaries had been removed because of carcinoma. A forty-two-year-old man had both testes removed. Observed for two years, he received during this time testosterone propionate and, as controls, estrogenic substances and placebos. This experiment showed an undoubted effect of the testosterone propionate on the patient's sexual activity and changes in the character of his dreams.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

The Psychology of Sudden and Premature Graying of Hair. Hyman S. Barahal. The Psychiatric Quarterly, XIV, 1940, pp. 786–798.

Popular customs, myths, ceremonials and other productions, establish hair as a phallic symbol. Strict taboos connected with cutting hair is an example. The myth of Samson who became powerless when his locks were shorn, is found with a few modifications in fables and mythologies throughout the world. A connection is often found between the plucking out of hair by mental patients and psychosexual problems, particularly the castration complex. The appearance of hair on the body coincident with sexual development is probably responsible for this cathexis. Graying hair being associated with old age and somatosexual decadence, sudden or premature graying of hair may variously express the resolution of a castration complex, unconscious suicidal ideas, identification with a parent, etc.

J. KASANIN

Group Psychotherapy. Louis Wender. The Psychiatric Quarterly, XIV, 1940, pp. 708–718.

Institutions provide an opportunity for the reëducation of patients in groups. The therapy of small groups is based on the following principles: (1) Intellectualization—the discussion of fundamental ideas in reference to neurosis, and emotional reactions; (2) patient to patient transference—accomplished by identification of new patients with those who have already developed a transference to the psychiatrist; (3) group catharsis—in which the discussion of family conflicts provides patients with the opportunity of expressing their own conflicts; (4) group interaction—in which the patients learn that their problems are not unique, and hence their recovery is possible. Discussion of the method includes practical suggestions for organizing group psychotherapy. According to the author it is an effective therapy.

J. KASANIN

Cardiovascular Lesions of Probable Psychosomatic Origin in Arterial Hypertension. Edward Weiss. Psychosomatic Med., II, No. 3, 1940.

Some extremely interesting clinical reports are given with emphasis on the necessity for psychological study of patients with severe organic cardiovascular disease. The psychic factor may be more important than the physical factor in producing disability. These reports are intended to suggest that cardiovascular lesions occurring in arterial hypertension may be preceded by psychic events that are related not only in time but also specifically to the personality of the patient. A man of 29 years of age developed high blood pressure and an acute psychosis following an appendectomy. When he found direct expression for his aggressive impulses in union activities, the blood pressure dropped; when he ceased these activities, the blood pressure rose. Cases of spontaneous subarachnoid hemorrhage, of repeated attacks of pulmonary edema, of progressive heart failure and of coronary occlusion are reported. A man aged 40 had made up his mind to tell his employer 'where to get off' when he was 'laid low with a pain in his chest', a coronary occlusion.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

A Study of Mechanisms in Two Cases of Peptic Ulcer. Carel Van der Heide. Psychosomatic Med., II, No. 4, 1940.

Following an excellent review of the literature, the author reports two analyzed cases of peptic ulcer. The first is a man 30 years old. After a period of spoiling by his mother, the birth of a brother caused the patient to turn to his father. Oral envy necessitated a strong defense in the form of a motherly attitude towards the brother. The passive and dependent wishes were even in their sublimation so obnoxious to the patient that they had to be overcompensated by exaggerated ambition and a drive towards independence. The repressed tendencies found expression in gastric symptoms which occurred particularly when the compensatory efforts were excessive and the gratification of his oral wishes thwarted. The second patient early in life renounced his aggressive impulses, becoming extremely passive and repressing strong oral receptive and aggressive tendencies. He was well-defended against sexual impulses by feminine identification and impotence, but against his oral strivings he had to build a complex system of defenses in the form of overcompensatory generosity and responsibility.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

A Critical Examination of the Concept of Bisexuality. Sandor Rado. Psychosomatic Med., II, No. 4, 1940.

In Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, Freud followed the lead of Krafft-Ebing in applying the concept of bisexuality to the central as well as to the peripheral parts of sexual functioning. This concept, formulated as a general characteristic of every human individual, came to play so important a rôle in psychoanalytic theory that younger men dealt with it not as a postulate or convenient frame of reference for interpretation, but as an established fact. Freud in 1933 reiterated that he had merely 'carried over the notion of bisexuality into mental life'. Verification of this hypothesis rests with biology.

The analyst seeking verification must turn to the biologist. According to contemporary biology, sex can be determined only by the character of the reproductive action system as a whole. Sex is no small bundle of cells and tissues within a larger one, but a component system of the total system: the individual. Sex is a differential development directed towards the construction and perfection of the reproductive system. Using the term bisexuality in the only sense in which it is biologically legitimate, there is no such thing as bisexuality either in man or in any other of the higher vertebrates. Psychologically, genital activity in an individual with male organs is always male, and the same applies to the female. The pleasure organization is neither sexual nor nonsexual, but an entity of a new order, and the psychoanalytic conception of sex is at any rate biologically untenable; though originally a dynamic source of inspiration and unparalleled in popular appeal, it led eventually to hopeless confusion and doomed the psychoanalytic study of sex to scientific frustration. Thus the biological status of the genital pleasure function, heretofore wrapped in ambiguities, is definitely established: inseparable from the reproductive action system, it is also integrated on a higher level into the pleasure organization in the individual.

The chief factors which cause the individual to apply apparent forms of stimulation to a standard genital equipment are the effects of anxiety which inhibits the ego and compels it to a 'reparative adjustment'. This approach 'has in practice unfolded a wealth of clinical details leading to a theory that is free of inconsistency and that serves as a reliable guide to treatment'.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Psychodynamic Aspects of the War Neuroses. A Survey of the Literature. Meyer Maskin. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 97–115.

Skilfully condensed, this survey of the literature starts with an outline of the more classical descriptive psychiatric war experiences of 1914–1918. The emphasis then shifts to the early psychoanalytic literature and the survey is brought up to date, including very recent contributions from current experience. Considerable space is given to a review and discussion of Kardiner's recent book, The Traumatic Neuroses of War.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Beauty, Life and Death. Hanns Sachs. Amer. Imago, I, No. 4, 1940.

An Introduction gives the approach to the subject by posing the following questions: what is the psychological process at the basis of the experience of beauty; from what particular psychic situation does it originate; what specific emotional reaction leads to the experience of beauty? It is then not so much beauty itself as the psychological experience connected with all phenomena to which we attribute beauty—such as rhythm, symmetry, repetition—which Sachs is investigating. He says: 'We can divide [the] beauties of nature into two classes. The first one where beauty appears to be within the scheme and purpose of nature. . . . The second class emerges out of a combination of circumstances which we cannot conceive as the consequence of a development or of a "plan", but which appear at random, "purely acci-

dentally".' To the first class, the author applies the old saying, *'naturæ artis magistra'*, for the second, he suggests *'ars naturæ magistra'*.

A chapter, The Sadness of It, first examines the social phenomenon in the experience of beauty. He repeats the conclusions of his work, *Gemeinsame Tagträume*, demonstrating the economic gain of alleviating feelings of guilt, achieved through the recognition that unconscious forbidden desires exist in other people too. The artist is no longer an outcast, once his work—which expresses his unappeasable desires in a disguised form—is accepted by an audience. The experience of beauty in an attenuated form and 'mixed with other ingredients' establishes, according to Sachs, a similar bond between the persons who enjoy it. However, the purest, most concentrated form of beauty has quite the opposite effect: it gives 'a feeling of expansion, not however towards other people but towards a miraculous isolation'. It is the quantity of beauty which determines whether its effect on the beholder is social or tends to isolation.

Freud demonstrated that beauty represents a sublimation of sexual impulses and perceptions. Inner frustration separates the experience of beauty from direct sexual gratification. Whereas direct sexual satisfaction is experienced with pleasure and joy and the gratification of the id through 'interest and action' has the effect of lively stimulation, the 'badge of true beauty is sadness'.

The third chapter, Digression into Movieland, states that Walt Disney's cartoons with their power of motion and action, their amazing irreality, their defiance of the laws of gravitation, are manifestations of the id. A scanty use of beauty conciliates the ego and the superego.

A fourth chapter, The Double Door, traces the development of beauty from primitive id tendencies which are marked by 'boisterous gaiety and surreptitious, unregulated motion'. With beauty, 'harmony and sweet sadness' reign, and the transformation takes place through the introduction of a 'static principle' in the movements of the id tendencies. This static principle is an expression of the immobility of death. Beauty, maintains the author, signifies a compromise between the movement of the eternally living impulses of the id and the benumbing influence of the death instinct. The æsthetic principles of the work of art—order and retardation of movement—are the compromise products of the life and death instincts in the creation of beauty. Through this admixture of quantities of death instinct, the id tendencies are divested of their id characteristics and can therefore pass the censorship of the superego and be received in the ego, thus enriching the latter.

In Conclusions, Constructions and Conjectures, Sachs considers the magic content, the play character and the social function of the work of art. The pleasure in beauty is, he tells us, forepleasure, sanctioned by the superego.

> 'We see that life *and* death both have to be present for the creation even of the slightest, most superficial bit of beauty. When we turn to the great, the pure beauty, we find them united by the strictest interdependence. Pure beauty holds life and death, not as toys serving for a moment's relaxation, but flaring up to their highest intensity. Life offers all of its strongest emotions, without alloy of trifles or trivialities. They appear with a clarity which defies words, but preserves undiminished all

of their original force. The creative activity of the mind, in reacting to beauty, in producing beauty, represents the highest form of psychic life, in which all its parts—the id, the ego and the superego are coördinated. Death brings with it the striving after permanence, stability, immobility. . . . Beauty is life dancing—but dancing to the tune of death.'

RICHARD STERBA

A Further Study of the Rorschach Test Applied to Delinquents. M. I. Pescor. Public Health Reports, LVI, No. 9, 1941.

'This is the third and final article dealing with the relationship of various factors to the Rorschach test as applied to a group of four hundred seventy-six prisoners admitted to the United States Northeastern Penitentiary.' The first article dealt with the age factor, the second with the marital status. This paper takes up many other factors and studies statistically their interrelationships. Pescor's results lead him to a rather sceptical attitude towards the Rorschach test in general. To quote his summary: '(1) The use of the Rorschach ink-blot test in a study of Federal delinquents at the United States Northeastern Penitentiary is reported. (2) The test was applied under rigidly standardized situations and scoring was made as objective as possible. (3) Under these conditions the test was found to be statistically unreliable except in measuring original, total and form responses. (4) A high degree of positive correlation (0.60 or higher) occurred between the following total scores: *(1)* Total responses versus original, detail, form, animal, and analysis of cards by the general to detail method; *(2)* popular unweighted versus animal; *(3)* original versus detail, form, and general to detail method of analysis; *(4)* whole versus form and analysis of cards by the general method only; *(5)* detail versus form, animal, and analysis of cards by the detail method only; *(6)* form versus animal; *(7)* animal anatomy versus detail to general method of analysis. The only highly significant negative correlation occurs between popular weighted responses and original. (5) Correlations among sundry extrinsic factors and various intrinsic test factors revealed only six coefficients above 0.50, namely, educational grade status versus total detail responses; mental age versus total detail, color, and motion responses and mental age versus analysis of cards by the general to detail and detail to general methods. (6) Applied as a measuring instrument, comparable to psychometric techniques, the Rorschach test is unsatisfactory in the routine examination of delinquents. (7) The Rorschach test is therefore not a test, but as Dr. Wells puts it, "an art, in which ink-blots are instruments in the same sense as the sculptor's chisel or the artist's pen".'

OTTO FENICHEL

Die Rolle des Ethischen und Religioesen in der Psychoanalytischen Theorie und Therapie. (The Rôle of Ethical and Religious Factors in Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy.) Max Levy-Suhl. Psychiatrische en Neurologische Bladen, 1940, pp. 1–20.

Freud tried to subject the 'higher principles' in man, especially the ethical and religious ones, to natural scientific explanation. Levy-Suhl is of the

opinion that Freud did so mainly by the hypothesis of the death instinct. This hypothesis, Levy-Suhl says, is debatable but it has shown the way to approach those 'higher principles' by scientific methods. Levy-Suhl then tries to demonstrate that ethical and religious factors are involved in psychoanalytic therapy. He is of the opinion that only by the help of such factors is psychoanalysis able to overcome the resistances rooted in the superego and in narcissism.

OTTO FENICHEL

Therapeutic Procedures as Part of the Educative Process. Dorothy W. Baruch. J. of Consulting Psychol., IV, 1940, pp. 165–172.

In a statement prepared for the section on Play Therapy of the 1938 meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Homburger-Erikson stated:[1] 'Our common interest in the play of children has one of its roots in a strong ideological movement which confidently expects the child's own nature to show the way to a more realistic education. Psychiatry tries to utilize what education tries to preserve, namely, the *autodidactic and autotherapeutic faculties* inherent in play. . . . to "play it out" is the most natural autotherapeutic measure childhood affords. No matter what experience has threatened the child's psychic integrity, he attempts to restore it by mastering in play a sphere of reality in which his acts are "physiologically safe, socially permissable, physically workable, and psychologically satisfying" . . . His play, however, and thus his psychic integrity, are easily disturbed whenever external rivalry, authoritative pressure, or internal conflict (such as ambivalent feelings towards the protecting mother) *accelerate his gradual weaning* from maternal protection. It is for this reason, I think, that an opportunity to play is particularly beneficial to a disturbed child if he is alone with a sympathetic adult, sure of having the toys and the adult to himself during a given period. . . . Thus many children are able to use the protective sanction of an understanding adult to heal themselves by means of play (an especially effective procedure if the mother also has an opportunity to talk to someone and to relieve her ambivalence to the child).'

Although the author of the present paper does not specifically indicate that she is familiar with Homburger's statement, nevertheless she presents an excellent demonstration of the successful application of its principle at the Broadoaks School of Education at Whittier College. The children at the Broadoaks Preschool 'show the effect of certain frustrating cultural impositions . . . deprivation of cuddling experiences; too early toilet training and overemphasis on cleanliness; subjection to anger-producing situations without opportunities for release'. The school provides them with experiences that 'dilute the effects of too continuous and too great deprivations and thwartings' of this type. This is done by 'supplying satisfactions that offset frustrations that are too painful for the personality to bear and yet remain healthy' and by giving 'release to emotions which if not released would hold the germ of potential maladjustment'.

The school is organized to provide general emotional prophylaxis for its

[1] Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry, VIII, 1938, pp. 499–524.

young pupils through 'provision of general release and of normal emotional contacts' within the interpersonal system of the teaching group. There is emphasis upon the empathic relationships of teachers and children. The teachers hold themselves out as sources of and objects for affection; they avoid the attitudes of 'niceness' which so often characterize the parents; the children have an opportunity in their relationships and through their play to express their natural aggressions and hostilities and to indulge their natural interests. This allowance is not boundless however. Limitations are placed on explicit injuries to the persons and private property of classmates and teachers which might lead to the complication of excessive guilt and retaliation fears.

'Therapy through more than usual provision of affection within the group situation' is made available to some children and 'time alone for contact' (fifteen or twenty minutes daily with a teacher who has been particularly assigned to a given child as a 'mother substitute') is arranged for the more withdrawn children and those with speech problems. Such special sessions, which the child is in the beginning told are his very own, ultimately, in some instances, lead to the revelation of anxieties and conflicts to which the teacher gives a sympathetic hearing. 'Contact periods thus turn into periods which (the child) uses to gain emotional release.'

'More than ordinary provision for release within the group' is made for the children who are overaggressive, destructive, and negativistic. Thus an attack on the teacher or other hostile outbreak finds her prepared to utilize aggressive play or to provide neutral objects towards which hostility can be adequately displaced. Or a child whose coprophilic tendencies are pronounced is given opportunities to clean the rabbit cage, mix mash for the chickens, clear slime out of the aquarium, water plants, and to perform 'all the dirtiest jobs' that have constructive value. This is in contrast to the many American schools in which the 'teachers simply stop the children and shut off outlets to them'.

In summary it can be stated that the paper reveals a sensible understanding of the rôle of the emotional tendencies and needs in the development of the person and demonstrates what appears to be an effective pedagogical technique for supplementing the childrearing defects of the middle-class American home. The author has observed a series of one hundred eleven children over a period of two years. Some of her results have been 'vivid and striking'. Oftener 'there is less extreme evidence of change'. But worthwhile developments have nearly always been present. The procedures suggested in the paper apparently achieve the best results where the neurotic stresses of the parents are not too grave and they too can be influenced to follow a sensible regime which frees the child from the blind enforcement of 'cultural patterns' at home. The reviewer's experience would tend to substantiate this.

MAXWELL GITELSON

Professional Beauties of Normanby Island. Géza Róheim. Amer. Anthropologist, XLII, No. 4, 1940.

At Normanby Island it has been a custom for some men and women to become 'professional beauties.' At the time of Róheim's visit to the island no more

professional men beauties were to be found, but the institution of professional women beauties was still in existence. Tradition and common opinion demands that the 'beauty' be small. She must especially have small breasts, and her teeth, face, vulva and pubic hair must also be 'small'. Her behavior has to be rather serious and not provocative; but she may never deny intercourse with any man who asks for it. A 'professional beauty' related to Róheim a dream which he believes throws some light on the psychology of the institution of her profession: she is a woman who desires all men but hides this desire behind a mask of passivity.

This high evaluation of 'small breasts' is most unusual among primitives; but infantile trends are generally characteristic for the cultural patterns of this area. It is Róheim's conclusion that the 'professional beauty' tries to deny her feminine rivalry with her mother by her passivity and the emphasis on her infantile appearance.

Two remarks of Róheim seem to lead in another direction. He states that the beauties marry only rich men. The beauty interviewed, remarked that she has been told by her mother that she was to become a professional beauty. It appears that this girl did not choose her profession entirely on her own initiative. With an appearance favorable for the 'job' economic interests would seem to have some connection with the institution.

GEORGE GEROE

NOTES

On May 26, 1942, the NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE elected the following officers: President: Leonard Blumgart, M.D.; Vice-President: Philip R. Lehrman, M.D.; Secretary: Henry A. Bunker, M.D.; Treasurer: Samuel Atkin, M.D.

The library of the NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE is very much in need of standard works on psychoanalysis and allied subjects. The Library Committee has sent out a request to members asking them for duplicate volumes from their own collections. The Committee is especially eager to complete the library's sets of psychoanalytic journals. Any numbers which can be donated will be most gratefully accepted.

THE BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY announces the following officers elected and other information about its membership for the year 1942–1943.

OFFICERS

Dr. John M. Murray, president
Dr. Eleanor Pavenstedt, vice-president
Dr. Joseph J. Michaels, secretary-treasurer

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Dr. Isador H. Coriat
Dr. Helene Deutsch
Dr. Leolia Dalrymple
Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman
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Dr. Frederick Rosenheim
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ASSOCIATE LECTURERS

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Dr. Leolia Dalrymple
Dr. Erich Lindemann
Dr. Joseph J. Michaels
Dr. Frederick Rosenheim

The establishment of a TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE was granted by the American Psychoanalytic Association at its annual meeting in Boston, May 1942.

June 1942 program of the TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY: Seminar on Freud's Writings conducted by Dr. Ernst Lewy. Seminar on Psychoanalytic Technique, Dr. Karl Menninger. Clinical Conference, conducted by Dr. Ernst Lewy. Case presented by Dr. Lewis L. Robbins. Scientific Meeting: The Psychoanalytic Study of an Anal Character, by Dr. Carl Tillman. Ernst Lewy, M.D., Program Chairman.

The Fifteenth Graduate Fortnight of THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, October 12 to 23, 1942, will have as its subject: Disorders of the Nervous System. Morning panel discussions will be held Tuesday and Friday of each week, at which questions relating to the papers of the evening sessions will be discussed by a panel of invited authorities. Seventeen hospitals of the city will present clinical programs in which distinguished clinicians from other staffs may participate. The subjects and speakers at the evening lectures will include: Military Psychiatry, Edward A. Strecker; The Emotions and Disease, Harold G. Wolff; Differential Diagnosis and Prognosis of Brain Tumors, Gilbert Horrax; Treatment of Speech Disorders, Stanley Cobb; Multiple Sclerosis and 'Encephalomyelitis', Tracy J. Putnam; Present Status of Shock Therapy, Nolan D. C. Lewis; Prefrontal Lobotomy, Walter Freeman; Types of Psychotherapy and Indications for Them, Lawrence S. Kubie; Migraine and Other Forms of Headache, Henry A. Riley; Epilepsy and Its Treatment, William G. Lennox. A registration fee of $5.00 will be charged those who are not Fellows of the Academy. A complete program will be mailed to physicians upon request.

At the annual meeting of the ILLINOIS PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY May 9, 1942, the following officers were elected for the year 1942–1943: President, Dr. Francis J. Gerty; Vice-President, Dr. Franz Alexander; Secretary-Treasurer, Dr. Eugene I. Falstein; Councilors, Dr. David B. Rotman and Dr. Hugh T. Carmichael.

Minimum requirements for positions in PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL WORK in a psychiatric or mental hospital have been advanced by a Joint Committee composed of members representing the American Psychiatric Association and the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers. The Committee is aware of the fact that in some psychiatric social work departments the responsibilities of the person in charge are chiefly administrative, teaching and research. In such settings, requirements both in experience and training should be of high calibre. The title allocation of Chief or Director and the salary should be commensurate

with the duties of that position. For heads of departments or psychiatric social service where the duties and responsibilities are not so varied or so extensive as those mentioned above, and where the social service staff including students is not large, an alternative of Senior Psychiatric Social Worker has been suggested. Experience qualifications have been outlined for the person in charge of a Department of Psychiatric Social Work and salary standards for the various positions listed vary within a range of about $200 yearly, depending upon location and relative living costs.